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ABSTRACT
How presidents talk us into war merges the study of problem definition in public
policy with the study of rhetoric in communications. Using both qualitative and
quantitative methods, this research analyzes the key words used by two presidents,
Lyndon B. Johnson and George W. Bush, to persuade us into escalating a war in Vietnam
and engaging in a pre-emptive war in Iraq, respectively. The findings indicate that
presidents repeat words that are patriotic, emotive, metaphorical, symbolic and religious,
tapping into American themes of Manifest Destiny and even predicting dire outcomes if
we do not accept their definitions of the dangers and rewards involved in going to war.
The study also finds that presidents develop a sustaining narrative that highlights what
problem definition literature calls a “causal story,” which identifies the harm done,
describes its cause, assigns moral blame and claims government is responsible for the
remedy (Stone 1989). This research indicates that Johnson used far less antithetical,
religious and repetitive language than did Bush, in some cases strikingly so.
This work relies upon the literature on problem definition, presidential rhetoric
and presidential leadership as a backdrop for studying the major speeches of these two
presidents prior to their escalation or initiation of war. It employs content analysis using
the computerized program, NVivo 7. The study concludes that while we may not be able
to measure the degree to which various audiences are persuaded by presidential rhetoric,
we can see that presidents, who wield the powerful bully pulpit, carefully choose their
words and repeat them often to afford themselves maximum persuadability with their
audiences as they try to talk us into war. Such language also appears designed to quell
dissent and to enlarge the authority of the president.
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION

“Policies and words are inextricably linked –
the former cannot be conjured in the absence of the latter.”
Robert Schlesinger, White House Ghosts: Presidents and Their Speechwriters

On April 7, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson gave his famous “Peace Without
Conquest” speech at Johns Hopkins University, his first consummate speech laying out
his rationale for why the United States was at war with Vietnam and why he thought this
war that he had inherited was worth continuing. On March 5, 1965, Johnson had given
orders to commence Operation Rolling Thunder, a sustained bombing raid on Vietnam,
which escalated the war (Battlefield Timeline, PBS). 1
On September 11, 2001, terrorist-controlled planes demolished the World Trade
Center in New York, damaged the Pentagon and crashed in a field southeast of
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. On March 19, 2003 (American time), President George W.
Bush began a concerted attack on Iraq called Operation Iraqi Freedom (September 11:
Chronology of Terror, CNN; The Invasion of Iraq, Frontline).
Both presidents waged different wars. Johnson’s war was a continuation of a
gradual involvement and was called a “conflict,” as the U.S. never made a formal
1

Through its Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on August 7, 1964, Congress had already given Johnson broad
war powers to deal with North Vietnamese attacks on U.S. forces, following a purported attack by North
Vietnamese torpedo boats on two U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of Vietnam, on
August 2, 1964. That resolution gave Johnson broad war powers to deal with North Vietnamese attacks on
U.S. forces.
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declaration of war against Vietnam (Reitano 2004, 29). 2 Bush’s war was a pre-emptive
effort that was actually declared a “war.”
Both presidents used pre-war/escalation rhetoric to garner support for their
wars/conflicts. They used patriotic language, religious language, metaphors, symbols,
manifest destiny language and antithetical language that drew stark delineations between
good and evil.

Importance of Presidential Rhetoric
Presidents must rally popular and political support for their wars and conflicts
because these events often require great expenditures of the nation’s resources, as well as
the service and lives of its citizens and often that of other countries. War creates added
economic costs, shifts in policy concentrations, heightened public scrutiny and global
concern.
One way presidents rally support for their wars is through their speeches, which
they use to define problems and offer solutions. When they define problems, they put
them on the systemic and institutional agendas. Cobb and Elder define the systemic
agenda as “all issues that are commonly perceived by members of the political
community as meriting public attention and as involving matters within the jurisdiction of
existing governmental authority” (1983, 85). They define the institutional agenda as “that
set of items explicitly up for active and serious consideration of authoritative decisionmakers” (1983, 86).

2

Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Johnson’s Under Secretary of State, called the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
“the functional equivalent of a declaration of war,” according to Reitano (2004).

2

As Hart, a scholar of the American presidency, explains, “public speech no longer
attends the processes of governance – it is governance” (Hart 1987, 14). Hart (1987)
calls presidential speech “speech for the record, speech that cannot fade, speech whose
echo will never cease” (6). 3 And he notes that “if rhetoric really is governance, then a
great deal of rhetoric must translate into a great deal of governance” (18).
This dissertation compares the pre-war-escalation and the pre-war rhetoric of
Johnson and Bush, respectively, to examine how these presidents defined the problem
that allowed them to rally support for committing the nation to war or escalating an
ongoing war.

The Power of Presidential Rhetoric
Rhetoric has as its basic function “the use of words by human agents to form
attitudes or to induce actions in other human agents … The most characteristic concern of
rhetoric [is] the manipulation of men’s beliefs for political ends” (Burke 1950, 41).
Rhetoric is both a human activity and the “science” of understanding that activity
(Knoblauch 1985).
Rhetoric is also a policy tool, an instrument “through which governments seek to
influence behavior and influence policy purposes” (Schneider and Ingram 1990, 511). If
“public policy almost always attempts to get people to do things they otherwise would
not have done, or it enables them to do things they might not have done otherwise
(Schneider and Ingram 1990, 510), then Schneider and Ingram posit that “individuals are
more likely to take actions in support of policy goals if the goals or actions are (1)
3

One might also speculate that the enduring impact of rhetoric is dependent on the perceived legitimacy
and efficacy of the speechmaker, although this work does not delve into that area.
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promoted by government officials as important, high priority issues, (2) consistent with
their values, beliefs, and preferences, [and] (3) associated with positive symbols, labels,
images, and events” (1990, 519-20). Schneider and Ingram say symbolic and hortatory
tools are one way government accomplishes this.
Given this context, the uncertainty and impact of war, and the great trust citizens
and elites give to presidential knowledge of foreign matters, presidential war rhetoric is
likely to play an important role in whether or not citizens accept presidential arguments
for war. After all, as some scholars point out, political rhetoric in a representative
democracy is the best source of information for evaluation of policy (Lippman 1922;
Mutz 1993; Page 1996). So important is rhetoric that Robertson (1976) says it is one of
two points at which representative government can fail, the other being the decisions
made by the public.

Research Questions
This dissertation seeks to answer the following research questions:
1)

How did these presidents use rhetoric to try to talk us into war?

2)

How were their addresses similar and different in terms of the words
and emphases they used?

3)

How did they frame their causal stories in terms of who (or what) was
to blame for the circumstances or events precipitating the war/conflict?

In addition to these research questions, I speculate as to why presidents might use
these definitions, as well as these portrayals or representations of the problem, and why
their approaches might have been different.

4

Importance of the Research
Presidents have tremendous rhetorical power to characterize problems and justify
action, based upon their definitions and interpretations. They are, in a sense, problemdefiners-in-chief who can influence policy through their bully pulpits. Moreover, Hart
(1984) points out that “citizens … are increasingly using rhetorical criteria when
evaluating the merits of their chief executives” (4), including how they frame their
arguments.
Words are important drivers of action, especially when employed by elites such as
presidents. Moreover, how presidents use similar or different themes and rhetorical
devices in their speeches to justify war reveals what they think is persuasive to both
domestic and international audiences in the context of their times. It is also revelatory of
their leadership styles, personality and worldview (Barber 1972). Therefore, the study of
pre-war presidential rhetoric reveals a great deal about how leaders read their audiences
and determine the best way to explain, legitimize and maintain support for perhaps the
most important action a government can take – waging war.
As Jerit (2002) puts it, “to the extent that we are interested in how citizens …
make decisions on important political issues, we must be concerned with the nature and
dynamics of political rhetoric surrounding those issues” (2).
This research is important for a number of reasons. First, it begins to address a
gap in the problem definition literature and in the study of public policy itself by
embracing a relatively new discipline in this area: communication of public policy. While
public policy studies have included such disciplines as agriculture, criminal justice,
economics, education and sociology, they have yet to fully incorporate communication

5

studies. Nor have communications studies incorporated problem definition in the sense
that it is defined in public policy. Thus, this study expands our understanding of problem
definition (and, for that matter, agenda setting) in the policy-making process and
broadens it to include other disciplines that can further inform it, while also further
informing those other disciplines.
Second, war is not an easy sell. It is the most awesome undertaking a president
can ask of his citizenry because it involves potential loss of life, endangerment of the
country, relations with other countries and large budgetary expenditures. Therefore, the
reasons for it must be carefully communicated, explained and justified for it to be
accepted, not only by average citizens, but by elites, the media and allies. Presidents are
the key players in making the case for war because they are the commanders-in-chief
(and, I would argue, definers-in-chief). In addition, typically we place high trust in them
in matters of foreign policy and crisis management. One of the key ways presidents
exercise influence is through their public addresses, which also provide insight into their
policy leadership.
Third, this research is important because how presidents rhetorically define the
cause of problems and offer solutions often directs the formation, implementation and
evaluation of that policy. Thus, this research advances knowledge of the crucial role of
rhetoric in legitimizing public policy, or creating the perception of legitimacy, especially
as it relates to presidents and war.
Fourth, this research breaks new ground in showing how presidents may include
religious rhetoric to define the need for war. Not only is this area of research new to

6

public policy, but even academic historians of American foreign relations largely have
overlooked religion. 4
In particular, understanding why Johnson talked so little about the war and talked
around it is perhaps illustrative of reluctance to wage war. Similarly, understanding how
Bush used speech to justify a pre-emptive war is illustrative of how presidents overcome
objections to policy and enhance their authority.
Despite the fact that presidential speeches primarily are written by staff, this work
treats speeches as if the two presidents were the authors themselves because presidents
must approve and take responsibility for what they say publicly (and sometimes nonpublicly). 5 Moreover, citizens treat such speech as if presidents were the authors.
Therefore, this study focuses on words, including arguments and themes, rather than
historical or political analyses, to understand the promotion of war.
This topic is timely, given the sagging popularity and human and economic costs
of the ongoing war in Iraq, the associated terrorist attacks and the connections some have
made between the Vietnam War and the Iraq War. It relates to a wide population in that
war calls upon all citizens to sacrifice in various ways, whether through military service,
financial support or emotional/physical support of those returning from war. This study
also highlights an influential population in that, without citizen support, a government
cannot successfully pursue a policy on a long-term basis.

4

Preston (2006) has done a comprehensive paper on the understudied importance of religion in this area.

5

As Hinckley points out, “we are not studying speechwriters rather than presidents “if there are important
similarities across presidents … If the same picture is presented across presidents, the institution is carrying
on specific components … It does not matter which … speechwriters suggested the phrase” (1990, 17).

7

Research Plan
In order to answer the research questions posed here, the applicable literature is
reviewed in Chapter 2. This work draws from numerous areas of literature, among them
communications (including political and presidential rhetoric), public policy (including
problem definition, leadership and policy typologies), the presidency, and the presidency
and religion.
Although scholars have done extensive research in these areas of literature
separately, few have examined their intersection, especially in the context of presidential
pre-war-escalation and pre-war rhetoric. This study recognizes that policies provide
communication vehicles and that communication is useful for promoting policies,
especially when done by presidents. Thus, it is hoped that this study broaches a new
frontier by drawing from different disciplinary areas, thus pushing the boundaries of
public policy study to be more inter-disciplinary.
Chapter 3 discusses the methods for analyzing the data, which consist of selected
pre-war-escalation speeches by Johnson and pre-war speeches by Bush. These speeches
are content analyzed using a software program called NVivo, Version 7, which allows the
researcher to categorize the various words and emphases used by the two presidents and
summarize their compared usage. Chapter 4 presents a summary of the findings on
secular language, and Chapter 5 summarizes the findings on inherently religious
language. Both chapters point to the use of antithetical speech, causal stories and
metaphorical/symbolic speech by presidents, and compare how the two presidents
differed in their use of these. Chapter 6 features a summary and discussion of the
findings, speculates as to their implications, discusses the limitations of the research and

8

suggests other potential areas of research. Throughout this work, there is an emphasis on
the varying degrees to which these presidents rhetorically drew stark contrasts, or even
painted black and white pictures, of the enemy, America, the coalition of nations
involved and the victims. There is also an examination of the degree to which these
presidents drew upon religious context to define the problem and to advocate the
continuation of war, or the initiation of war, as the only possible solution to the problem.
This study also shows the varying degrees to which these presidents co-opted the
citizenry by defining the job citizens supposedly needed to do to fulfill presidential
ambitions for war. Similarly, it looks at the ways in which they co-opted allies to gain
their support. This study opens up many new areas of research, including how presidents
rhetorically define problems by predicting what will happen if their suggested course of
action is not taken.

9

CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to review seemingly disparate literatures that
pertain to presidential war rhetoric in the areas of problem definition, policy typologies,
political rhetoric and policy leadership, and to focus on the features in each area of
literature that help answer my research questions.
The study of problem definition through presidential rhetoric has the potential to
weave all these different literatures together in a way that is often not done in policy
literature. It is important to merge the study of these areas because rhetoric is one of the
primary ways (if not the primary way) that leaders define problems, advocate and create
policy “solutions” and define their leadership (and in turn are defined by it). Certainly,
rhetoric is more or less important in different policy areas, and certainly no amount of
rhetoric can create success out of a bad policy choice. But not only is it clear presidents
cannot lead without speaking, when it comes to their promotion of war as a policy
solution, they must use effective rhetoric to help gain citizen, elite and world support.
Rhetoric cannot guarantee them a successful war policy, but it might help obscure (if
even temporarily) the failure of that policy.
This chapter is organized around the following major headings: Presidential
Rhetoric (including Problem Definition in Presidential Rhetoric), Policy Typologies, The
Nature of Political Rhetoric, Presidential Rhetoric as a Policy Tool, The Rhetorical
Presidency (including Foreign Crisis Rhetoric, Antithetical Appeals, Use of Symbols,
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Use of Frames and Religious Rhetoric; Moral Leadership), Presidential Policy
Leadership Through Rhetoric and Conclusion.

Presidential Rhetoric
Political scientists have been slow to study how political rhetoric links political
elites and the electorate 6 (Jerit 2002, 1). And yet, as Beck notes, “political persuasion is
a critical topic in political science” that we are only beginning to study in the laboratory
(Beck 1999, 8). In addition, only recently have scholars begun to merge some of the
literature on rhetoric, problem definition and leadership, especially as regards presidential
speech.
The president is the most prominent person in American politics and as such is
constantly commented upon and evaluated by all parts of society. He and his policies
receive more press coverage than all other political figures combined (Edwards 2003,
15).
It was Theodore Roosevelt who declared the White House a “bully pulpit.”
Presidents employ this pulpit to persuade us to accept their definitions of a problem,
including the need to go to war. It is from there that they can command attention from
the public, Congress, the media and the world at large through their rhetoric (Edwards
2003, 8). And many of them have been prolific speakers. Presidents use their bully
pulpit because they are dependent upon public support to achieve their goals, whether

6

Notable exceptions have been Jacobs and Shapiro 2000, and Johnston, Blais, Brady and Crete 1992.
Jacobs and Shapiro show how politicians track public opinion to determine how to craft their public
statements and actions to win support for their policies. According to Beck, Blais et al. “were able to
convincingly demonstrate via survey experiment that the Liberals in Canada had a rhetorical advantage
early in the campaign, but that the Conservatives effectively countered this over the course of the
campaign” (1999, 8).
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from citizens in general or from Congress, (where they face many obstacles and have few
assets to persuade) (Edwards, 2003, 14). Thus presidents are engaged in a “permanent
campaign” to win support (Edwards 2003, 21). Edwards (2003) says “the president’s goal
is to influence which attitudes and information people incorporate into their judgments of
his policies and performance” (159). The bully pulpit is a central element of a governing
strategy that Kernell (1997) calls “going public” (Edwards 2003, 8), or bypassing
Congress by going directly to the people. 7
Eshbaugh-Soha (2006) argues that presidents are not even trying to rally public
support for their policy goals through their speeches, but rather are “signaling” to
Congress their policy preferences in an attempt to influence congressional votes. His
view is counter to the prevailing model presented by Kernell (1997) that presidents
increasingly try to “go public” because they believe this is a better way to influence the
public through their speeches.
Thus, it is no surprise that there is a “substantial and rapidly increasingly body of
literature focusing on presidential rhetoric” and that “underlying most of this research is
the premise that the president can employ rhetoric to move the public” (Edwards 2003,
6).
Any study of presidential rhetoric implies that presidents have power to persuade
us and therefore to influence public opinion. However, this is not a study of the direct
effect of presidential rhetoric on popular opinion because, while it seems unlikely that

7

Other elements of a governing strategy, according to Edwards, are party leadership, mobilization of
interest groups and exercise of legislative skills (2003,8). Edwards (2003) says presidents persist in going
public even though they typically do not succeed in changing public opinion because they usually become
presidents by doing so, because not all their efforts are designed to change opinions (there is value in
preaching to the converted) and because their real influence may be on elites, the media and Congress (241246).
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presidents would speak so much if they didn’t believe it had an effect, charting that exact
effect is tricky. Not only are the media often a filter for presidential words (and therefore
one must find a way to measure media use and impact of presidential words), but
attributing movements of public opinion to presidential rhetoric is difficult. For one thing,
there are numerous other factors that affect public opinion so isolating only presidential
words is a difficult task. So for this study, it only matters that presidents think rhetoric is
important. We must presume that this is so because they speak a lot. Perhaps they also
think it is expected of them, so they are afraid not to do it. Thus, this study assumes
presidential rhetoric has an effect because it is the main tool employed by presidents in
their attempts to move the public.
Even so, Edwards (2003) says that presidents are rarely able to move the public to
support their policies (79) and that only a few studies have concluded that presidents can
influence public opinion on a small number of issues. However, Edwards (2003) notes
that Robert Tucker argues for a “situational charisma,” in which a leader of “nonmessianic tendency” evokes a charismatic response simply because of being in position
in a time of acute distress,” citing Roosevelt and Churchill during war times (83).8 And
he notes that “an individual president may be ineffective and fail to move opinion, but the
potential is there” (2003, 6).
Yet Edwards says that “chief executives are not directors who lead the public
where it otherwise refuses to go, thus reshaping the contours of the political landscape.
Instead, presidents are facilitators who reflect, and may intensify, widely held views. In
the process, they may endow the views of their supporters with structure and purpose and
8

When it comes to influencing public opinion, Edelman makes the point that it behooves us to examine
how political actions get some groups the tangible things they want from government and what these
actions mean to the mass public, including how it is placated by them (1977, 12).
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exploit opportunities in their environments to accomplish their joint goals” (Edwards
2003, 74). However, the president’s rhetoric [also] could have a disproportionate effect
on some constituencies (Edwards 2003, 75).
Jeffrey Cohen, who has done the most work on aggregate opinion, concludes
presidents can affect public opinion only modestly, and that they can affect the public
agenda over time only on foreign policy (Edwards 2003). Presidential rhetoric on foreign
matters is a special case. Edwards says “there is some evidence that people tend to defer
more to the president on foreign issues than on domestic problems” because such matters
are distant, appear complex and seem to require specialized knowledge. He says people
defer to the president more on foreign issues than domestic ones (Edwards 2003, 27).
Ironically, foreign policy rhetoric provides the most conspicuous cases of the
executive branch misleading the public or manipulating its policy preferences because of
its control over the flow of information (Jerit 2002, 8). Jerit (2002) cites the Gulf of
Tonkin incident as an example, saying “the government largely controlled what
information reached the public and distorted it in ways that served its policy agenda” (9).
Page and Shapiro agree that political leaders and other elites
“sometimes fail to provide the kind of unbiased, useful political
information and interpretations that citizens need and … sometimes
promote misleading, distorted, or outright false understandings of politics”
(1999, 113). Downs further points out that elites may provide the public
with “correct, but biased, information (1957, 94).
Ben-Porath (2007, 181) supports this view, finding that
in building the case for imminent war, presidents turn to narrative
descriptions of specific atrocities, namely rape, torture and victimization
of children, [while by] the same token, presidents wishing to avoid
American involvement in war use abstract terms and statistical
information concerning human rights crises, but refrain from detailing
personalized stories of abuse.

14

Jerit says, “The predominant view is that rhetoric increases or decreases the
importance of particular considerations” (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Johnston et al. 1992;
Zaller 1992). She says that presidential rhetoric can prime the argument by raising “the
priority that individuals assign to certain considerations, thereby influencing which
information individuals retrieve from memory and incorporate into their judgments”
(2002, 13).
Some scholars refer to rhetoric used to argue a particular worldview as a
“narrative.” While a coherent “state-of-war narrative” has been critical in conducting
past wars, Callahan, Dubnick and Olshfski say there has been little scholarship on the
role of narratives during wartime, with the exception of broad historical anecdotal or
atheoretical studies (2006, 554). However, a number of scholars have looked at how
different national cultures have examined the memory of past wars (Igarashi 2000,
Lundberg 1984, Moeller 1996). 9
An increasing amount of literature today concentrates on American narratives that
try to define enemies and threats. These include focus on the mass media’s role in
preparing the nation for war (Doherty 1999), social scientists and others who create
stereotypical images of enemy societies and their threats (Robin 2001), and images that
pervade American culture and Cold War narratives (Whitfield 1996).

9

A time-honored narrative found cross-culturally throughout history is the self-defense narrative, which
might suit Bush’s Iraq War. In this narrative, the Hero rescues not only the Victim but Himself. The
Protagonist and Hero are primarily the United States (whose point of view is being taken and who is
inherently good). The Villain (first al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden, then Saddam Hussein and Iraq) is
inherently bad. The Villain commits villainy (9/11, presumed accumulation of nuclear material in which to
attack the United States) against the Victim (principally the United States, but also the coalition and the
Iraqi people). The Hero role is to rescue the Victim. The Hero undergoes Difficulties (9/11, the seeking out
of Bin Laden and later the pre-emptive war). The Hero battles against the Villain. Victory (presumed
killing of Bin Laden and conquering of Iraq) is expected. The Villain is presumed to face Punishment
(defeat, death). The Hero is presumed to receive a Reward (vindication, victory, glory) (Lakoff 2008, 25).
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The social sciences have taken a particular interest in narratives in recent years
(see Bal 1997; Chatman 1978, 1990; and Cobley 2001a, 2001b). Other social scientists
have used discourse analysis to examine narratives in daily conversation, workplace
interactions, doctor-patient interactions and celebrity interviews (Abell and Stokoe 1999;
Beech 2000; Boje 1991; Gee 1999; Loewe et al. 1998; Ochs and Capps 2001; Schiffrin,
Tannen, and Hamilton 2001; Waitzkin, Britt and Williams 1994; Wajcman and Martin
2002).
Lakoff (2008) has recently delved into the area of the political mind, noting
“narratives and frames are not just brain structures with intellectual content, but rather
with integrated intellectual-emotional content. Neural binding circuitry provides this
integration” (Lakoff 2008, 28). Cognitive science and neuroscience tell us that narratives
are fixed in the neural circuits of our brains. We know that they can be activated and
function unconsciously, automatically, as a matter of reflex” (34).
Lakoff (2008) says the “lived story” (narrative) is at the center of modern
personality theory, or neural computation. He says:
A president may see himself as a Hero rescuing a Victim-nation from a
Villain-dictator. Or as leading a Battle of Good Against Evil. The roles in
narratives that you understand yourself as fitting give meaning to your life,
including the emotional color that is inherent in narrative structures (33).
Lakoff (2008) notes that the “deep Rescue narrative” remains the same in the first Persian
Gulf War under Bush I and the second under Bush II. This is possible, he says, because
the
the synapses of the neural circuits characterizing [the deep narratives]
have been so strengthened that the highly general, deep narratives are
permanently parts of our brains. Neural binding allows these permanent
general narrative structures to apply to every new special case. That’s why
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the same narrative structures keep recurring, from war to war … from one
political figure to the other (38).
In fact, Lakoff (2008) says that “a misleading and destructive idea can be
introduced under conditions of trauma and then repeated so often that it is forever in your
synapses. It won’t just go away.” He says the only way to “inhibit it” is to “provide
alternatives” (125).
Zaller argues that:
the president’s greatest chance of influencing public opinion is in a crisis,
which attracts the public’s attention and in which elites articulate a unified
message. At other times, most people are too inattentive or too committed
to views to be strongly influenced by elite efforts at persuasion (Edwards
2003, 166).
Certainly, attack and war qualify as crises.
Johnson’s and Bush’s narratives have both similarities and differences. Johnson
inherited an ongoing conflict with plenty of context. It stemmed out of an international
cold war against Communism that dated back to the mid-1940s, involving many
countries. It escalated under President Kennedy who in the early 1960s sought to increase
U.S. military involvement in South Vietnam through additional machinery and advisers.
Johnson used a supposed second attack by North Vietnam on an American ship on
August 4, 1964, to secure a congressional Gulf of Tonkin Resolution to give him broad
war powers. He used the resolution to launch limited reprisal air attacks, thus escalating
U.S. involvement in what would become the Vietnam War (Brigham and Hoffman,
retrieved 2007). However, he never formally justified the war publicly until his Johns
Hopkins address titled “Peace Without Conquest,” on April 7, 1965, long after his first
major “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress” on November 27, 1963.
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Bush used the actual terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 as a pretext for war
in Iraq, even though there is dispute as to the link to Iraq. The 9/11 attacks were unique in
American history, despite analogies to Pearl Harbor in 1941 and other American wars
associated with “triggering events,” because they occurred in a narrative vacuum, unlike
other American wars in which context had been “well paved materially, politically, and
psychologically over an extended period of time” (Callahan et al. 2006, 554). The event
“occurred in a context of public indifference to or ignorance of the threat posed by
terrorists.” In addition, Bush declared war “without any troops or plans in place to
confront this particular enemy” (Callahan et al. 2006, 555). 10
Presidents must compete in a congested environment to be heard over Congress,
the media and many other sources of information. And they must focus public attention
on their policies for a sustained period of time, which requires repeated rhetoric (Edwards
2003, 148, 155).
Problem Definition in Presidential Rhetoric
One way politicians justify their focus on an issue and argue for access to the
political agenda is by defining it as a problem. How they define the problem has impact
on if and how it is addressed. 11
Problem definition is the process of characterizing issues in the political arena that
are seen as having social significance, meaning, implications and urgency (Rochefort and
Cobb 1994). Problem definition is a key element of rhetoric, and vice versa. How a
10

The authors say “the bombings of the World Trade Center in 1993 and the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, as well as the mischief of the Unabomber, were perceived as the
criminal acts of fringe fanatics who would be brought to justice through normal channels of law and order”
(2006, 555).
11
Of course, before presidents influence how the public thinks about a problem they must get them to
think about it. However, while agenda setting is important, this study is limited to problem definition.
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problem is defined prescribes its politics, its chances of reaching the public agenda, its
likelihood of reaching a desired policy outcome and the range of solutions available for
solving it. Indeed, Crable and Vibbert (1985) say problems are only identified as such
when someone gives voice to them (5). Given the impact of problem definition, scholars
increasingly have focused on it in recent times (see Baumgartner and Jones 1993, ch. 2;
Cobb and Elder 1983, 172-179; Jones 1994, 24-26, 181-183; Kingdon 1995, ch. 5;
Rochefort and Cobb 1994; Stone 1988, Pt. 3).
Most of the literature on problem definition focuses on how it is the impetus for
agenda setting. For instance, Kingdon (1995) has studied how problems, including their
definition, are one of three “streams” that influence the agenda, the other being proposed
solutions and politics, including electoral, partisan, interest group and institutional
factors. Kingdon focuses on how to achieve agenda status when one or more streams
(usually a problem and political streams) open a window of opportunity that allows
policy entrepreneurs to try to link the streams.
Problem definition involves three activities: (1) investigating the nature, extent
and probable cause of a condition seen as undesirable; (2) framing (italics mine) the
condition as a policy problem amenable to public intervention; 12 and (3) specifying
relevant goals for evaluating solutions (Weimer, 1993). Problems are defined and
redefined as a result of changes in criteria, including core beliefs (Jones 1984, 25, 182–
184).
Rochefort and Cobb (1994) have summarized much of the literature on problem
definition. They say the function of problem definition in political discourse is “to

12

Researchers of presidential influence upon public opinion may do well to consider the use of rhetorical
framing to fit preferred policy options into public opinion.
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explain, to describe, to recommend, and above all, to persuade (italics mine)” (15).
Rochefort and Cobb (1994) examined various streams of literature in terms of social
conflict and politics, social construction of reality, post modernism and policy analysis.
Notably, all these approaches emphasize the importance of language to understanding
policy making and the social construction of reality. Rochefort and Cobb also emphasize
the importance of referential symbols (clear tangible or factual basis) and condensational
symbols (icons or slogans that can represent a wide variety of meaning to different
people) (167). In this work, I speculate that Johnson used more referential symbols and
Bush more condensational symbols. Rochefort and Cobb also emphasize two schools of
thought: instrumental, which is focused on rational problem solving, and expressive,
which is seen as a defense of moral values. Again, I would speculate Johnson employs
more of the former and Bush more of the latter.
Rochefort and Cobb (1994) and Stone (1989) point out that problem definition is
often influenced by the perceived location of the cause and who is seen as to blame
(causality). They look at how claims are made, showing how they influence the attention
a problem gets, its salience (level of awareness and caring associated with it) and whether
or not they influence the problem achieving systemic or institutional agenda status. For
instance, they discuss the influence of severity (How serious is the problem?), incidence
(How many are affected and for how long?), novelty (Is this a new problem?), proximity
(How close to home is it?) and crisis association (Is it perceived as a crisis? Is crisis
rhetoric used?)
Stone (1989) argues that the essence of successful problem definition is the causal
story, which identifies the harm done, describes its cause, assigns moral blame to
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individuals or organizations and claims government is responsible for the remedy.
Problem definers, she says, translate “difficult conditions” into problems that are
amenable to human action (282). Strategists, she says, define problems to win over the
most people and gain the most leverage over their opponents (1988, 106).
Hoekstra (1999) uses Stephen Skowronek’s book, The Politics Presidents Make
(1993), to highlight the “sustaining narrative” (causal story and problem definition) that a
president uses to make his place in history and to maintain leadership authority. That
narrative may involve justifying action by laying out a detailed case, as Johnson tended to
do. It also may involve staying on a generalized message, as Bush tended to do.
Edelman (1988) says “those who favor a particular course of government action
are likely to cast about for a widely feared problem to attach it to in order to maximize its
support” (21). As an example of this, some have accused Johnson of using the purported
Gulf of Tonkin attack as a reason to escalate the war in Vietnam, while some have
accused the Bush administration of having a plan to invade Iraq and using 9/11 as a
pretext.
Presidents have tremendous power over problem definition. In Bostdorff’s
analysis of six presidents (John Kennedy to George H.W. Bush) and their foreign crisis
rhetoric, she found that presidents can “use language to give birth to an issue, to
encourage us to believe that no issue exists and to convince us that some issues are more
urgent and deserving of our attention than others.” She says presidential rhetors
recognize that the way they define an issue “establishes the stasis, or central point, on
which an issue turns” (1994, 4). Thus, presidents do well to name an issue so that their
proposed policy seems to be the best solution. In doing so, they also are more likely to
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portray themselves as effective and even as heroes in a battle between good and evil
(1994, 6).
Given citizens’ tendency to trust the president when the country is threatened
from abroad, presidents can “enact policy before announcing the existence of a crisis; the
issue definition then serves to rationalize the president’s course of action. Because crises
imply threat and urgent need for resolution, many citizens enthusiastically jump aboard
the president’s crisis bandwagon” (Bostdorff 1994, 7).
Bostdorff (1994) says that by defining an issue as a crisis, presidents can focus
attention on it, give it urgency and more easily call upon citizen sacrifice and unity,
which is especially important pre-war (5) or pre-escalation of a war.
Bostdorff (1994) goes so far as to say presidents actually create and promote
crises through their rhetoric because it serves them to do so. She says they
treat the crises like a completely objective, factual state of affairs that has
occurred as a result of some other party’s actions. A closer look reveals
that crises have a different origin. According to Windt, ‘Situations do not
create crises. Rather the president’s perception of the situation and the
rhetoric he uses to describe it mark an event as a crisis’ (9).
Opposition to the president’s definition in such situations is difficult, and
opposers must attack the president’s definition of the problem before they attack the
policy. But “to criticize the commander-in-chief in the midst of an apparent crisis may
appear downright unpatriotic. Therefore opponents discover that arguments against the
president’s assertions quickly garner them opponents of their own” (Bostdorff 1994, 7).
Bostdorff (1994) found that
commanders-in-chief typically emphasize a menacing crisis scene that
threatens American lives and American principles, thus dictating that the
United States act to achieve both pragmatic (the protection of lives) and
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idealistic (the protection of principles) purposes that would serve to
rectify, or correct, the crisis scene (206).
She found that presidential
appeals to American ideals also deflected troubling questions about the
ethicality of U.S. policy by infusing military intervention with moral [even
sacred] purpose. In this way, presidents’ situational portrayals served to
reinforce the American myths of mission and manifest destiny, for
commanders-in-chief contended that the nation must act to defend its
moral ideals and then point to the accomplishment of pragmatic goals as
evidence that the United States had fulfilled its moral destiny (1994, 206,
219). 13
The literature, Bostdorff (1994) says, suggests that presidents often speak of
foreign crises as follows: (1) the United States is passive and primarily wants world peace
and increased welfare of other nations, (2) when attacked by another nation, the United
States, as hero, becomes active and retaliatory only as a last resort to defend itself or
other nations of goodwill, (3) the United States has the capability and determination to
defend itself when needed, (4) crises are tests of national will, with emphasis being on
American character rather than the consequences of war (it is more important to speak
about the United States proving it is tough than the pragmatic aspects of war, which
sometimes leads to dangerous games of chicken), (5) presidents ask to be evaluated in
terms of progress and efficiency (they did what they set out to do, which they hope shows
they are good leaders), (6) the United States is the victim, and the enemy is responsible
for the crisis (which helps rally national unity, stir popular support for the president’s
policy and deflect any responsibility for U.S. contribution the crisis, a sort of name and

13

Bostdorff says her research corroborates that of Windt (1973, 1990), Gregg and Hauser (1973) and
Birdsell (1987), who concluded that presidents tend to elevate foreign crises into tests of national will in
their rhetoric (1994, 221).
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blame the enemy approach) and (7) the enemy is diabolical (which helps rally support
presidential crisis leadership) (12). 14
Bostdorff (1994, 6) found most presidents inflated events in their rhetoric,
expanding their power in foreign affairs at the expense of Congress. And her concern is
that presidential crisis rhetoric too often presents crises as tests of credibility where the
actors have to prove their courage “through daring, and all too often reckless, acts of
military intervention” (1994, 223).
But Bostdorff’s (1994) study is of crisis, not war. She acknowledges that “unlike
war, crisis connotes a short-term issue, something that will be resolved fairly quickly and
with limited sacrifice [and that] crisis does not suggest the elusive goal of complete
victory, as war does” (5-6).
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Other scholars explore the cultural effects on problem definition. Rochefort and
Cobb (1994) make the case that the conditions surrounding a problem are tied to the
words used to describe it. They argue that “value concerns drive the process of public
policy making in all fields” (163). They validate the importance of rhetoric in problem
definition, as do Schneider and Ingram (1993), who talk about the images familiar to
target populations, noting they are socially constructed and based upon stereotypes
portrayed through symbolic language, metaphors and stories (334). These images are
often a key part of rhetorical problem definition.
Bosso (in Rochefort and Cobb 1994) shows how
societal characteristics and cultural values converge with existing
structural and political conditions to create the contexts within which
political actors jockey to promote competing problem definitions and
formulate public policy (200).
Bosso also helps us understand why the number of definitions considered is
usually small. Most believe that dominant groups (usually business elites) control the
institutions of power (such as the mass media and Congress) to the degree that new
definitions are suppressed before they are widely considered. Thus, the range of
alternatives is a “pitiful few” (in Rochefort and Cobb 1994, 184). This is even truer when
it comes to foreign policy, as presidents are usually given the latitude to set foreign
policy, although they often ask Congress, pro forma, for approval to go to war. And
presidents must ask Congress to finance war. Nevertheless, presidents have the most
information about crises as they have access to intelligence and foreign staff. They
therefore have great control over the definition of the problem and the options to solve it.
Kay (2003, 60) says “the primary concern of most of the recent work in problem
definition … is with how issues are conceptualized by officials and by the public at
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large.” Other areas of importance are policymakers’ understanding of causality and
problem ownership. 15 Kay (2003) says the problem definition literature makes clear that
“‘policymakers’ conceptualizations of an issue serve as a means of ‘filtering out’
irrelevant (and perhaps even inconvenient) information” (64). She also notes that “issues
that are identified with national security or civil rights generally receive more attention
(not to mention more resources) from policymakers than those viewed as representing
‘lower priority’ matters’” (2003, 60). This is particularly important as we analyze
presidential rhetoric justifying war.
Aside from these limited forays into the role of persuasion in problem definition,
the literature has not adequately delved into the connection between problem definition
and rhetoric, including the use of symbols, antithetical language and core values to
promote policy. Nor has it adequately investigated why presidents (and other politicians)
use rhetoric that relies upon the emotive, religious and patriotic.
Given the importance of rhetorical problem definition in the creation and
promotion of policy, it behooves scholars to further examine the relationship between
presidential rhetoric and policy type, an area to which we now turn.

Policy Typologies
There is extensive literature on policy typologies, which attempts to classify
policy and provide insight into these types of policies. Theodore Lowi (1964) developed
a classificatory scheme for distributive, redistributive, regulatory and (later) constituent
policies (Steinberger 1980). This section, however, limits the discussion to some features
15

When presidents strongly promote a worldview of faith, scholars might question their view of causality:
Does their rhetoric reflect a “wish it were so” attitude, do they believe “a” causes “b,” where do they stand
on science versus faith, etc.
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of social regulatory policy, as developed by Tatalovich and Daynes (1988), as this type of
policy most incorporates regulating norms, values and moral codes of conduct, areas that
presidents appear particularly drawn to in their pre-war rhetoric. 16 Tatalovich and Daynes
(1988) define social regulatory policy as “the exercise of legal authority to modify or
replace community values, moral practices, and norms of interpersonal conduct with new
standards of behavior” (1).
War policy, especially that promoted rhetorically, does not fit neatly into Lowi’s
broad policy typologies (neither does anti-Communism or anti-terrorism policy). 17 Like
regulatory policy, 18 war policy seeks to regulate the behavior of individuals and groups.
Indeed, Lowi said public policy is simply “officially expressed intention backed by a
sanction,” and that all public policies are coercive (Tatalovich and Daynes, 1998, x).
War policy seems to lend itself to a particularly strong blend of coercive rhetoric by
presidents. Perhaps that is because war calls upon citizens to offer their lives and tax
money. And there may be other security sanctions, as well as subtle dissuasion to
express dissent.
Unlike other regulatory policy, social regulatory policy attempts to regulate noneconomic behavior that is seen as corrupting society by tapping into values and norms.
16

It should be noted that Edelman’s (1974) focus on the symbolic dimension of politics could also be seen
as a typology, according to Steinberger (1980).
17
Terrorism is a unique, even peculiar policy. Terrorism policy is highly complex because the enemy is
decentralized, diffuse and adheres to no rules of engagement. It is the type of policy that leads to the
“political deadlock and policy paralysis” to which Brodkin refers (1987, 571). Whereas an issue is defined
as “a special kind of policy situation, with identifiable causes or sources, definite characteristics, and a
limited number of outcomes,” (Eyestone 1978, 3) the causes and sources of terrorism may be hidden and
diffuse, its means unpredictable and the ways to address it mystifying. Inherited conflicts such as that in
Vietnam more readily fits into this description.
18
Lowi was primarily concerned with economic policy. Therefore, war policy does not fit his typology
specifically (and indeed typologies have been criticized for lacking ways to objectively assign policies into
distinct categories – see Smith 2002). However, the war with Iraq and the conflict with Vietnam have
elements of each of the typologies, although they are most akin to regulatory policy because its synonyms
are “police power” and “government intervention” (Tatalovich and Daynes 2005, xiii).
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Convincing citizens to go to war is not just an economic exercise, but when presidents
promote war through their rhetoric, they often frame values in extreme language that taps
into moralism (including good versus evil), patriotism and religiosity. Thus, the language
of war policy may exhibit many characteristics of social regulatory policy, while the
policy itself may not. This paper’s conception of war policy expressed rhetorically, then,
best fits within Tatalovich and Daynes’ (1988) social regulatory policy because the
rhetoric attempts to simultaneously export those social (and economic) values to nondemocratic regimes and regulate behavior. However, war policy itself is unlike social
regulation, such as abortion policy. So this is a somewhat unconventional application of
this area of literature.
The aspects of morality touched on by the advocates of policy typologies is
perhaps most relevant to this work, although it, too, is not a perfect fit. Lowi observes
that social regulatory policy is “more ideological, more moral, more directly derived from
fundamental values, more intense, less utilitarian, more polarized, and less prone to
compromise” (Tatalovich and Daynes 2005, xiii).
In laying out the parameters of social regulatory policy, Tatalovich and Daynes
outline three major beliefs about policy adoption: First, “policies arise out of the demands
and preferences of actors in the political environment, including interest groups,
politicians and bureaucratic agents)” (Haider-Markel and O’Brien 1997, 553). This paper
does not delve into the nuts and bolts of how policy is made, but rather focuses on how
two presidents communicated their preferences for war policy through their rhetoric.
Second, “new policy is more likely to be adapted when it builds incrementally on
existing policy” (Haider-Markel and O’Brien 1997, 553). Again, this paper does not
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examine whether or not Bush and Johnson built upon existing war policy, but rather how
they rhetorically promoted it. War is an extreme policy, so it seems less incremental,
although Johnson inherited a war that he escalated.
Finally, Tatalovich and Daynes built upon the idea that “public policy is often a
reaction to the perceived scope of the problem and/or the salience of the issue” (HaiderMarkel and O’Brien 1997, 553). Here then is an area where rhetorical promotion of
policy seems to fit. Rhetorical problem definition by presidents promoting war may
enhance the scope and salience of the problem by the use of antithetical language,
symbols, causal stories and the other techniques this work addresses. Issue salience is
aided by the fact that presidents have high standing with citizens and elites in matters of
foreign affairs and crisis. And, as mentioned, rhetoric has become governance in the
world of presidents.
Thus, we bring in one aspect of Lowi’s definition of public policy that has
received less attention – that policy must be “officially expressed” and it must include in
that expression “intention.” To convince us to go to war, that most awesome of
undertakings, presidents must express their intentions. They do so most persuasively and
most often through their rhetoric, employing one of their most powerful assets – the bully
pulpit. In this sense, their persuasiveness in large part substitutes for outright coercion,
although more subtle coercive intentions may be at work to quash dissent, such as
insinuations that not seeing the potential spread of Communism as against the interests of
U.S. and world democracies or that to criticize war policy is an attack on the troops and
therefore inherently unpatriotic. When that rhetorical persuasion taps into the core values
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and norms that are part of Tatalovich and Daynes’ social regulatory policy, it can be even
more powerful.
Lowi says that social policy is different from economic policy in that it is
characterized by “radical” rather than “mainstream” politics. Radical policy seeks to
eliminate social actions (abortions, for instance). Mainstreamists only want to regulate or
channel social actions (pollution, for example). War is not social policy, but it tends to fit
the radical category. Both Johnson and Bush sought to end dictatorial regimes, to stamp
out what they considered extremist ideology and to replace that ideology with what they
considered mainstream government and thought (democracy) (Tatalovich and Daynes
2005, xiv).
As Lowi notes, “mainstream political actors avoid taking a moral posture toward
the conduct to be regulated; conduct is to be regulated only because it is injurious in its
consequences … For the radical, conduct is to be regulated because it is good or bad in
itself” … The objective of radical regulation is complete elimination of the conduct”
(Tatalovich and Daynes 2005, xiv).
In Lowi’s new classification grid, the tendencies are to see regulatory policy in
terms of “sin” for radicalists, as opposed to “error” for mainstreamists (Tatalovich and
Daynes 2005, xiv). Lowi points out that in fact “political leaders can transform politics
through radicalization, by adding a moral dimension to the policy discourse” (Tatalovich
and Daynes 2005, xviii).
Lowi said mainstream politicians were more likely to seek political consensus,
while radical politicians were less open to consensus and were more ideological
(Tatalovich and Daynes 1998, xiii). Lowi concludes that “(moral) policy causes (radical)
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politics” (Tatalovich and Daynes 2005, xxiii). Additionally, Tatalovich and Daynes
conclude that Republicans exploit social regulatory issues to mobilize their base (1988).
Part of typologies is the “definitional process,” or the “way in which particular
policy meanings are developed and disseminated,” (Steinberger 1980, 193). But little
research has focused on the “question of meaning selection,” how “meanings are thought
up, ratified and propagated by organized political processes” (Steinberger 1980, 194).
If indeed Lowi’s typologies show that different kinds of policies have different
kinds of politics associated with them, then perhaps war policy promoted by presidential
rhetoric has different kinds of rhetorical techniques (tied to politics and other factors)
associated it. And perhaps there are some differences in how presidents speak about war,
which says something about public policy that has not been well explored. Even
Steinberger has acknowledged that Edelman’s (1974) emphasis on the symbolic
dimension of politics is among those typologies that “seems to focus on a particularly
salient aspect of public policy and to provide a basis for sound theorizing” (1980, 186).
Perhaps it makes sense that social regulatory policy, rhetorically promoted by presidents
making a case for going to war, will be more black and white, patriotic and religious
(1980, 186).
Steinberger (1980) says “it has proved nearly impossible to confidently identify a
particular policy as being of this type or that,” especially as public policy is complex and
ambiguous (186-87). Nevertheless, different presidents may see war policy as more or
less social regulatory, and their rhetoric may reflect that. As Steinberger (1980) puts it,
“the import and significance of any particular policy is, in the most general sense,
indeterminate and open to interpretation and dispute” (188). After all, “the social world
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… is essentially a series of socially constructed meanings” (1980, 188). And indeed, it is
those meanings presidents seek to create with their pre-war rhetoric. Or, put another way,
socially constructed meanings generally appear as ‘typifications’ … Such
typifications, taken together, describe not merely social meanings but also
social reality … Typifications … are generally and commonly employed
by participants in the political process to define public policies … Thus, to
talk about the different types of policies is to ‘conceptualize some of the
ways in which participants tend to define policies’ (Steinberger 1980,
189).
The meaning of a policy (i.e. the participants’ understanding of a policy’s
purpose, potential impact and relationship to other policies) must be “attached to it by the
various participants in the policy process” (Steinberger 1980, 189), and presidents are key
participants in war policy. This goes beyond Schattschneider’s (1960) teaching about the
way participants try to manipulate the scope of conflict to further their policy preferences
because
efforts to define and redefine policies are not, as Schattschneider would
have it, simply matters of strategy or distortion; they are in fact
unavoidable if policies are to be at all relevant and meaningful … This …
implies … that various participants will define a single policy in various
ways not simply out of tactical or prudential considerations but, rather,
because of contrasting perspectives or worldviews (Steinberger 1980,
190).
Steinberger (1980) says typologies broaden Schattschneider’s insight by showing
that “conflict or disagreement is not limited to the issue of scope, of public versus private,
but may also include an entire range of other questions dealing with political impact,
economic impact, motive [and] relationships to basic values (italics mine), etc. (190).
Steinberger (1980) highlights the importance of evaluating the meaning and
definition of policies, noting that “one may … wonder if some meanings are more
correct, or more appropriate, than others … If so, then surely one of the primary tasks of
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the policy analyst would be to determine the truest meaning of a particular policy” (191),
which I would add is the goal of this work.
Steinberger wonders if certain policies tend to be defined in characteristic ways,
similar to what is investigated in this research. He also asks if certain actors (here,
presidents) tend to see policies in terms of certain dimensions as they seek to make sense
of the political world (here, how presidents define war policy pre-war and pre-warescalation). He wonders how these definitions are formulated and disseminated (here,
how presidents define and promote war policy in their speeches). Finally, he wonders if
meanings are likely to multiply or become fewer during the decision process (here, do
presidents inflate meaning as they continue to give speeches selling war?).

The Nature of Political Rhetoric
Rhetoric is an important tool for presidents. In fact, presidents have more control
over the messages they communicate than they do over any other aspect of the
communication process, with the exception of issues that force themselves upon the
public agenda. Indeed, “presidents have almost complete freedom in the language they
use to express their views on matters of public policy” (Edwards 2003, 127).
But what is political rhetoric exactly? Here, “political” is defined as exercising or
seeking power in the governmental or public affairs of a state” (Webster’s 2003, 1497).
Rhetoric is a “type of communicative behavior [that] enters the realm of arguing but falls
short of deliberative behavior,” according to Risse (1999, 3), who says “when actors
communicate rhetorically, they justify their behavior, their preferences, and their
definition of the situation.” Risse says rhetoric involves persuasive argument and is based
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upon the assumption that there are those willing to change their preferences or definitions
of a situation.
Inherent in political rhetoric process are validity claims emphasizing the “moral
rightness of the norms underlying arguments.” In this process, actors, in this case
political leaders, share what Risse calls a “common lifeworld,” or “supply of collective
interpretations of the world and of themselves, as provided by language, a common
history, or culture.” They also share “a common system of norms and rules perceived as
legitimate,” as well as a “repertoire of collective understandings to which they can refer”
(Risse 1999, 5). It is these commonalities that presidents call upon when making their
case for war because they act as shorthand everyone recognizes and tap into people’s
emotions.
Wei (2000, 96) says political rhetoric is “both an expression of emotion and an
appeal to others to become emotionally involved.” He says political rhetoric often seeks
to evoke patriotic emotions and is a means for achieving political dominance. Patriotic
rhetoric, for instance, may be a way to encourage uncritical acceptance of a problem
definition.
Bostdorff (1994) says “rhetoric is sometimes cynical and manipulative,
sometimes high-minded and admirable, but it is always persuasive discourse that,
especially when uttered by presidents, helps construct our political realities” (3). Some
studies have concluded that rhetoric is about values, and partisan values in particular
(Sniderman and Theriault 1999; Wittman 1995).
Jerit (2002) adds that “political rhetoric is characterized by partisan or ideological
arguments – i.e., claims about the responsibility, or the lack thereof, for government
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action” (15), or what Stone would call “causal stories.” Nevertheless, Converse (1964)
points out that only a small part of the citizenry make political decisions on an
ideological basis, while the majority makes them according to group loyalties, the nature
of the times and other factors. Thus, elites cannot make purely ideological appeals
because they have to appeal beyond their core supporters, which may be why they make
use of various rhetorical devices (as discussed below) and patriotic, religious and nonspecific rhetoric.
Foucault (1980) says discourse, especially dominant discourse (and certainly
presidential discourse is dominant), structures our worldview and excludes other
interpretations. Used strategically, discourse shapes actions based upon our perceptions
of how the world should be. Thus, how leaders talk can give us clues to actions they
might take and not take. For instance, if they talk strongly about one country being the
source of a problem, especially a problem that could crop up again, we might infer they
will take action regarding that country. The more inflated their language, the more
serious action we might come to expect. According to this theory, strong presidential
rhetoric against Communism stemming from Vietnam or terrorism stemming from Iraq
are predictive of likely action against these countries, especially because presidential preescalation/war rhetoric is dominant, strategic discourse, these are problems that are
unlikely to go away and they are perceived as highly threatening.
There have been a lot of studies of rhetoric and of political elites, but there has not
been systematic study of how political rhetoric links political elites and citizens (Riker
1990, 56). Clearly, presidents and other world leaders believe rhetoric is an important
link to citizens, or they would not place so much emphasis on it. Indeed, President Bill
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Clinton bemoaned the 1994 defeat of congressional Democrats with these words: “The
role of the president of the United States is message … I got caught up in the
parliamentary aspect of the presidency and missed the leadership, [the] bully pulpit,
which is so critical” (Edwards 2003, 4). George H.W. Bush (Bush I) said his biggest
disappointment as president was that “I just wasn’t a good enough communicator”
(Edwards 2003, 6). The “Great Communicator,” President Ronald Reagan, said one of his
“greatest frustrations during those eight years [of his presidency] was [his] inability to
communicate to the American people and to Congress the seriousness of the threat we
faced in Central America” (Edwards 2003, 6). Even Winston Churchill asserted that “of
all the talents bestowed upon men, none is so precious as the gift of oratory” (Edwards
2003, 5). Nevertheless, some researchers believe president overestimate their capacity to
win public opinion (Edwards 2003, 7).
As Hart (1984) points out, presidents have different rhetorical styles that reflect
their leadership personality. Those who prize reason (and it as most politically
advantageous) may appeal to logic and rationality often in their rhetoric. Similarly, those
who value religion above all else (or who see it as most politically advantageous) may
appeal to faith and scriptural ideas. 19
There is a tendency for political information (including rhetoric) to devolve to the
simplest message, or to cancel out “random components” as citizens do not know much
about politics. This is because “substantial amounts of information [are] distributed
unevenly in an electorate that pays sporadic attention to political events” (Ferejohn 1990,
14). Moreover, “the organization of political information depends on how it is presented,
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Of course, the implication here is that faith is illogical and irrational, which is a much more complicated
discussion.
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or ‘framed’” (Ferejohn, 1990, 11). Such simplification in framing is often accomplished
by symbols because they stand for more complex or unfamiliar things, enhance certain
aspects and conceal others. These symbols idealize the identity and history of a people
(Hinckley 1990). As Lasswell puts it, “any elite defends and asserts itself in the name of
symbols of common destiny … By the use of sanctioned words and gestures the elite
elicits blood, work, taxes, applause, from the masses” (Hart 1984, 5). Thus, the central
battle in any political conflict is often “the struggle over whose symbolic definition will
prevail,” as Hinckley (1990) puts it (1).
Research also “suggests that information is retained in rough proportion to the
existing stock of information on the topic” (Ferejohn 1990, 11). This suggests that if the
president repeats his message, receivers are more likely to retain it, and possibly accept it
(Ferejohn, 1990, 11).

Presidential Rhetoric as a Policy Tool
Rhetoric is also a policy tool, an instrument “through which governments seek to
influence behavior and influence policy purposes” (Schneider and Ingram 1990, 511). As
Kingdon (1984) noted, “the content of ideas themselves, far from being mere
smokescreens or rationalizations, are integral parts of decision making in and around
government (131).
Schlesinger (2008) says “in campaigns and in the White House, speeches not only
reflect policies but frequently act as a policy-forcing mechanism: The fact of a
pronouncement focuses and curtails any lingering debates – most of the time” (9).
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If “public policy almost always attempts to get people to do things they otherwise
would not have done, or it enables them to do things they might not have done
otherwise,” then Schneider and Ingram (1990) posit that “individuals are more likely to
take actions in support of policy goals if the goals or actions are (1) promoted by
government officials as important, high priority issues, (2) consistent with their values,
beliefs and preferences, [and] (3) associated with positive symbols, labels, images and
events” (519-20). Symbolic and hortatory tools are one way government accomplishes
this (along with authority, incentives, capacity-building and learning tools).
Symbolic and hortatory tools may be used by policy makers to encourage
compliance with, or support of, a particular policy. Policy makers may appeal through
intangible values (such as justice, fairness, equality, right and wrong, freedom, order,
safety, preservation of traditional values, efficiency, effectiveness, etc.) or through the
use of images, symbols and labels (Schneider and Ingram 1990, 519, 529). The
assumption is that “people develop preferences on the basis of culturally induced values,
and that they need to be convinced that a policy preferred alternative fits into their value
scheme” (Schneider and Ingram 1990, 529). Such rationales “do not insert factual
information or resources into the decision situation,” nor do they just involve weighing
the benefits and costs or objective comparisons with other options. Rather, they
“emphasize the positive aspects of the policy and seek to minimize the negative ones”
(Schneider and Ingram 1990, 529). This may include
the use of images, symbols, and labels to associate the preferred activities
with positively valued symbols … [In fact,] policy may go to considerable
lengths to associate desired behavior with positive (or at least neutral)
labels and [to] avoid negative labeling (Schneider and Ingram 1990, 520).
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Such tools are distinguished by the fact that they alter perceptions of the policy-preferred
activities” (Schneider and Ingram 1990, 521).

The Rhetorical Presidency
Rhetoric is a very powerful tool for presidents. Neustadt (1986) says presidential
power is wrapped up in the “power to persuade” (25). 20 Tulis (1987) says presidents use
rhetoric more today than ever before and claims there is now a “rhetorical presidency,”
aided by a mass media that enables presidents to speak immediately and directly to large
national audiences and that encourages dramatic verbal performance.
As Stuckey (1991) sees it, the president is the nation’s “interpreter-in-chief” (1).
And Edelman (1988) goes so far as to imply that rhetors such as presidents actually
create reality by what they say and that, indeed, “political language is political reality”
(104).
The rhetorical presidency was one of the major institutional developments of the
20th Century. As Ceaser et al. note, “popular or mass rhetoric, which presidents once
employed only rarely, now serves as one of their principal (sic) tools in attempting to
govern the nation” (in Cronin 1982, 234). Prior to the 20th Century, people did not trust
“popular leadership through rhetoric.” Presidents preferred to communicate to the
branches of government and rarely spoke to the people directly (in Cronin 1982, 234).
Today, as Ceaser et al. point out, “presidential speech and action increasingly
reflect the opinion that speaking is governing. Speeches are written to become the events
to which people react no less than [to the] ‘real’ events themselves” (in Cronin 1982,
234). President Kennedy, who mastered television, noted that presidents had become
20

Neustadt, however, concentrated primarily on the president’s power to persuade Washington insiders.
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more educational and psychic leaders than administrators and program developers (in
Cronin 1982, 235). Johnson followed Kennedy with “a steady stream of oratory that
swelled popular expectations of governmental capacity to a level that even his apologists
now concede far exceeded what government could possibly achieve” (in Cronin 1982,
235), although he was less verbose about the Vietnam War prior to the Gulf of Tonkin
incident, after which me made his first major public statement about the war (Vaughn
1985, 617).
Carter in his assertion that a president should be “the leader of the people,” rather
than “the head of government” was, according to Ceaser et al., a “perfect expression of
… support for the doctrine of the rhetorical presidency” (in Cronin 1982, 246). He
pledged to spend more time with people and gave more largely inspirational speeches to
mobilize a popular constituency that could boost his poll ratings and power. He also
merged policy and mood in his speech (in Cronin 1982, 240).
Ceaser et al. say the development of the rhetorical presidency is the result of three
factors: (1) a modern doctrine of presidential leadership (most important), (2) the modern
mass media, and (3) the modern presidential campaign. The authors note that the framers
of the Constitution feared popular rhetoric (which they saw as “pure” democracy) on a
mass scale would undermine the rational and enlightened self interests of citizens and so
create instability. They did not want a representative government that looked only to
public opinion as its guide (in Cronin 1982, 237). The framers worried that instead of
consulting the “cool and deliberate sense of the community,” popular orators would be
chained to public opinion, or mood, which would undermine the discretion and flexibility
that statesmanship demands (in Cronin 1982, 237).
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The founders reasoned that
in democracies, … political success and fame are won by those orators
who most skillfully give expression to transient, often inchoate, public
opinion. Government by this means, if indeed it can be called governing,
leads to constant instability as leaders compete with each other to tap the
latest mood passing through the public. The paradox of government by
mood is that it fosters neither democratic accountability nor statesmanly
efficiency (in Cronin 1982, 237).
While the framers did not think popular rhetoric could be avoided in a republican
system, they wanted to minimize reliance upon it and create institutions that could run
efficiently without relying upon changing public opinion. That is one reason power was
given to the people’s representatives, who they believed would not be easily swayed by
rhetoric, rather than directly to the people. The framers also were counting on the impact
of popular rhetoric becoming muted as the nation grew (in Cronin 1982, 237).
In addition, the framers originally designed a presidential selection process that
disallowed direct, active campaigning by candidates. They also designed the presidency
so that it was more of a constitutional office, relying upon the formal powers of the
Constitution and informal powers stemming from the office, rather than an institution that
could stir mass opinion by rhetoric (in Cronin 1982, 238).
The framers thought presidential communication would focus on reminding the
public of basic principles and that they would be informed about policy through
presidential communications to Congress. Congress was expected to be reasoned and
deliberative, not popular in nature.
Foreign Crisis Rhetoric
One area of the literature in this area that is particularly relevant is that of crisis
rhetoric, especially as regards foreign affairs. War is indeed a crisis, and during crises
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“presidents must persuasively advance claims of crisis in order to prompt public support
for their crisis policies” (Bostdorff 1994, 1).
The impact of crisis rhetoric is especially enhanced when it is used by presidents
regarding a foreign issue because presidents are symbols of national unity, citizens have
greater reverence for them than they do for other government officials and citizens tend
to believe presidential statements about foreign affairs because they believe the president
has superior information in this area 21 (Bostdorff 1994, 6). For instance, the Gulf of
Tonkin incident that precipitated further U.S. involvement in Vietnam was relatively
obscure, which worked to Johnson’s favor as few Americans knew enough about it to
question the president’s words (Bostdorff 1994, 8). One could argue that the startling
nature and audacity of 9/11 worked to Bush’s advantage in the same way, but even more
so.
However, crisis rhetoric does not guarantee a president “persuasive success”
because it is impossible to convince everyone of a president’s interpretation of the
problem and impossible to get everyone to accept his proposed policy solution to it.
Nevertheless,
presidents clearly possess resources that give them a decided advantage
over those who articulate competing views … If the commander-in-chief
can persuade citizens to accept his preferred interpretation of a crisis and
its resolution, he has much to gain (Bostdorff 1994, 8).
Presidents use crisis rhetoric to talk about their duties and responsibilities as
president and commander-in-chief and to associate themselves with successful policies
(Bostdorff 1994, 227). And
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Given the controversy over the Iraq war at this writing, including questioning Bush’s justification for
war, this may be changing.
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during a foreign crisis, a president’s references to his office, title, and
responsibilities serve to legitimize his policy decisions. Such references
also function as authoritative appeals to forestall questions and criticism.
In effect, the president argues that he alone has the necessary expertise and
power to make the proper decisions, a viewpoint that encourages citizens
who revere democracy to defer to the president as though he were king
(Bostdorff 1994, 228).
Use by presidents of such words as “we,” “our nation” and “America” during a
crisis help citizens identify with the president and can also encourage group conformity
and discourage dissent, especially when presidents invoke national myths. Those who
express opposition to the president or his policies may be viewed as cranks or traitors
(Bostdorff 1994, 229).
During a crisis, “presidents try to evoke strong emotions” in their rhetoric “to
build and maintain public support for the actions necessary to achieve crisis-oriented
goals. They do so by presenting the situation … as clearly, simply, and directly [as] a
case of good versus evil” (Edwards and Wayne 2003, 505).
Edwards and Wayne (2003) say that Bush’s actions following 9/11 “provide a
good example of how presidential power expands during periods of national emergencies
and how the enemy is demonized (2003, 504). For instance, they cite his contrast of
“U.S. morality versus terrorist immorality.” They point out that in a September 20, 2001,
news conference, Bush rallied Americans to his anti-terrorism campaign by describing
terrorists as “the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the twentieth century,” saying
they followed in the paths of fascism, Nazism and totalitarianism, that Osama bin Laden
was “an evil man … one of the worst” and that Saddam Hussein was evil (506). Johnson,
too, did some of this characterization, but as he
struggled to find a convincing rationale to justify the American presence
in Southeast Asia, … he would discover that the traditional moral
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arguments that presidents had used to support previous wars seemed
inappropriate and political appeals were ineffective (Vaughn 1985, 617).
Edwards and Wayne (2003) say that “demonizing the bad guy as malevolent is a
frequent tactic,” noting that in former President Jimmy Carter’s memoirs, “Keeping
Faith,” he described the Ayatollah Khomeini as “fanatical, “insane” and “deranged”
(2003, 506). Former President George H.W. Bush in the book, “A World Transformed,”
compared Saddam Hussein to Hitler, noting Hussein had “disdain for international law,”
misrepresented what had happened and lied to his neighbors. In May 13, 1999, remarks
to veterans groups about Kosovo, former President Bill Clinton painted former Serbian
President Slobodan Milosevic as “an irascible and irrational dictator, a war criminal”
(506).
Wander (1984) notes that American foreign policy rhetoric personifies nations,
but the abstract way in which presidents describe enemy nations also dehumanizes
people. Indeed, Ivie (1980) found that presidential war rhetoric was replete with images
of savagery. He says “a people strongly committed to the ideal of peace, but
simultaneously faced with the reality of war, must believe that the fault for any such
disruption of their ideal lies with others” or face “guilt that would otherwise threaten to
drive the nation toward some form of self-mortification” (280).
Antithetical Appeals
Antithetical language draws delineations that are “sharply contrasted in character
or purpose” (American Psychological Association). Examples for the purposes of this
work include how presidents describe the main protagonists – Communism, guerrillas
and North Vietnam by Johnson, or the United States, its coalition/allies and the “enemy,”
variously defined as al Qaeda, Iran, North Korea, Saddam Hussein and Iraq, by Bush.
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Bostdorff (1994) says antithetical appeals that characterize the enemy as evil and
threatening create a situation in which diplomacy smacks of appeasement; thus the
chances that innocent people will suffer is increased (226). She says antithetical appeals
“allow citizens to place the blame for bloodshed on others, rather than to assume
responsibility and guilt themselves” (1994, 226).
Finlay, Holsti and Fagen (1967) argue that painting a picture of an evil enemy
allows a nation to assume “a posture of self-righteousness” and justify “any means”
necessary to win (8). Bostdorff notes it can also provide rationalization for military
action.
Antithetical appeals are one way presidents attempt to appeal to their audiences.
As Bostdorff (1994) notes, researchers of foreign crises from a rhetorical perspective
“must recognize that a president’s public messages are addressed to someone, that his
discourse persuasively appeals, overtly or covertly, to some audience” (21). Thus, Burke
(1950) says, presidential speakers must identify with their audience.
As Taylor (2007, 667) points out, “numerous critics have established how,
following 9/11, the rhetoric of George W. Bush powerfully revived Cold War tropes and
symbolically translated terrifying and agonizing events into a familiar vocabulary of
moralized, binary oppositions” (Bostdorff 2003; Cloud 2004; Hariman 2004; Jackson
2005; Johnson 2002; Lazar and Lazar 2004; Murphy 2003; Noon 2004).
Use of Symbols
The symbolic politics literature, pioneered by Harold Lasswell, Murray Edelman,
Kenneth Burke and others, “analyzes the use of symbols, whether in language or
ritualized behavior, in giving meaning and structure to political reality” (Hinckley 1990,
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2). However, Hinckley (1990) says the presidency literature rarely cites the symbolic
politics literature, while the symbolic politics literature suggests the need for, but does
not provide, work on presidential symbolism. Further, “presidential leadership is not
treated as a problem in symbolism” (3). Thus, this work is an attempt to more fully
integrate these literatures in a new context.
Presidents often use symbols to frame issues, as Edwards and Wayne (2003) note.
Symbols are simple or familiar things that stand for other more complex or
unfamiliar things and may be used to describe politicians, events, issues,
or some other aspect of the political world … The choice of symbols
inevitably highlights certain aspects of an issue or event and conceals
others, just as in other forms of framing (130, 162).
Hinckley (1990) speaks of a symbolic presidency – “a particular set of
expectations about the office that are held by the public, described by journalists and
teachers, and encouraged by the presidents themselves” (130). Hinckley (1990) defines
symbols as “words (gestures or any series of actions)” that “call forth a larger and usually
more complex set of ideas than the literal meaning of the object” (4). Symbols typically
evoke “ideas already in the public philosophy …, characterizing the identity and history
of a people, often in idealized terms. Symbols evoke ideas the society wants to believe
are true.” A symbol also can “help produce the independent condition it stands for,
including “a call to action in war” (Hinckley 1990, 5). “Symbols, also, can give false
comfort and distract attention from problems that need to be faced” (Hinckley 1990, 7).
Hinckley (1990) calls political symbolism “central to the office of the President”
(1). She says “symbols are purposive; hence we need to evaluate the intent of the
symbol-givers” (1990, 8).
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Hart (1984) says various scholars have argued that much of politics is about
symbols, noting
as [Harold] Lasswell put it, ‘any elite defends and asserts itself in the
name of symbols of common destiny ... By the use of sanctioned words
and gestures the elite elicits blood, work, taxes, applause, from the masses.
When the political order works smoothly, the masses venerate the
symbols; the elite, self-righteous and unafraid, suffers from no withering
sense of immortality.’ Symbols are then means and ends of politics as they
are both valued in themselves and can be manipulated to influence others.
(5).

In her study of rhetoric by Presidents Truman through Reagan, Hinckley (1990)
found that
symbols can be used politically to shape attitudes, build support, persuade
to action or in one widely accepted definition of political power, to help A
get B to do what A wants done (1).
Hinckley (1990) says writers say “the central battle in a political conflict is often ‘the
struggle over whose symbolic definition of a situation will prevail” and that “control of
the symbolic actions of government is as important as the control of its tangible effects.”
One writer whom Hinckley does not name has gone so far as to call “the central political
activity the symbolic manipulation of words to define situations” (1). Thus, symbols can
manipulate the way an issue is presented (Edelman 1964, 6).
Problem definition literature also indicates the usefulness of emphasizing national
symbols (e.g., freedom) (Peters 1996), painting a vision (Reagan’s “Morning in
America,” Johnson’s “Great Society”) and describing policies in symbolic or
metaphorical ways (Bush’s “War on Terror”). One reason for this is that symbols can
simplify complex policy, reassure citizens that policies are for their own good and
transcend differences.
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Johnson “Great Society” served as a symbol for his administration. Who
wouldn’t want a “great society,” but who can really define what it means, Edwards and
Wayne ask (2003, 132).
Presidents are sometimes faulted for inadequate use of symbols. In fact, many
observers believe that “a president’s failure to lead the public to adopt broad symbols for
his administration can cause severe problems in relations with the public (Edwards and
Wayne 2003, 132). For instance, Presidents Carter, Bush I and Clinton were faulted for
lack of “unifying themes and cohesion in their programs and for failing to inspire the
public with a sense of purpose or ideas to follow. Instead of providing the country with a
sense of their vision and priorities, they emphasized discrete problem solving,” while
Reagan “continually invoked symbols of his vision of America and its past” (Edwards
2003, 162).
Using symbols and other rhetorical devices is quite different from providing sheer
information because symbols evoke emotion. Lakoff (2008) says
if you believe in the 18th Century view of the mind, you will … think that
all you need to do is give people the facts and figures and they will reach
the right conclusion. You will think that all you need to do is point out
where their interests lie, and they will act politically to maximize them …
You will not need to appeal to emotion … You will not have to speak of
values … You will not have to frame the facts … If you believe in the 18th
Century view of the mind, you will … be dead wrong. You will be
ignoring the cognitive unconscious, not stating your deepest values,
suppressing legitimate emotions, accepting the other side’s frames as if
they were neutral, cowering with fear at what you might be called and
refusing to frame the facts so they can be appreciated. You will be
ineffective (11, 12).
This is so because the mind, says Lakoff (2008), is largely unconscious (14). Moreover,
we cannot “freely choose not to think certain thoughts when certain words are used and
when [our] brain is tuned to activate those thoughts,” (Lakoff 2008, 19) such as when we
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think “cowardice” when the words “cut and run” are used. As Western (2007) has shown,
emotion is central in political persuasion.
Stone (1988) says the use of symbols and other rhetorical tools, such as
metaphors, help us understand the problem and reinforces the idea that description of the
problem is the only way to understand it (106-165). Stone (1988) looks at symbolism as a
way to help define problems through such means as stories, synecdoches (figures of
speech in which a part is used to represent the whole), metaphors and ambiguity (108126). She says how a problem is defined determines its saliency and relevancy to the
public. 22
Kingdon (1993, 103) says symbols focus attention on a problem, the type of
language used determines the size of the audience that becomes involved and well-chosen
symbols expand the conflict. Hardy, Palmer and Phillips (2000) note that “symbols,
narratives, metaphors employed by the enunciator must possess receptivity. They must
resonate with other actors; otherwise they will fail to convey the meaning intended by the
enunciator” (1,236). Moreover, symbols must “be familiar to others and capable of
dislodging existing symbols.” Orators may create new concepts, but they are more likely
to borrow ones that already have been used, as the former takes creativity and power.
Edelman in particular has concentrated on “the pervasive and profound
importance of symbols in politics” (Elder and Cobb 1983, 1). The essence of Edelman’s
(1971) work is that the type of symbols used affects political action or inaction. He looks
at how democracy and power work, believing democratic governments are supposed to
shape the wants and preferences of citizens, which they do this through symbols, myths,
rituals and political language (7). In “Constructing the Political Spectacle,”, Edelman
22

Lakoff and Stone might disagree on this, depending how Stone would define description of the problem.
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(1988) talks about how language, including symbols, helps to maintain power, status and
resource allocations (24). This can in turn mask the real problems. He looks at how
language, including symbols, determines what aspect of a problem receives focus. He
says government manipulates citizens’ views of what is and is not important.
Edelman (1988) says symbols also are useful for identifying social worth and
therefore one’s perceived enemies: “Enemies, then, are identifiable persons or
stereotypes or persons to whom evil traits, intentions or actions can be attributed” (87).
Hinckley (1990) found presidents used symbols to invoke national pride and patriotism,
to appeal to the American people for support, to identify with the people as one of them,
and to propose and explain the administration’s actions (42).
Presidents may
manipulate symbols in attempts not only to lead public opinion, but also to
deliberately mislead it … The presidency uniquely lends itself to symbolic
manipulation as presidents personify government and the nation’s
heritage, which image they can enhance by television appearances,
appearances with heads of state, foreign travel and ceremonies (Edwards
and Wayne 2003, 133).

Thus, symbols may highlight certain aspects, while concealing others (Edwards and
Wayne 2003, 130, 162). “If presidents can persuade a substantial segment of the public to
adopt symbols that are favorable to them, they will be in a better position to influence
public opinion” (Edwards and Wayne 2003, 131). For instance, “enemies … are
identifiable persons or stereotypes of persons to whom evil traits, intentions, or actions
can be attributed” (1988, 87). If portrayed as a threat to society, symbolic reference to
enemies can help drive policy.
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Bostdorff (1994) says our definition of a foreign crisis and our understanding of
its nature and means of solution are primarily constructed through presidential rhetoric
that includes symbols, rather than by objective, independent means (2). Such symbolladen rhetoric can help determine the course of action presidents choose to take and in
some cases narrow their policy choices by binding them with their own rhetoric (1994,
159).
Use of Metaphors
Metaphors are also useful rhetorical tools in political rhetoric. Metaphors
illustrate parts of the whole meaning. Metaphors can also be thought of as “the more
familiar object to which a less familiar or ambiguous phenomenon is compared”
(Schlesinger and Lau 2000, 613). Metaphors are more abstract than the actual issue.
Schlesinger and Lau (2000) postulate that political elites and the public
communicate about complex policies in part through “reasoning by policy metaphor,”
(611) or comparing proposed policy alternative policies to more readily understood social
institutions, which they define as the “complex combinations of norms, practices, and
organizational arrangements that shape various collective activities.” These are
constructed by sources of cultural authority (which certainly includes presidents) and
personal experience (Schlesinger and Lau 2000, 613). Thus terrorism issues are
described in terms of war (the “war on terrorism”). In fact, like the health policy the
authors studied, terrorism lends itself to policy metaphors because of its “salience,
complexity and multivalent nature.” The public then brings its own experience to the
comparison (Schlesinger and Lau 2000, 614).
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Such metaphors, Schlesinger and Lau (2000) say, make complex issues more
comprehensible because they enable elites and the public to draw upon common
understanding. Reasoning by metaphor occurs, they say, because the average American
knows virtually nothing about public issues, political debates, institutions or lexicons (in
large part because it pays little attention to them). Yet, the public understands and may
even influence policy at some level. Policy metaphors provide mental shortcuts that can
replace ideological reasoning.
Presidents use seemingly simplistic policy metaphors that many people can
understand (that stretch across domains) to argue for their war policy. They may also use
a variety of metaphors so that individuals recognize desirable features in at least one type
(Schlesinger and Lau 2000, 621).
The policy metaphors concept is similar to that of rhetorical frames (indeed
Schlesinger and Lau 2000 call policy metaphors “conceptual frames” and “templates”) or
condensational symbols, and, it is argued here, can be extended beyond public
understanding of social institutions to public understanding of war policy as
communicated through political rhetoric (612).
Political rhetoric is the most powerful vehicle through which such reasoning
occurs by presidents as they command the bully pulpit. Indeed, Schlesinger and Lau
(2000) suggest scholars undertake further research to “attempt to establish a common
language (italics mine) for policy deliberation that is based on a shared understanding of
policy metaphors” (623).
Another reason policy metaphors are powerful, according to Schlesinger and Lau
(2000), is that they have an affective component. “It has long been recognized that much
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of the power of metaphors involves the emotional responses that can induce in a variety
of political or social contexts” (612). But the affective quality of these metaphors is not
just useful for the public – it helps less sophisticated decision makers select policy
alternatives based upon their own emotional responses and the emotional responses they
receive. In addition, such metaphors help less sophisticated decision makers selected
policy alternatives.
In addition to being descriptive, policy metaphors can be prescriptive. As Rein
and Schöen point out, metaphors can generate a “normative leap … from data to
recommendations, from fact to values, from ‘is’ to ‘ought’ that can powerfully shape the
preferences of decision makers” (Schlesinger and Lau 2000, 94). Thus, reasoning by
policy metaphor can be an integral part of problem definition, as well as prescriptive
problem definition (what is predicted will happen if the issue is not addressed the way a
policy maker prescribes).
Schlesinger and Lau (2000) say metaphors are invoked to help the public
understand events that are both novel (terrorism) and long-standing problems (ongoing
war) (612-13). In short, policy metaphors can negate the need for intense intellectual
investment for both the public and decision makers. One could argue they contribute to
mental (and democratic) laziness, or a lack of political sophistication, as easily as one
could argue that they are necessary to process complex information in a complex policymaking process in a complex global environment.
Schlesinger and Lau (2000) take a more charitable approach, saying that the use
of such devices allow the public to make “reasoned (and reasonable) assessments of
policy even if largely ignorant of the details of policy or the workings of American
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politics” (623). But those opposing the Iraq and Vietnam wars might well argue that
demanding and comprehending more details about the policies and the way politics
worked in these situations may have negated the more compelling effect of the nicer
sounding policy metaphors.
Schlesinger and Lau (2000) help summarize why presidents might use metaphors
to make the case for war: (1) to communicate more effectively, (2) to overcome policy
complexities, (3) to appeal to emotions, (4) to take advantage of public ignorance, (5) to
build broad coalitions of support, and (6) to guide their own policy choices.
Brodkin (1987) points to another reason president might use such metaphors. She
says that politicians are unable to manage policy conflict because the “institutions of
governance are both too weak to manage a modern political economy and too porous to
restrict the demands made upon them.” Thus, “administrative agencies may work in
tandem with politicians who try to depoliticize policy choices by reframing them to
appeal to widely shared values” (571). If managing a political economy is ungovernable,
managing international war policy seems even more difficult. Perhaps when policy
complexity increases, presidents draw upon simplistic metaphors all the more in their
attempt at rhetorical management.
Use of Frames
Another rhetorical device used by presidents is framing. A frame is “a central
organizing idea for making sense of an issue or conflict [that] suggests what the
controversy is about and what is at stake.” A frame defines and simplifies a complex
issue. For instance, welfare can be framed as a program to help the poor or as a giveaway
to slackers (Edwards and Wayne 2003, 159).
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According to Lakoff (2008), many people get framing backward: framing comes
before policy. Policy fits the frame, not vice versa. Indeed, he says, “policy is about
fitting frames – moral frames. The mistake is when people think framing is about selling
policy” (67-8). For example,
if health care is framed as ‘health insurance,’ then it will be seen through
an insurance frame, and the policy will fit that frame: it will be a business,
with profits, administrative costs, premiums, actuaries, outsourcing, care
criteria, denial of care to maximize profits and many people not buying
insurance even if it is required by law. Whereas if health care is seen as
protection – on par with policy and fire protection, food safety and so on –
then it becomes part of the moral mission of government, where the role of
government is protection and empowerment (Lakoff 2008, 67-8).
Lakoff says every word is defined relative to a frame or conceptual framework
(Powell 2003). The power of framing is evidenced by the fact that politicians spend
millions of dollars developing language, based upon polling and focus group input they
use to test the framing of their rhetoric.
Moreover, Lakoff (2008) says “language gets its power because it is defined
relative to frames, prototypes, metaphors, narratives, images and emotions (2008, 15). He
says “the neural circuitry need to create frame structures is relatively simple, and so
frames tend to structure a huge amount of our thought” (22).
Edwards and Wayne (2003) say the president’s goal is to influence which
attitudes and information people retrieve from their memories and incorporate into their
judgments of his policies and performance. The frame helps by interacting with “an
individual’s memory to prime certain considerations, making some more accessible than
others and therefore more likely to be used in formulating a political preference.” The
frame serves to raise “the priority and weight that individuals assign to particular
attitudes already stored in their memories” (129).
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Framing demands
less of the public than directly persuading citizens on the merits of a
policy proposal. [With a frame,] the president does not have to persuade
people to change their basic values and preferences. He does not have to
convince citizens to develop expertise and acquire and process extensive
information about the details of a policy proposal. In addition, framing …
[is] less susceptible to distortion by journalists and opponents than direct
persuasion on the merits of a policy proposal (Edwards 2003, 160).

Instead the president often uses simple themes that may have been identified through
public opinion research as favoring his positions (Edwards 2003, 160).
Zaller (1992) says one of the ways the public keeps informed is through
stereotypes and frames, which influence their views (8). Schneider and Ingram (1993)
believe framing through stereotypes determines policy agendas and that framing often
involves creating “us” and “them” categories (338-339).
Presidential Religious Rhetoric; Moral Leadership 23
Throughout American history, presidents have used religious rhetoric to rally
Americans and the world to the cause of spreading freedom and democracy, especially in
times of global hostilities. Cold War presidential rhetoric provides some examples. As
such, they have assumed a role as moral leaders, or what I like to call “priests-in-chief.”
Some view President Woodrow Wilson’s faith as a primary influence on his
foreign policy, while others have seen it as a vague guide. But some scholars have been
struck by President Harry Truman’s “explicit grounding in religious dogma and imagery”
as demonstrated in a 1949 address to Christians and Jews: “The defense of mankind
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The problem in trying to sum up the literature on this subject is that it crosses so many disciplines, none
of which specifically combines pre-war religious rhetoric by presidents, especially in the context of
problem definition. Among the disciplines: communications, diplomatic history, foreign policy, literature,
public policy, political science, sociology and religion.
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against these attacks lies in the faith we profess – the brotherhood of man and the
Fatherhood of God” (Truman 1949). Similarly, President Dwight D. Eisenhower
proclaimed in 1954: “Democracy is nothing in the world but a spiritual conviction, a
conviction that each of us is enormously valuable because of a certain standing before our
own God” (Eisenhower 1954). And likewise President John F. Kennedy said in his 1961
inaugural address, “The same revolutionary beliefs for which our forebears fought are
still at issue around the globe – the belief that the rights of man come not from the
generosity of the state but from the hand of God” (Kennedy 1961). Johnson, too, quoted
Scripture and made some references to a secular American religion.
President Jimmy Carter is seen as basing his foreign policy on a promotion of
human rights that reflected his religious beliefs, according to his national security adviser.
President Ronald Reagan was explicit about using religion as his guide in foreign policy,
relying upon an Old Testament view of good and evil in the Cold War and apocalyptic
themes from the Book of Revelation in his view of the threat of nuclear war. Few would
doubt the importance of religion to the policies of the current president, George W. Bush
(Preston 2006). 24
Scholars say we need to know more about how religious views informed the
foreign policies of other presidents in the 20th Century, including that of President
Johnson (Preston 2006, 807). To this it is worth adding that, although President Bush’s
religious beliefs are more evident in his rhetoric, we also need to know how his views
informed his policies.

24

Preston says diplomatic historians “have been quick to point out the essential continuities between
Bush’s post-9/11 foreign policy and … the influence of religion” (2006, 784).
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Typically, presidents’ religious rhetoric is the “rhetoric of virtue,” Sicherman
(2007) says. This “derives clearly from religious elements, mostly Protestant Christianity,
but is sufficiently vague to [en]compass the multiple faiths that have distinguished
Americans from the outset” (170). He says “the United States, perhaps more than other
countries, still invokes a religiously derived rhetoric of virtue” (2007, 113). However,
Sicherman (2007) found that when presidents relied upon this American civil religion, 25
although based upon theological ideas, to combat another religion (Islamism, for
example), it didn’t “travel well” (113). 26 He found this especially true when that religious
language embodied American exceptionalism and universalism, which are meaningful to
domestic audiences but hard to export, or when it was “joined to the national interest and
pragmatic demands of the rest of the American foreign policy credo” (Sicherman 2007,
118). Sicherman (2007) concludes, “It should be clear that religion, insofar as its civil
American religion is concerned, works primarily and best for American audiences” (118).
In their study of religious rhetoric in American populism, Rhys and Alexander
(1994) found American civil religion is “generally is understood as a religious discourse
that relates the nation to transcendent sources of meaning and destiny” and that it has
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Sociologist Robert Bellah coined the term “civil religion” in the late 1960s to describe a general, quasireligious view of public life – “the religion of the republic,” so to speak. It embodies a vague, complex
public myth and symbolism found in all biblical faiths, but espouses no one faith in particular. Few debate
civil religion exists, but they do debate whether it is a positive force (social glue for the country that
legitimates national life) or a negative force (a tool used cynically in political rhetoric that includes hollow
rituals during national celebrations and national grieving and, as used by fundamentalists, a type of
religious nationalism). See http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/ed253a/american_civil_religion.html for
more definitions and further discussion.
26
As Sicherman (2007) further points out, especially with regards to Bush and the Iraq War, “American
exceptionalism and its universalism are in the end derived from a religious approach, but are not
synonymous with religion itself. Meaningful to domestic audiences, this rhetoric is hard to export,
especially when it encounters a ‘religious religion’ such as Islam. And such verbiage is even harder to
sustain when joined to the national interest and pragmatic demands of the rest of the American foreign
policy credo” (118).
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priestly and prophetic orientations in that it celebrates and criticizes (4). They call civil
religious language an elastic symbol that has a
transcendent moral standard and wide cultural resonance, … without
sectarian divisiveness … It ties together understandings of God’s will with
national history and projects a mandate for rightly guided action onto all
members of the national community (Rhys & Alexander 1994, 4).
Preston (2006) has noted the striking, continuing and integral role of religion in
the formation, execution and justification of American foreign policy. But he also says
the influence of religion in this process has been “relatively neglected and generally
unrecognized” by diplomatic historians (784):
Independently, religion and foreign relations [we could just as easily
substitute ‘foreign policy’] are two of the most important and exhaustively
studied aspects of American history. Religion has consistently been one of
the dominant forces in shaping American culture, politics, economics and
national identity. Indeed, the United States is the only major industrialized
democracy where religion is as salient today as it was three centuries ago
… And yet, despite some specific exceptions, … these two great
disciplines are rarely, if ever, comprehensively or effectively bridged
(Preston 2006, 786).
Pagels discusses the power of religious references by presidents, noting “many
people think that religion is benign,” but it can be “enormously divisive,” “can reinforce
divisions,” “can demonize the opposition” and can “imply that anyone who is not
Christian, much less evangelical, is not a real American” (Lawton 2003).
Richard Cizik of the National Association of Evangelicals says “Americans not
only expect this language of their presidents, … they respect it” because “this is a nation
with a soul of a church.” He says American presidents, who act as heads of state and
leaders of a political party, have the function of priest or pastor, especially when it comes
to trying to help a nation heal of its wounds. Cizik sees it as appropriate for presidents to

59

bring their theology to the issues and argues this is not necessarily a partisan act (Lawton
2003).
But for Professor Steve Tipton of Emory University, public emphasis on
American civil religion may be more appropriate at certain times than at others. He says
“one of the things that’s most revealing about religion in public or religious language and
moral rhetoric from the public pulpit – and particularly from the presidential podium – is:
what is the occasion?” (Lawton 2003).
Rhys and Alexander (1994) say religious rhetoric can provide a “politically
legitimate vocabulary” for a president seeking to explain himself, mobilize adherents,
persuade bystanders and neutralize opponents” (Rhys and Alexander 1994, 3). They say
the ideological frames of religious rhetoric are “laced with symbols that resonate at
affective levels” (1994, 3). Rhys and Alexander add that civil religion is “understood as a
religious discourse” and has “justified imperialism, legitimated inequality and contributed
to political quiescence” (4).
Populist religious discourse, Rhys & Alexander note, referred to the “United
States’ place in a divine order and the social contract as a sacred covenant.” It “assumed
that the nation’s religious heritage gives it a responsibility for moral action.” Populism’s
religious rhetoric frames offered “coherent diagnoses of current societal evils [and]
prescribed a better future society (Rhys & Alexander 1994, 13). “Thus, such discourse
provided a way to interpret events, a central ideological frame, gave the movement
legitimacy [and] provided adherents a language and a transcendent vision of a just
society” (Rhys & Alexander 1994, 14).
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Amy Tilton Jones found that President George H.W. Bush’s speeches to
religiously conservative audiences attempted to firm up his base by providing moralreligious justification for the first Gulf War (in Medhurst 2006). Rachel Martin Harlow
demonstrates how Bush Sr. bridged the vast differences in culture and political power to
defend U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf War by framing the agents of war in
opposing terms and thus polarizing the conflict (in Medhurst 2006). Harlow says Bush
Sr.’s “god-term of leadership allowed Americans to take diplomatic and military
initiative without appearing as controlling and belligerent as would otherwise have been
the case” (in Medhurst 2006, 75).
The personal religious lives of presidents also can influence their worldview and
therefore their rhetoric, as well as how their rhetoric is perceived. Bailey (2008) argues
George W. Bush rhetorically achieved personal and political transformation before the
electorate in his 2000 presidential campaign by rhetorically conforming his conversion to
Christianity to the Pauline conversion narrative of the Bible 27 , thus enabling Bush,
among other things, to “create a sense of “consubstantiality” with evangelical Christians
and to “declare his previous transgressions off limits for public scrutiny” (215). Indeed,
Bailey (2008) says, “there is much to be learned about how religious elements, like the
Pauline conversion form, inspire public policy initiatives and the rhetoric offered in
support of them” (232).
Ivie (2007) sees in the Bush’s war rhetoric on evil, in the “war on terror” and in
the invasion of Iraq a “reframing [of] the question of national security into one of a
chosen people’s recurring quest for redemption,” complete with a biblical “scapegoat.”

27

This conversion narrative, according to Bailey, includes a Transgression Phase, a Transformation Phase
and a Commissioning Phase.
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Ivie says Bush “spoke to a Christian America in the language of a Christian man
crusading for a righteous cause by declaring an unrestricted war on evil” (223). He calls
such “ritualized perceptions of peril” the “engine of unreflective policy making” (2007,
221). Ivie (2007) notes that Murphy has observed that Bush’s post-9/11 rhetorical world
was “governed by theistic essence,” “filled with heroes and villains, divided by good and
evil, and given purpose by God’s will, which was to be fulfilled by people of faith and
character opposed to evil.” Noon has concluded that “Bush’s providential certainty” and
“prophetic dualism” “supplanted critical thought with the righteous pursuit of ‘moral
security’ against ‘evildoers’” (Ivie 2007, 223-4).
Bailey (2008) says the prominence of Bush’s Pauline conversion form in his
electoral discourse, in which he claimed to be guided by a higher power, gave his
discourse the prospect of rhetorical legitimacy for the 46 percent of Americans who claim
to be born-again Christians. Even for those evangelical Christians who don’t agree with
Bush’s aggressive response to 9/11 or the Iraq War, “Bush’s claims of waging war under
divine sanction are more likely to resonate with them because of the prevalence of the
Pauline form in the evangelical tradition” (233) and because the rhetorical framework of
religious, political and moral certitude among religious voters that Bush established in his
2000 electoral rhetoric has remained in operation (Bailey 2008, 233). As proof, Bailey
points out that 80 percent of religious Republicans continued to support the war in June
2007, compared to 40 percent of the general public. Bailey (2008) says
studies of Bush’s presidential rhetoric should acknowledge that the
certitude it often manifests may appear, at least for those able to identify
with Bush’s conversion experience, to be a reasonable extension of his
divine call (233).
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Unfortunately, similar studies of how Johnson’s religious worldview and
experience affected his public policy rhetoric are not easy to find. Dartmouth University
visiting religious professor Randall Balmer, who has studied Johnson in terms of how he
applied his teachings in religion to his political promises as president, says of Johnson,
“His mother taught him that the strong have an obligation to care for the weak … This
explains why Lyndon Johnson pushed for civil rights at considerable political cost to
himself. It also explains his Great Society ambitions” (Lim 2008).
In examining how faith shaped presidents from Kennedy to Bush, Balmer
particularly focuses on politicization of religion, including the “soft religiosity” of
Johnson’s Great Society. Johnson, Balmer (2008) tells us, did not come from a clear
religious lineage, but rather a mixture of influences from Baptist to Christadelphian (4950). “Johnson himself, however, evinced little piety, and what little he showed during his
long career of public life could be properly be called perfunctory, even performative”
(2008, 51). As Time magazine put it, “Lyndon Johnson belongs to those whose beliefs
were formed by inheritance” (“Johnson’s Faith,” 1964).
Preston (2006), in chronicling the influence of religion on the foreign policy of a
number of presidents, concludes, “We need to know much more about how religion
affected the foreign policies of other major figures of the twentieth century, such as…
Lyndon Johnson…” (808). He cautioned that “if studies of religion and foreign relations
are to have any impact on the field, they must … be able to illustrate, to some degree, a
relationship and cause and effect between religious matters and diplomatic events”
(Preston 2006, 809).
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Presidents seek to establish moral leadership through their rhetoric. One way they
do this is to “preach, reminding the American people of religious and moral principles
and urging them to conduct themselves in accord with these principles” (Hinckley 1990,
73).
Bostdorff (1994) found presidents appealed to revered ideals to rationalize the
cost of human life, the depletion of the nation’s economic reserves and other sacrifices by
“endowing them with a transcendent meaning” (210). She says “bloody military
interventions apparently become more palatable to citizens, even heroic, when presidents
can successfully imbue them with moral purpose” (1994, 210).
Hinckley (1990) found presidents frequently cited God, American founders and
great presidents in their speeches (55). She argues that “presidents do not engage in
political activity.” Rather
they engage in moral – and explicitly religious and moral principles [and
urge people] to conduct themselves in accord with these principles. They
lead prayers, quote from the Bible, and make theological statements about
the Deity and His desires for the nation … They are the moral leaders and
high priests of the American society (Bostdorff 1990, 73-74).
Indeed, Hinckley (1990) says presidents are consciously cultivating this impression of
themselves.
Hinckley (1990) also found presidential rhetoric from Truman through Nixon was
replete with apocalyptic imagery. Thus,
Truman describes the international situation as a war between good and
evil, lightness and dark, and Eisenhower sees the forces of good and evil
massed and armed and opposed, as rarely before in history. Kennedy says
that a trumpet summons us in mankind’s hour of maximum danger;
Johnson prophesies that the hour and the day and the time are here; and
Nixon announces the beginning of the third millennium (76).
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Hinckley (1990) noted that “principles, virtues, and goodness are heard in almost every
address. Decency, obligation, and duty are mentioned frequently” (76).
Hinckley (1990) found Republicans are somewhat more likely than Democrats to
use religious references (78). She says some evidence suggests presidents believe in, and
take seriously, their role of moral and religious leadership, pointing out a Kennedy
adviser’s comment that “our presidents today have to be a personal model, a cultural
articulator, and a semi-priest or semi-tribal leader” and that “it will be less important in
years to come for presidents to work out programs and serve as administrators than it will
be for presidents … to serve as educational and psychic leaders.” She quotes a Nixon aide
who said presidents must be a combination of “leading man, God, father, hero, pope,
king” (1990, 78-79).
Religious symbolism is also important. Wilson (1979) says “the dynamics of
American society have … made the realm of religious symbols and language a primary
means of establishing differentiation and claiming uniqueness, albeit in a way not
threatening to national unity” (47).
Dante Germino calls the American public philosophy “theocentric,” or Godcentered, and says that from the beginning presidents have emphasized God in their
addresses. Hinckley says this tradition is part of a larger American emphasis on civil
religion (a nation “under God”) that is apparent in its pledges, inscriptions and currency,
including weekly prayer breakfasts in Congress. Thus, she says presidents “are expected
to be moral leaders for a moral nation” and “the religious tradition has been heightened
and institutionalized to become a major feature of the modern presidency” (Hinckley
1990, 79). As Germino puts it, “in the American public philosophy as expressed by
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presidents throughout American history, ‘God has made … America his chosen country’”
(Hinckley 1990, 83; Germino 1984, 6).
Hinckley (1990) found presidents portrayed the nation as moral by saying the
nation seeks peace and freedom in the world, symbolizes freedom, tries to lead other
nations to freedom and by emphasizing, as Eisenhower put it, that destiny has laid upon
the country the responsibility of the free world’s leadership. Hinckley also found
presidents attributed morality to the nation through its supposed association with God, in
that its mission of freedom has been given directly by God or the nation has at least
received a divine blessing. Nixon associated the nation’s destiny with the will of God.
Kennedy implied that the nation’s acts are God’s work. And Truman said God had set
before the nation the greatest task in mankind’s history. Hinckley says Johnson merely
said “the nation has been ‘allowed by God to seek greatness through its own work and
spiritual strength’’’ (83).
Robertson (1980) summarizes:
The mission and the destiny were inherent in the Revolution: democratic
government, equality, and individual pursuit of happiness were the
legitimate inheritance of all mankind … and Americans were charged by
God (as His chosen people) to represent all mankind and to bring the
blessings of His inheritance to the world (69).

So, Hinckley (1990) says, “the nation is moral because of its connection with the larger
divine purpose” (84). Hinckley (1990) found that the modern presidents she studied were
three times more likely than their predecessors to use religious words and phrases, stating
the nation’s mission in the world in religious terms, whereas earlier presidents showed no
consistency in doing so (116, 118).
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Hinckley (1990) also found presidents justified the nation as moral by saying “it
seeks no territory or personal aggrandizement as it pursues its world mission. It is
altruistic and innocent of selfish ends” (84). She quotes Calvin Coolidge’s inaugural
address of 1925 to emphasize how ingrained this philosophy has been:
America seeks no earthly empire built on blood or force. No ambition, no
temptation, lures her to thought of foreign domination. The legions which
she sends forth are armed, not with the sword, but with the cross. The
higher state to which she seeks the allegiance of all mankind is not of
human, but of divine origin. She cherishes no purpose save to merit the
favor of Almighty God (1990, 87).
Blanchard (1978) says the idea that this country is not a bully provides us added
ammunition when attacked:
We can strike all the more forcefully if we are provoked, that is, if we can
believe that the other fellow started it … The very fact that the other
person strikes first releases us from all restraint. He becomes a ‘bad’
person (or nation), and it becomes acceptable for us to punish him (2327). 28
Hinckley (1990) found the presidents she studied were more alike than unlike in
“their willingness to act as moral leaders and tell the people what is the Divine Will in
regard to administration proposals” and “to some extent, presidents are merely expressing
what they believe the public wants to hear” (86).
In her analyses of the annual and inaugural addresses from George Washington
through Bill Clinton, Shogan (2002) argues that “moral and religious rhetoric should not
be viewed simply as a reflection of presidential character or as a fulfillment of American
‘civil religion,’ but as a strategic tool to enhance independent power and authority”
(2002, iii).

28

See also Margaret Mead in “And Keep Your Powder Dry” (New York: Morrow, 1965), 150, 151; and
Gabriel Almond in “The People and Foreign Policy” (New York: Praeger, 1962), 69-72.
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Presidential Policy Leadership Through Rhetoric
It is difficult to define presidential leadership. Rather, we tend to discuss the
qualities of what we consider to be good leaders. There are various theories of leadership
that can be applied to presidents. This study examines presidential leadership as exercised
through communication, including rhetoric and images, rather than through policies,
management, etc. Therefore, this is a selective look at the voluminous literature on
leadership.
Presidents are the only institutional figures in American government with a
national constituency. They are “potentially in a position to formulate timely and
coherent policy responses to national problems” (Brodkin 1987, 573). As Kingdon says
of the president, “No other single actor in the political system has quite the capability of
the president to set agendas” (Kingdon 1984, 25). And they do this largely through their
rhetoric.
Leading the public is at the core of the modern presidency: “Both politics and
policy revolve around presidents’ attempts to garner public support, both for themselves
and for their policies” (Edwards 2003, 4). Not only must the president earn public
support, but he must actively take his case to the people – in a kind of permanent
campaign to persuade or mobilize the citizenry (2003, 4, 5).
Freud (1921) said a leader must establish strong affective ties between himself
and his followers, must be representative of the people and must be able to suggest a
wide variety of beliefs, emotions and behaviors through ideas vividly expressed. He
must be able to convey the importance of just and equal treatment. And his prestige is
dependent upon success and lost in the event of failure.
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There are various types of leaders described in the literature (transformational,
transactional, etc.). However, these are not particularly relevant here as they do not seem
to place high value upon rhetorical leadership. One of the chief ways presidents lead is
through oratory, of which Winston Churchill said, “He who enjoys it wields a power
more durable than that of a great king” (Edwards 2003, 5).
Both Freud (1921) and Hogg (2001) discuss the use of rhetoric and polemic to
manipulate emotions and retain influence. Gardner (1995) particularly emphasizes that
the central element of leadership is telling identity stories. Good leaders tell dynamic,
unfolding stories “about themselves and their groups, about where they were coming
from and where they were headed, about what was to be feared, struggled against, and
dreamed about.” The leader and his followers are the “principal characters or heroes”
(14).
Freud argued that leaders influence through words and ideas. Gardner (1995)
sharpened this focus by “showing that the leader's words and ideas generally focus on
identity, inspiring and leading followers by providing a vision or story about where a
group is going, and what needs to be done to get there” (Goethals 2005, 554).
Gardner (1995) says the stories of most successful political leaders revitalize
themes that have been important to the group. Ronald Reagan, for example, revitalized a
story of American goodness and greatness that had come unraveled during the
administrations of his four immediate predecessors, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter.
Gardner (1995) also distinguishes between stories that are inclusive, telling about
the common identities of many people, and exclusive stories, which emphasize the
differences between in-groups and out-groups, and trumpet the virtues of the in-group
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(Goethals 2005, 555), similar to antithetical appeals. Hogg (2001, 2003) describes
leaders who seek to retain leadership by redefining the in-group prototype in a selfserving manner and whose stories are exclusionary (Goethals 2005, 555).
According to Goethals (2005),
followers thirst for leadership, they are highly suggestible by the ideas
forcefully expressed and vividly embodied by a leader, they have strong
emotional attachments to leaders … Followers have leader schemas such
that they expect leaders, particularly presidents, to be strong, active, and
good (557).

Indeed, Bligh, Kohles and Meindl (2004) point out that “leadership is a function
of leaders and followers embedded in a rich web of negotiated meaning and contextual
variables” (562). Image through words and deeds is crucial for presidents, for instance, in
gaining trust for their leadership. Edwards and Wayne (2003) note that “while engaging
in these and other functions, presidents often make appeals to patriotism, traditions, and
U.S. history (and its greatness) to move the public to support them, thus reminding
people of their common interests. They also frequently invoke the names of revered
leaders of the past who made difficult decisions on the basis of high principles” (133).
Michael Deaver, Reagan’s public relations person, adds that “image is sometimes as
useful as substance” (Edwards and Wayne 2003, 135).
In their attempt to lead the public by rhetoric, presidents try to speak directly to
the people, rather than relying on the media as a filter. Thus they give in-person speeches
and addresses in their attempt to “go public,” as Kernell (1997) puts it. When presidents
go public, they often try to persuade citizens by simplifying complex, multidimensional
public policy that is subject to widely different interpretations and opposing views. They
use tools such as symbols and metaphors, which may tap into general values. They try to
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relate widely held values to policy, events or their own performance, and show the public
that their position lines up with perceived public values. In doing so, they try to influence
the values the public uses to evaluate policy (Edwards and Wayne 2003, 128,129).
Ferejohn (1990) says:
leaders retain their hold on their positions by convincing others, citizens
and potential challengers, that they are willing to undertake retaliatory
actions that … may not really be costly to them … As long as followers
are not sure that acts of leadership are costly, they won’t find it
worthwhile to challenge the politician’s authority (10).
Bostdorff (1994) says presidents have put that tendency toward violence in the
best possible light, insisting they and the country are peaceful and principled, that they
are forced to act because of the instigation of others and out of dedication to American
freedom. They characterize military interventions as unavoidable, imperative and as tests
of national commitment (223).
Bostdorff (1994) refutes previous studies that have shown presidents rely heavily
on scapegoating, victimage, portrayal of a wicked enemy and other antithetical appeals to
rally citizens behind them and their policies, noting that Johnson, among others, rarely
indulged in this. But those who do so focus on creating a diabolical villain who poses a
great threat to the United States, most often a country but sometimes an individual (223224). In the process, people of a particular nationality are portrayed as a monolithic bloc
(Bostdorff 1994, 225).
Slotkin (1973) argues that Americans historically have treated violence as a
means of regeneration, and Hale (1983) says “the American social order is based on the
values of profit, conflict, competition, ‘stand and fight,’ etc.” Presidents have merely
internalized these values. Therefore, Hale argues, “modern presidents, when faced with a
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perceived ‘crisis,’ have resorted to some type of violence, thinking it to be a
demonstration of courage” (420).
We have discussed the moral role of presidents through their rhetoric. Hinckley
(1990) calls them the “moral leaders and high priests of the American society” (73), the
“cultural and religious leaders of the nation. They lead prayers, quote from the Bible, and
urge their congregation to look to matters of the spirit” (Hinckley 1990, 132).
Hart (1994) says the longer a president is in power, the more he begins “to feel
that his will and the Nation’s are isomorphic, that he has become America incarnate”
(249-64). Hinckley (1990) confirms this with her study of modern presidents, noting
fewer self-references. Her studies show there is a belief that “the president is a moral
leader closely associated with God, who will articulate and unify the people around a
national mission” (135).
War policy leadership through rhetoric has its own unique features. Presidents
have the advantage of being the only elected officials with national constituencies (which
empowers them) and of having a bully pulpit to wield that power. When it comes to
foreign affairs, presidents have an added advantage as citizens put great trust in them in
this area.
War is a foreign policy crisis, and presidents can establish leadership by invoking
such a crisis. Crises can compel an issue onto an agenda if people believe there is a
problem or preexisting perception. Bostdorff (1994) says “because foreign locales are so
distant and knowledge of them is far removed from most Americans’ daily lives,
presidents must persuasively advance claims of crisis in order to prompt public support
for their crisis policies” (1).
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We look to presidents especially during crisis, especially when they propose war.
Presidents have a unique leadership opportunity to structure public perception during
such times. Presidents seem to acknowledge that citizens want them to address crises fast,
which is difficult in the case of terrorism and intractable wars. Barber (1974) notes that
Americans want a president to be a “take-charge man, a turner of wheels, a producer of
progress even if that means some sacrifice of serenity” (145). Edelman (1977) adds that
citizens’ desire for “resolute action is even greater in a crisis (49).
Successful crisis promotion allows the president to increase his personal
credibility, or supply of public goodwill, which he can draw upon during future policy
decisions” (Bostdorff 1994, 8). Presidents then use crisis promotion to “accrue valuable
symbolic reserves so that long after the successful resolution of a crisis, it may continue
to serve as a powerful reminder of the nation’s triumph” (Bostdorff 1994, 8). Edelman
(1964, 6) and Graber (1976, 289-321) call this a “condensational symbol” in the sense
that presidents may refer to it again to “distribute symbolic reassurance” (Bostdorff 1994,
8). For instance, Bostdorff (1994) notes that two months after the Gulf of Tonkin
incident, Johnson still referred to his “limited and fitting response” to reassure voters of
his leadership intentions in Vietnam, building on his election campaign against Barry
Goldwater in which he presented himself as a man of peace who used good judgment and
restraint in the Tonkin crises. In this, Bostdorff says, Johnson “replenished his symbolic
reserve for future use” (1994, 9).
However, Bostdorff (1994) is concerned presidents use crisis promotion to create
an imperial presidency. She says “presidents have used foreign crises to accrue more
power and, in turn, have relied on public and congressional acceptance of power
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usurpation to promote more crises” (2). She says “presidents promote a sense of crisis
whether they believe such an assertion is justified or whether they simply believe such an
allegation is politically expedient” (1994, 2).
Bostdorff (1994) says presidents “today involve the nation in military intervention
in other countries almost at will” (2). And she notes that “the relationship between power
and discourse appears to be symbiotic” (1994, 234). For instance, “presidential rhetors
[use] their discourse about foreign crises to … [allow] them to expand their powers and
to enhance their political standing” (Bostdorff 1994, 207). She found presidents
“heightened the significance of each crisis scene when they depicted it as one that
challenged American principles and proclaimed that the protection of these principles
was a necessary goal of presidential crisis management” (1994, 210). Bostdorff (1994)
concludes, “Commanders-in-chief have employed crisis promotion to accrue more
power, and then used accumulated power to promote more crises” (14).

Conclusion
This review of the literature on presidential rhetoric (including problem definition
in presidential rhetoric), policy typologies, the nature of political rhetoric, presidential
rhetoric as a policy tool, the rhetorical presidency (including foreign crisis rhetoric,
antithetical appeals, use of symbols, use of frames and religious rhetoric; moral
leadership) and presidential policy leadership through rhetoric suggests it might be worth
studying how presidents use rhetoric to define the need for war in similar and different
ways.
The research shows that presidents have tremendous persuasion power when they
wield the bully pulpit, especially on foreign crisis issues. How they rhetorically define the
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problem frames their proposed solution to the problem as they see it. Their word choices
(including antithetical word choices) and emphases, their narrative and causal stories
(assignation of blame), their referential and condensational symbols, and their framing of
the problem may even affect the neural circuitry of our brains (Lakoff 2008). Thus there
is a manipulative element to presidential rhetoric.
Rhetorical problem definition by presidents may reinforce American myths of
manifest destiny, buttressed by religious and moral rhetoric. And by virtue of their
rhetorical power, especially in a foreign crisis, commanders-in-chief may discourage
dissent through their rhetoric by implying that other interpretations evidence a lack of
patriotism. As presidents classify the need for war policy, they tap into the social
regulatory policy components of norms, values and moral codes of conduct. They engage
in meaning selection. Their political rhetoric is full of validity claims that emphasize the
moral rightness of their arguments. As a result, presidential rhetoric may enhance
leadership and moral powers.
The following Data and Methods chapter explains the criteria for selecting data,
the design of the research and the method used to analyze the speeches of Johnson and
Bush (including grounded theory).
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CHAPTER THREE – DATA, RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This chapter discusses the characteristics of the data, the research design
(including the research questions) and the methodology employed in this work. The data
section includes a discussion of the speeches chosen for analysis; speech sources and
selection criteria; and a list of the speeches, where they were given, the date they were
given and their web addresses. The list is summarized in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. The research
design section features a discussion of the theory upon which this work relies, the
reasoning for comparing the Johnson and Bush speeches, research expectations,
advantages and disadvantages of the research design, and problems and challenges
related to the design. The methodology section discusses how the content of speeches
was analyzed using the computer program, NVivo 7, the capabilities of the program,
descriptive categories that arose from the data and methods used to measure the speeches.
The research questions are as follows:
1) How did these presidents use rhetoric to try to talk us into war?
2) How were their addresses similar and different in terms of the words and
emphases they used?
3) How did they frame their causal stories in terms of who (or what) was to
blame for the circumstances or events precipitating the war/conflict?
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Data
Speeches Chosen For Analysis
The Johnson data consist of the president’s pre-Vietnam-War-escalation speeches,
from the day he was sworn into office after President Kennedy’s assassination
(November 22, 1963) to his major address at Johns Hopkins University of April 7,
1965. 29 His first address mentioning Vietnam was his state of the union address on
November 27, 1963. The Bush data consist of the pre-Iraq-War speeches by the president
from September 11, 2001 (commonly known as 9/11) until March 18, 2003, the day
before the invasion of Iraq (American time). However, the last speech chosen that met the
criteria was on March 17, 2003.
Speech Sources and Selection Criteria
The speeches were selected from a variety of sources, in both print and electronic
format. Primary among them was the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States, which is published by the U.S. Office of the Federal Register and is the official
publication of U.S. presidents’ public writings, addresses and remarks. The Public
Papers are published in annual print volumes and online through the U.S. Government
Printing Office (online versions are only available from 1991 forward). 30 They list the

29

This research ends with the Hopkins speech rather than the Gulf of Tonkin incident (August 2 and 4,
1964) speech because Johnson did not make a consummate speech laying out why the United States was in
Vietnam until the Hopkins address. In addition, just prior to that speech, on March 5, 1965, he had given
orders for the commencement of Operation Rolling Thunder, which escalated the war. Historians have
debated the authenticity of the Gulf of Tonkin incident, saying the administration’s justification for
retaliation “proved to be based largely on seriously flawed intelligence and possibly, according to some
critics, manipulated” (Prados 2004).
30
See http://www.gpoaccess.gov/pubpapers/
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presidential addresses, radio and television broadcasts, speeches to Congress, short
messages, news conferences, and speeches given on the road. 31
All the print volumes for Johnson and Bush were manually examined to select
speeches, then checked with various online sources. For each president, speeches were
electronically loaded into NVivo from the online resources.
As there were no online Public Papers for Johnson, the online Lyndon Baines
Johnson Presidential Library and Museum 32 was used to load electronic copy into NVivo.
The online library only makes available selected speeches and messages, so the online
American Presidency Project 33 also was used.
For Bush, the resources used were the online Public Papers, the White House
web site archives and the online American Presidency Project. The latter two sources
were used because at the beginning of the research, the online Public Papers version did
not contain all the relevant Bush speeches. The online Public Papers provide the
convenient Document Categories of “Addresses to the Nation” and “Addresses and
Remarks,” which allow more easy selection of major addresses. For Bush, only highly
topical speeches, especially (but not limited to) those listed under “Iraq” or “terrorism,”
were selected from the “Addresses and Remarks” category.
31

“The public activity of presidents is listed in The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States.
The Public Papers, in annual volumes, lists all presidential addresses, radio and television broadcasts,
speeches to Congress, short messages, news conferences, and speeches on the road. Typically, the format,
subject, audience, time, and place are provided … In short, the compilation provides a comprehensive and
authoritative record of the president’s public and verbal activity, from George Washington to the present.
This record is limited to actions that are presidentially defined and excludes the following categories:
nonpublic actions, as in White House conversations, available only through the accounts of participants;
actions by other officials – such as cabinet members or White House aides – taken in the name of the
administration; and purely nonverbal appearances” (Hinckley 1990, 18). However, presidents included in
the online Public Papers only date from 1991, meaning Johnson is not included.
32
See http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu
33
The American Presidency Project, established in 1999, is an online collaboration between John Woolley
and Gerhard Peters at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Its archives contain 84,345 documents
related to the study of the presidency. See http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/

78

All speeches chosen for Johnson and Bush were delivered in person or were
televised live. 34 Only one radio address was used, and that was for Johnson. For an
address to be considered major, it had to be “a speech before a nationwide audience:
inaugural addresses and nationally broadcast speeches to Congress and the American
people” (Hinckley 1990, 19), or a speech that marked a significant milestone,
substantively pertained to the war, was given to a prominent audience and may or may
not have been broadcast, but may have gotten news coverage. As Johnson spoke
sparingly of the Vietnam War, and often in the context of peace and foreign policy, the
researcher’s inclination was to be more generous in including one of his speeches that
might pertain to war, even if Johnson said little about the war or just seemed to allude to
it generally, especially if it was a major speech within the time frame specified in this
research. This was done for the sake of having enough comparative data in relation to the
Bush speeches, as Bush spoke prolifically and specifically about the need for his war.
Speeches to large interest groups (such as the AFL-CIO, conferences of U.S. attorneys,
groups of lower level-officials, such as mayors, and large religious groups) were used, as
were foreign addresses.
Minor speeches, such as those given to a special audience (Hinckley 1990, 19),
were excluded. In their study of the impact of presidential speeches, Brace and Hinckley
(1993) classified major speeches as “all live addresses televised to a national audience”
(385). By inference, minor speeches are not necessarily live and not necessarily televised
to a national audience.
34

When this project was begun, some of the Bush speeches were not available from the online GPO Public
Papers of the Presidents, where speeches are categorized and therefore easier to evaluate for importance to
this work. It was therefore necessary to rely upon the White House web site, and now those links all
connect to Spanish versions. Near the end of the project, there was much more online availability. Thus, as
speeches were chosen at the beginning of this work, it was very much a judgment call as to what to include.
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Also excluded were remarks pertaining to appointments and nominations, bill
signings, communications to Congress, communications to federal agencies, directives,
interviews with the news media, joint statements, letters and messages, meetings with
foreign leaders and international officials, resignations and retirements, and statements by
the president, all categories used by the Office of the Federal Register and the
Government Printing Office in the print and online versions of the Public Papers.
Also excluded were introductions of new cabinet members and radio addresses,
with the exception of one Johnson address used in this category, again for the sake of
having enough comparative data in relation to the Bush speeches. Bush gave many radio
addresses on the war and on terrorism, in addition to his abundance of other addresses,
which were excluded. Campaign speeches and single-community speeches to relatively
small groups (such as federal employees, corporations, etc.) were also excluded.
The criteria for using speeches was also based upon the amount of references to
the war (with exceptions made for Johnson, as noted), the intended public nature of the
speech, the news value of the speech (state of the union addresses, for instance, are highly
publicized) and the importance of the venue. Using these criteria and what Neuendorf
(2002) calls “immersion in the message pool” (in this case, reading all the speeches of the
two presidents prior to the beginning or escalation of their wars), the researcher
discovered which speeches it made sense to use for this study (72).
Thus, this research analyzes 29 Bush speeches and 16 Johnson speeches. The
Johnson speeches totaled 1,084 inches of copy, and the Bush speeches totaled 1,167
inches of copy, as measured in the print version of the Public Papers, which standardizes
line length. Although there was some difference in formatting the printed copy for the
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two presidents, measurements were made to ensure that there was an equivalency so that
each could be counted in the same way. The count was made by manually measuring the
length of the copy in the Public Papers using a ruler. Only the copy of the speech and
any included speech headings were measured, including the small amount of space
preceding and following any headings. Neither the introductory information (name of
speech, date delivered), nor the ending notations (when and where the speech was given
and any supplementary information about the speech or its audience) was measured.
Copy inches were rounded up or down to the .25 inch measure, depending on which was
closest. The speeches were measured twice for reliability purposes.
List of Speeches
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 list the speeches that were chosen for Johnson and Bush,
respectively, by president, name of the speech, locale of the speech, date of the speech
and online source.
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Table 3.1. Pre War-Escalation Speeches by President Lyndon B. Johnson:
November 27, 1963 to April 7, 1965
Name

Locale

(1) Address Before a
Joint Session of the
Congress

U.S. Capitol

(2) Annual Message
to the Congress on
the State of the
Union
(3) Remarks to the
Legislative
Conference of the
Building and
Construction Trades
Department, AFLCIO
(4) Remarks on
Foreign Affairs at
the Associated Press
Luncheon
(5) Radio and
Television Report to
the American People
Following Renewed
Aggression in the
Gulf of Tonkin*
(6) Remarks at
Syracuse University
on the Communist
Challenge in
Southeast Asia

U.S. Capitol

Date
Web Address
1963
11/27 http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson
/archives.hom/speeches.hom/631127
.asp
1964
1/8
http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson
/archives.hom/speeches.hom/640108
.asp

Sheraton Park
Hotel,
Washington, D.C.

3/24

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/i
ndex.php?pid=26127&st=&st1=

Waldorf Astoria
Hotel,
New York City

4/20

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/i
ndex.php?pid=26168&st=&st1=

Not Available

8/4

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/i
ndex.php?pid=26418&st=&st1=

New journalism
building,
Newhouse
Communications
Center,
Syracuse
University,
Syracuse,
New York

8/5

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/i
ndex.php?pid=26419&st=&st1=
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Table 3.1 (continued). Pre War-Escalation Speeches by
President Lyndon B. Johnson:
November 27, 1963 to April 7, 1965
Name
(7) Remarks Upon
Signing Joint
Resolution of the
Maintenance of
Peace and Security
in Southeast Asia
(8) Remarks Before
the American Bar
Association
(9) Remarks at the
Dedication of the
Eufaula Dam
(10) Remarks to the
Members of the New
Hampshire Weekly
Newspaper Editors
Association
(11) Remarks in
Memorial Hall,
Akron University
(12) Remarks at
Lindbergh Field
(13) Christmas
Message to the
Americans in VietNam
(14) Annual
Message to the
Congress on the
State of the Union

Locale
East Room,
The White House

Date
1964
8/10

Web Address
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/i
ndex.php?pid=26429&st=&st1=

New York City

8/12

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/i
ndex.php?pid=26434&st=&st1=

Eufala Lake,
Oklahoma

9/25

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/i
ndex.php?pid=26528&st=&st1=

Grand Ballroom,
Carpenter Motor
Inn, Manchester,
New Hampshire

9/28

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/i
ndex.php?pid=26540&st=&st1=

Memorial Hall,
Akron, Ohio

10/21

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/i
ndex.php?pid=26635&st=&st1=

Lindbergh Field,
San Diego,
California
Unknown

10/28

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/i
ndex.php?pid=26683&st=&st1=

12/23

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/i
ndex.php?pid=26769&st=&st1=

U.S. Capitol

1965
1/4
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http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson
/archives.hom/speeches.hom/650104
.asp

Table 3.1 (continued). Pre War-Escalation Speeches by
President Lyndon B. Johnson:
November 27, 1963 to April 7, 1965
Name
(15) Remarks to
Committee Members
on the Need for
Additional
Appropriations for
Military Purposes in
Viet-Nam and the
Dominican Republic

(16) Address at
Johns Hopkins
University: “Peace
Without Conquest”

Locale
East Room,
The White House
(to members of
the U.S. House
and Senate
Appropriations,
Foreign Relations
& Armed
Services
Committees)
Shriver Hall
Auditorium,
Johns Hopkins
University,
Baltimore,
Maryland

Date
1965
5/4

4/7

* Only radio address used.
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Web Address
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/i
ndex.php?pid=26938&st=&st1=

http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson
/archives.hom/speeches.hom/650407
.asp

Table 3.2. Pre-War Speeches by President George W. Bush:
September 11, 2001 to March 17, 2003
Name
(1) Remarks at
Barksdale Air Force
Base, Louisiana, on
the Terrorist Attacks
(2) Address to the
Nation on the
Terrorist Attacks

Locale

Date
Web Address
2001
Dougherty
9/11
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2001_publ
Center,
ic_papers_vol2_misc&page=1098&
Barksdale AFB
position=all
Oval Office,
9/11
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2001_publ
The White House
ic_papers_vol2_misc&page=1099&
position=all

(3) Remarks by the
President While
Touring Damage at
the Pentagon
(4) President's
Remarks at the
National Day of
Prayer and
Remembrance
Service
(5) Remarks at the
Islamic Center

Site of the Attack, 9/12
Arlington,
Virginia

(6) Address Before a
Joint Session of the
Congress of the
United States in
Response to the
Terrorist Attacks of
September 11
(7) Address to the
Nation Announcing
Strikes Against Al
Qaida Training
Camps and Taliban
Military Installations
in Afghanistan

National
Cathedral,
Washington, D.C.

9/14

Mosque,
Washington, D.C.

9/17

House Chamber
of the U.S.
Capitol

9/20

Treaty Room,
The White House

10/7
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http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2001_publ
ic_papers_vol2_misc&page=1101&
position=all
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2001_publ
ic_papers_vol2_misc&page=1108&
position=all

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2001_publ
ic_papers_vol2_misc&page=1121&
position=all
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2001_publ
ic_papers_vol2_misc&page=1140&
position=all

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2001_publ
ic_papers_vol2_misc&page=1201&
position=all

Table 3.2 (continued). Pre-War Speeches by President George W. Bush:
September 11, 2001 to March 17, 2003
Name
(8) Remarks
Announcing the
Most Wanted
Terrorists List
(9) Address to the
Nation from Atlanta
on Homeland
Security
(10) Remarks to the
United Nations
General Assembly
(11) Remarks to the
United States
Attorneys
Conference

(12) Remarks
Announcing Action
Against Terrorist
Financial Support
Networks
(13) Remarks at a
Reserve Officers
Association
Luncheon
(14) Remarks to
United States
Mayors and County
Officials

35

Locale
Bonaparte
Auditorium,
Federal Bureau
of Investigation
Headquarters
World Congress
Center,
Atlanta, Georgia

Date
2001
10/10

11/8

11/10
New York City

Presidential Hall,
Dwight D.
Eisenhower
Executive Office
Building,
Washington, D.C.
Rose Garden,
The White House

Ballroom,
Washington
Hilton Hotel,
Washington, D.C.
East Room,
The White House

11/29

12/20

2002
1/23

1/24

Web Address
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2001_publ
ic_papers_vol2_misc&page=1212&
position=all
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2001_publ
ic_papers_vol2_misc&page=1360&
position=all
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2001_publ
ic_papers_vol2_misc&page=1375&
position=all
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2001_publ
ic_papers_vol2_misc&page=1459&
position=all

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2001_publ
ic_papers_vol2_misc&page=1532&
position=all

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/i
ndex.php?pid=64180&st=Remarks
+at+a+Reserve+Officers+Associati
on+Luncheon&st1= 35
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2002_publ
ic_papers_vol1_misc&page=110&p
osition=all

Available through the American Presidency Project; not available through Public Papers online.
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Table 3.2 (continued). Pre-War Speeches by President George W. Bush:
September 11, 2001 to March 17, 2003
Name
(15) Address Before
a Joint Session of the
Congress on the
State of the Union
(16) Remarks at the
National Prayer
Breakfast

(17) Remarks on the
Six-Month
Anniversary of the
September 11th
Attacks
(18) Address to the
Nation on the
Proposed
Department of
Homeland Security
(19) Address to the
Nation on the
Anniversary
of the Terrorist
Attacks of
September 11
(20) Address to the
United Nations
General Assembly

Locale
House Chamber,
U.S. Capitol

International
Ballroom,
Washington
Hilton Hotel,
Washington, D.C.
South Lawn,
The White House

Date
2002
1/29

2/7

Web Address
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2002_publ
ic_papers_vol1_misc&page=129&p
osition=all
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2002_publ
ic_papers_vol1_misc&page=187&p
osition=all

3/11

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2002_publ
ic_papers_vol1_misc&page=374&p
osition=all

Cross Hall,
The White House

6/6

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2002_publ
ic_papers_vol1_misc&page=937&p
osition=all

Ellis Island, New
York City

9/11

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2002_publ
ic_papers_vol2_misc&page=1570&
position=all

General
Assembly Hall at
the United
Nations
Headquarters,
New York City

9/12

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2002_publ
ic_papers_vol2_misc&page=1572&
position=all
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Table 3.2 (continued). Pre-War Speeches by President George W. Bush:
September 11, 2001 to March 17, 2003
Name
(21) Address to the
Nation on Iraq

(22) Remarks on the
Passage of a United
Nations Security
Council Resolution
on Iraq
(23) Address Before
a Joint Session of the
Congress on the
State of the Union
(24) Remarks at the
National Prayer
Breakfast

(25) Remarks on the
Iraqi Regime’s
Noncompliance
With United Nations
Resolutions*
(26) Remarks at the
National Religious
Broadcasters
Convention

Locale
Grand Rotunda,
Cincinnati
Museum
Center, Union
Terminal,
Cincinnati, Ohio
Rose Garden,
The White House

House Chamber,
U.S. Capitol

Date
2002
10/7

11/8

2003
1/28

Web Address
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2002_publ
ic_papers_vol2_misc&page=1751&
position=all

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?position=all&page
=2053&dbname=2002_public_pape
rs_vol2_misc

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2003_publ
ic_papers_vol1_misc&page=82&po
sition=all
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2003_publ
ic_papers_vol1_misc&page=130&p
osition=all

International
Ballroom,
Washington
Hilton Hotel,
Washington, D.C.
Roosevelt Room,
The White House

2/6

2/6

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2003_publ
ic_papers_vol1_misc&page=135&p
osition=all

Presidential
Ballroom,
Opryland Hotel
Nashville,
Tennessee

2/10

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/rel
eases/2003/02/20030210-5.html, or
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2003_publ
ic_papers_vol1_misc&page=146&p
osition=all
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Table 3.2 (continued). Pre-War Speeches by President George W. Bush:
September 11, 2001 to March 17, 2003
Name

Locale

(27) Remarks to the
National Governors
Association
Conference
(28) Remarks to the
American Enterprise
Institute Annual
Dinner 36
(29) Address to the
Nation on Iraq

State Dining
Room,
The White House
International
Ballroom,
Washington
Hilton Hotel,
Washington, D.C.
Cross Hall,
The White House

Date
2003
2/24

Web Address

2/26

3/17

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2003_publ
ic_papers_vol1_misc&page=203&p
osition=all
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2003_publ
ic_papers_vol1_misc&page=216&p
osition=all
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2003_publ
ic_papers_vol1_misc&page=277&p
osition=all

* Videotaped for later broadcast.

Research Design
Using content analysis of the pre war-escalation speeches and the pre-war
speeches of Johnson and Bush, the researcher employed content analysis to establish
grounded theory about the words used most often by Johnson and Bush to define the need
to escalate an ongoing war (Johnson) or begin a war (Bush).
Grounded theory is inductive, qualitative analysis using specific methods and
systematic procedures (Glaser 2001, 200). It uses a set of coding procedures to provide
standardization and rigor for the analysis (Strauss and Corbin 1998, 13). Grounded theory
is built rather than tested (Patton, 2002, 127). The grounded theory paradigm provides
researchers with analytical tools for handling large amounts of raw data and encourages
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Also called, “The President Discusses the Future of Iraq” in some versions.
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them to consider alternative meanings of phenomena, while elucidating the concepts that
make up the theory (Glaser 1993).
Grounded theory provides guidance for describing the data and conceptually
ordering the data into discrete categories according to properties and dimensions.
Immersion in the data and thick description helps elucidate the categories. Using
grounded theory, one can theorize about the ideas and concepts in the data and formulate
them into a logical, systematic and explanatory theme that corresponds to real-world
phenomena. A good grounded theorist recognizes any tendency toward bias (Patton 48990; Strauss and Corbin 1998, 7, 21).
Although grounded theory does not recommend that the researcher state her
expectations, expectations exist nevertheless in many cases. Yet bias and researcher
expectations are not the same thing. Bias is defined by Patton (2002) as “distortion of
data to serve the researcher’s vested interests and prejudices” and as setting out to “prove
a particular perspective or manipulate the data to arrive as predisposed truths” (51). This
never occurred in this study, so reference is made to expectations instead of bias. Patton
(2002) acknowledges that, at least when dealing with qualitative data, “the ideals of
absolute objectivity and value-free science are impossible to attain in practice and are of
questionable desirability in the first place since they ignore the intrinsically social nature
and human purposes of research” and because the “researcher is the instrument of both
data collection and data interpretation” (50). Indeed, even asking the question indicates a
bias, according to Patton.
To overcome bias, Patton (2002) recommends striving for what he calls
trustworthiness and authenticity, expressed in terms of balance, fairness and
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completeness (51). He further urges qualitative researchers to adopt a stance of “empathic
neutrality,” a “middle ground between becoming too involved, which can cloud
judgment, and remaining too distant, which can reduce understanding” (50). This
“neutrality with regard to the phenomena under study” means that “the researcher does
not set out to prove a particular perspective or manipulate the data to arrive at
predisposed truths” (51). The researcher achieves neutrality, according to Patton (2002),
by “carefully reflect[ing] on, deal[ing] with, and report[ing] potential sources of bias and
error” through “systematic data collection procedures, rigorous training, multiple data
sources, triangulation, external reviews, and other techniques,” which Patton (2002) says
are designed to produce “high-quality qualitative data that are credible, trustworthy,
authentic, balanced about the phenomena under study, and fair to the people studied”
(51).
In this study, the researcher’s empathic neutrality was achieved by stating
expectations up front, systematically collecting data based upon pre-set rules, applying
training in qualitative analysis and grounded theory, studying two presidents and their
numerous major speeches on war, using qualitative and quantitative analysis
(triangulation of methods) and receiving external review of the research from a faculty
dissertation committee. Further, this is a mixed-methods work, and the quantitative
element of the study operates on a null hypothesis. In addition, the researcher reports
results of tests confirming and disconfirming expectations. And finally, the researcher has
retained a certain detachment because the study involves only the analysis of presidential
speech text, meaning that the researcher spent no time in the field, nor did she have
contact with human subjects. While this may exclude valuable data, such as the
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environment in which the speeches were given, presidential expressions and voice
emphasis (among other factors), personal attendance at the speeches was impossible, as it
often is in content analysis. Thus, the study of text alone provides for detachment.
Grounded theory allows one to employ microanalysis, or line-by-line analysis, to
generate categories and suggest relationships; theoretical sampling, or sampling of
emerging concepts to explore how the properties of concepts vary; theoretical saturation,
or development of categories to the point at which no new categories emerge; range of
variability, or range of variation of a concept dimensionally along its properties; open
coding, or identification of concepts, their properties and their dimensions in data; axial
coding, or the relating of categories to their subcategories; and relational statements, or
initial hunches about how concepts relate to hypotheses (Strauss and Corbin 1998, 57, 73,
101, 123, 135, 143). This study employed word-by-word analysis, memos, exhaustion of
categories, in-depth exploration of concepts, detailed coding and hunches expressed in
ongoing memos.
It was determined that Johnson and Bush were the best candidates for comparison
of pre-war-escalation/pre-war speeches for the following reasons: First, each produced a
body of rhetoric justifying war. Second, the two were relatively contemporary
presidents. Third, their wars were comparable in that they were controversial, not
inevitable and of significant duration. And fourth, these presidents came from different
political parties. Of course, Johnson escalated American engagement, whereas Bush
began a war pre-emptively. 37 In addition, Johnson said he was fighting a war on
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“U.S. engagement in Vietnam began small under President Eisenhower and grew under presidents
Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon before Congress ended it under President Ford,” according to Holt, P.M.
2005 (May 5). Lessons We've Learned -- or Should Have -- in Vietnam, Christian Science Monitor, 97
(113).
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Communism, while Bush said he was fighting a war on terrorism. And Johnson inherited
his war, while Bush began his. Studying at least two presidents provided points for
comparison, which allowed for more meaningful conclusions about how presidents talk
us into war.
The researcher’s expectations were that Johnson would use fewer antithetical
terms and would use less pronounced antithetical language than did Bush to define the
need for war escalation/war initiation. Antithetical language is defined as language that
is highly charged and provides contrasting descriptions of the qualities of the United
States, its coalition, its enemy, the war, the plight of victims and job of citizens. It was
also expected that Johnson would use less religious language and less hyper-patriotic
language than Bush. These expectations existed because Bush’s language was striking in
these respects even before analysis began, and was noted as such by prominent others and
the media. It was also expected that Bush’s fundamentalist, neo-conservative background
would prompt him to make more frequent use of religious language than Johnson and to
see war as a messianic mission rather than as a secular policy choice. Again, this was
because much had been written in advance of this research on Bush’s religious
background. 38
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A sampling of many such headlines includes a March 10, 2003, Newsweek cover titled “Bush & God,”
with subheads “How Faith Changed His Life and Shapes His Presidency” and “Why His ‘God Talk’
Worries Friends & Foes;” a Sojourners Magazine article on Bush titled “Dangerous Religion” (2003); an
article by The Progressive titled “Bush’s Messiah Complex” (2003); a Reuters’ article titled “Bush Letter
Cites ‘Crusade’ Against Terrorism” (2004); a New York Times Magazine article titled “Faith, Certainty and
the Presidency of George W. Bush” (2004); and an article by the Seattle Times titled “‘The Jesus Factor’
and George W. Bush” (2004). I had also read Bush’s biography, A Charge to Keep, which chronicled his
combined political/religious journey. Indeed, Lawton (2003), who has observed that Bush’s speeches
frequently reflected his religious beliefs, says Bush works with a team of speechwriters headed by Michael
Gerson, an evangelical Christian who studied theology at evangelical Wheaton College in Illinois.
Professor Steve Tipton of Emory University says that while there is an effort by Gerson to use a unifying
civil religious rhetoric that is not specific to denomination or faith tradition or that explicitly says “Christ
Jesus,” … there are also “these evangelical resonances” (Lawton 2003).
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Content Analysis
This study employs content analysis, which derives “numerical measures from a
non-numerical written record” (Johnson and Joslyn 1995, 244). Content analysis enables
researchers to “take a verbal, non-quantitative document and transform it into quantitative
data” by constructing a “set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories that can be
used to analyze documents, and then [recording] the frequency with which each of these
categories is observed in the documents studied” (Johnson and Joslyn 1995, 244-45).
There are four steps in content analysis, according to Johnson and Joslyn (1995,
245-46): (1) deciding what sample of germane materials to include in the analysis, (2)
defining the categories (and subcategories) of content to be measured so that it relates to
the research topic and the measures are both valid and reliable, (3) choosing the recording
unit, whether it be a word, a sentence, a paragraph, an item in its entirety, etc., based
upon the ease of identification, the correspondence between the unit and the content
categories (words may be more appropriate for measuring traits, for example), and the
appropriate size of the unit for the research, and (4) devising a system of enumeration for
the content being coded (including measurement of the presence or absence of a content
category and the frequency with which a category appears).
A researcher usually can enhance the validity of content analysis by precisely
explaining the procedures followed and by the content categories used. Reliability is best
demonstrated by showing inter-coder reliability, where “two or more analysts, using the
same procedures and definitions, agree on the content categories applied to the material
analyzed. The more agreement, the stronger the researcher’s confidence can be that the
meaning of the content is not heavily dependent on the particular person doing the

94

analysis. If different coders disagree frequently, then the content categories have not been
defined with enough clarity and precision” (Johnson and Joslyn 1995, 246). As
mentioned, the use of more than one coder was not practical for this study.
While political scientists have used content analysis sparingly, Johnson and
Joslyn say it is “a useful technique in some areas of inquiry” (1995, 247).
Advantages/Disadvantages
This research design has certain advantages. Weber (1990) says that analysis of
content has an advantage over data-generating and analysis techniques because it is
unobtrusive, meaning neither the sender nor the receiver is aware they are being
analyzed. Thus, the measurement itself does not confound the data. The design also has
time limitations that make the quantity of material analyzed manageable. And the data is
accessible. In addition, grounded theory allows one to generate in-depth and extensive
data for analysis.
There are also some disadvantages. Some complain that thematic text analysis
does not consider context, or that researchers make inferences that were not in the
speaker’s mind (Stone in Roberts 1997, 37-38; Edwards and Wayne, 124). Others say
that it is impossible to “surmise the intentions and context from which they were
generated,” including the “sights, sounds, smells, intonations, and emotional tensions of
the original event,” as well as the effects of lighting, makeup, stage settings, camera
angles, clothing, pacing of delivery, predispositions of the audience, attentiveness of the
audience, level of drama and other aspects involved with speech making (Edwards and
Wayne 2003, 124; Stone in Roberts 1997, 37-38). However, Stone points out that “text
can be daunting and complex enough without considering additional issues in evaluating
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themes conveyed by the setting or nonverbal communications” (Edwards and Wayne
2003, 124; Stone in Roberts 1997, 37-38).
Potential Problems
Potential problems with the research design are that a single coder precludes intercoder reliability checks, assurance of validity (that the study measures what it says it
does), and accuracy (Patton 2002, 464-6, 556). It was highly impractical to do a jointauthored dissertation or employ another researcher. Consequently, the researcher relied
upon double counts in final tallies to ensure reliability.
The challenge in coding Johnson’s speeches was that he tended toward obtuseness
and often spoke generally about war (and its flipside, peace) and foreign policy. In few
speeches did he approach Vietnam explicitly or in great detail. Rather, he might talk
about Communism or security in general. For instance, the researcher chose to code the
following excerpt from his “Remarks on Foreign Affairs at the Associated Press
Luncheon” on April 20, 1964, even though he spoke generally about protection, world
policy, territory acquisition, arming the nation, etc. It is difficult to determine if he is
alluding to the Vietnam War:
To you serious and concerned men, who have gathered here at this
luncheon, and ladies, I want to speak about the problems and the potentials
that lie ahead and the great purpose to which you and I, and all Americans,
must be dedicated … The world has changed many times since General
Washington counseled his new and weak country to ‘observe good faith
and justice toward all nations.’ Great empires have risen and dissolved.
Great heroes have made their entrances and have left the stage. And
America has slowly, often reluctantly, grown to be a great power and a
leading member of world society. So we seek today, as we did in
Washington's time, to protect the life of our Nation, to preserve the liberty
of our citizens, and to pursue the happiness of our people. This is the
touchstone of our world policy. Thus, we seek to add no territory to our
dominion, no satellites to our orbit, no slavish followers to our policies.
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The most impressive witness to this restraint is that for a century our own
frontiers have stood quiet and stood unarmed.

Another problem was deciding to whom a president was referring in a speech. For
example, when Bush talked about “we,” as in “we are deliberate and patient,” did he
mean the “royal we” of the presidency, the United States and its allies, or all? Also, who
Bush called the “enemy” changed over time. This is where researcher judgment comes in.
While this is not a study that seeks to measure the ability of rhetoric to persuade
or mobilize, it nevertheless assumes that presidents (and their staff) craft words as they
do for these purposes. Perhaps presidents and scholars need to find better ways to
measure exactly how (and/or if) rhetoric moves us.

Methodology
The computer analysis program NVivo, Version 7, was used to analyze, word-byword, line-by-line, 16 pre-April 8, 1965, Johnson speeches and 29 pre-March 19, 2003,
Bush speeches through content analysis.
The focus was on (1) how the problem was defined, including: (a) assignation of
cause, blame, or responsibility for the problem, and (b) identification and description of
the enemy; (2) mention of God and/or references to scripture, (3) patriotic references to
positive qualities of the United States and its citizens, (4) references to history calling the
United States and it allies to action, and (5) metaphors and symbols used.
Coding Software
NVivo 7 allowed the researcher to create various categories and sub-categories
and then to code words under those categories/sub-categories (Strauss and Corbin 1998,
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105, 115-6). All words were coded under the sub-categories of the categories, not the
large categories themselves.
NVivo allowed the researcher to itemize the speeches being analyzed (Tables 3.1
and 3.2 are lists of the speeches itemized in NVivo), and it produced seven major
categories across both presidencies in the course of coding speeches (see Table 3.3).

Table 3.3. Descriptive Categories That Emerged From Johnson and Bush
Pre-War-Escalation/Pre-War Speeches
Descriptive Categories for Johnson
Characteristics of America
Characteristics of Coalition/Allies
Characteristics of the Enemy
Characteristics of the President
Characteristics of Victims
Characteristics of the War
Job of Citizens

Descriptive Categories for Bush
Characteristics of America
Characteristics of Coalition/Allies
Characteristics of the Enemy
Characteristics of the President
Characteristics of Victims
Characteristics of the War
Job of Citizens

NVivo then allowed the researcher to create subcategories of words under these
categories, as well as to total and compare the number of times these two presidents used
these subcategory words in their pre-war/pre-escalation speeches. This study presents in
detail these subcategories and the (up to) five most-used subcategory words used by the
two presidents in each category in Chapters 4 (empirical findings on secular language)
and 5 (empirical findings on religious language) (see Tables 4.1 and 5.1, respectively).
Both the words and the categories chosen arose from grounded research.
A major challenge in this research was reducing the data to manageable form.
This meant combining coded subcategories whenever possible or eliminating some
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subcategories that had too few entries. In addition, some words seemed to fit under more
than one category and subcategory.
NVivo allowed the researcher to establish the word as the recording unit. A word
may be used more than once in a sentence and therefore must be counted for each use (in
this case manually). NVivo also allowed the researcher to establish a system of
enumeration; in this case, that involved counting the up to five words that appear most
often in the subcategories of the categories, and then comparing each president’s choice
of words. The up to five most-used words by each president in each category illustrate
the most prominent ways they defined the need for escalation/initiation of war and
assigned causal blame for the problem.
The researcher then determined the frequency of these words by counting their
use per page of presidential speech, relying upon the standardized column widths
established in the Public Papers. A column inch of speech was used as the metric
because the decimals were large enough to have meaning. The speeches for each
president could be directly compared in length by ruler measurement (column widths and
type size balanced out to be almost even). Therefore, the researcher could analyze the
average use of the words per column inch of printed speech copy.
A determination was then made as to whether the proportional comparisons of the
up to five most-used words, per category, by each president were statistically significant
by using a statistical test for comparing two binomial proportions, thus producing a
Z-score (Ott, 1988, 242). Where a category produced words used in common by both
presidents, a Z-score was also produced for those words. The differences in column
inches of speech between the two presidents (83 inches) were controlled for in the Z-
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score. A Z-score was not used for tables calculating total use of key words in all
categories (see Tables 4.1 and 5.1). Nor was a Z-score given when comparisons of
binomial proportions did not pass the necessary test for the normal approximation of
significance to hold for both populations (the first example of this may be seen in Table
5.3).
A word may be coded twice. For instance, when Bush spoke to the nation’s
governors on February 24, 2003, he said, “As leaders, our job is to remind the American
people [of] that – of the reality of the dangers we face, and do everything we can to
prevent attack.” “Leaders” was coded under Coalition and under President because it
seemed to refer to both. However, only an estimated five percent of words were coded
under more than one category.
Chapters 4 and 5 examine the empirical findings on secular language and
inherently religious language, respectively.
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CHAPTER FOUR – EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON SECULAR LANGUAGE

Introduction
When President Johnson defined the need to escalate the war in Vietnam and
President Bush defined the need to go to war in Iraq, they generated numerous key terms
in their speeches to make their case. This study has had as its goal the examination of
their speeches to discern and code the up to five most-used key words in multiple
categories that arose from grounded research (the data talking to the researcher). It has
done so through qualitative content analysis, using the program NVivo 7, in which the
speeches were analyzed one-by-one, line-by-line, word-by-word. It also has been done
through quantitative analysis, in which the key words were manually counted (with the
assistance of NVivo) and the length of the speeches manually measured in The Public
Papers of the Presidents.
The goal has been to compare how these presidents tried to talk us into war by
employing the same or different key words, how many times they repeated these key
words (again, comparatively) and how they employed problem definition by probability
statement – discussed in detail in Chapter 6 – to argue for war.
This chapter examines the findings of these qualitative and quantitative analyses
by first summarizing which secular key words these two presidents used the most in the
main definitional categories, America, the Coalition, the Enemy, the Job of President, the
Victims, the War and the Job of Citizens. Manual counts were done twice by the
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researcher to help provide reliability to the findings, given that it was only realistic to
have one tabulator for this study.
The key words are predominantly nouns, but in some cases are adjectives, verbs
or adverbs. The choice depended upon how important the word seemed to be as an
attribute of the category, in addition to how often it was used.
The empirical findings are first summarized in tabular form, then the tabular
information is explained textually and then the use of the key words is illustrated in the
context of the presidential speeches. For instance, “Category: America” begins with a
table summarizing comparatively the up to five key words used by each president to
define America, one of the categories that arose from grounded research. This is followed
by an explanation of what is presented in the table, including what key words the
presidents may have shared. This is then followed by examples from the speeches of each
president’s key words used in context, with all of Johnson key words for that category
examined first and all of Bush’s key words for that category examined second. For each
key word in context, there is a subhead. So, for example, the reader will see Example of
Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define America: “Strength” or Example of Key
Word in Context Used by Bush to Define the Enemy: “Terrorist.”
The tabular and textual summaries also include the proportion of the time the key
word was used per column inch of each president’s total column inches of speech, the
total inches having been manually measured in the Public Papers of the Presidents. It
was possible to compare the inch length of these speeches in the Public Papers simply by
employing a ruler count because the type size, type faces and column inch widths were
virtually identical (or slight differences in one aspect were compensated for by another
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aspect), given the standardization of the papers. A summary Z-score reflects this keyword-per-inch use and shows whether or not there was a statistically significant
difference in word use by Johnson and Bush.
Patton (2002) tells us that qualitative data can be organized and reported via
sensitizing concepts, or categories that the researcher brings to the data. Thus, this
chapter summarizes the data as discussed above to illustrate the rhetorical similarities and
differences employed by each president to make the case for war.

The Qualitative and Quantitative Findings
Comparative Summary of Total Findings
As expected, Johnson used far fewer key terms overall to define the problem and
therefore the need for war. Johnson used almost half as many, even given the fact that he
had only 83 fewer inches of column inches of speech than Bush (1,084 to Bush’s 1,167).
Johnson used a total of 721 key terms in all seven categories in 16 speeches (half
as many speeches as Bush) to define America, the Coalition, the Enemy, the Job of
President, the Victims, the War and the Job of Citizens, while Bush used a total of 1,379
terms in all categories in 29 speeches (see Table 4.1).
Johnson used the fewest words in all categories to define the Job of Citizens (12,
compared to Bush’s 28). Johnson used the most terms in all categories to define War, but
still less than Bush (203 to Bush’s 271). However, Johnson did surpass Bush is his total
use of words in all categories used to describe the Job of President (87 to Bush’s 60).
Bush used the least words to describe the Job of Citizens (28). He used the most
words to define the Enemy (541 to Johnson’s 143). Additional comparisons may be seen
in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1. Total of Five-Most-Used Defining Words
In Each Category By Johnson and by Bush
Category
America
Coalition
Enemy
Job of President
Victims
War
Job of Citizens
TOTAL

Johnson
104
83
143
87
89
203
12
721

Bush
169
212
541
60
96
271
28
1,379

In the following section, the five most-used defining words by each president in
each of these categories are explored. In addition, some examples of these words, used in
context in the presidential speeches, are provided. For simplicity sake, reference is made
only to the first variation of the word used.
Category: America.
Table 4.2 reports the data for this category.
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Table 4.2. Five Most-Used Words by Presidents Johnson
And Bush to Define America
Johnson
Word
strength(en)(strong)
free(ly)(dom)
world
power(s)(ful)
nation(s)(al)
TOTAL

Bush
Freq.
29
23
19
18
15
104

Word
home(land)(front)
free(dom)(freedoms)(freedom’s)
nation(al)(nation’s)
great(ness)
resolve(d)(resolute)

Freq.
50
36
31
27
25
169

Z-Score
N/A
-1.49 (free)
N/A
N/A
-2.24* (nation)
-3.55**

*sig. at p<.05; **sig. at p<.01.
Note: Test is the difference between two binomial proportions. In the body of the table, I am only
comparing words shared by each president that are significant. In this case, that only involves comparing
Johnson’s use of the word “nation” (and its variants) with Bush’s use of the word “nation,” as indicated by
the bracketed word in the Z-score column, and the total use of words by each president to define America.
Only those that are significant are indicated by asterisks. This is done in this way in this table (and in all the
relevant tables following in each chapter) because shared words do not necessarily appear on the same line
if they are not used in the same proportions by each president. In this case, “free,” and its variants had a Zscore of (-1.49), which was not significant and so not indicated. Additionally, while the word “world” may
seem like an odd term to code as defining America, it was chosen because it seemed to be an attempt to
distinguish America, which is described as part of the civilized world, from the Enemy, which is described
as an outcast, uncivilized entity.

Summary. Based upon the test of binomial proportions employed to examine the
two presidents’ five most-used terms, the results indicate that Bush was much more likely
than Johnson to use terms in total to define America, and among the two presidents’
shared terms, Bush was more likely to use the term “nation.”
When it came to the five-most used terms defining America, Johnson used 104
key terms to Bush’s 169. In his 16 pre-war-escalation speeches, the five most-used terms
he employed to define America were “strength,” and its variations “strengthen” and
“strong” used 29 times; “free,” and its variations “freely” and “freedom,” used 23 times;
“world,” used 19 times; “power,” and its variations “powers” and “powerful,” used 18
times; and “nation,” and its variations “nations” and “national,” used 15 times.
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In contrast, in the 29 pre-war speeches given by Bush, the five terms he used most
to define America were “home,” and its variations “homeland” and “homefront,” used 50
times; “free,” and its variations “freedom,” “freedoms” and “freedom’s,” used 36 times;
“nation,” and its variations “national” and “nation’s,” used 31 times; “great,” and its
variation “greatness,” used 27 times; and “resolve,” and its variations “resolved” and
“resolute,” used 25 times.
“Free” and its variations, and “nation” and its variations, were used by both
presidents, with “free” in second place for both. The presidents were distinguished from
each other by their use of the terms “strength,” “world,” “power” (Johnson) and “home,”
“great” and “resolve” (Bush). The following are examples of these key words in context:
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define America:
“Strength.” Johnson uses “strength” to refer to America as follows: “We have more
strength than any other nation, more strength than all nations put together, and we are
going to keep it” (Remarks in Memorial Hall, Akron University, October 21, 1964); and
“You are in Viet-Nam, far from the places and people you love, because the forces that
have given our Nation strength and wealth have also placed upon it the burden of
defending freedom – even in remote and distant villages” (Christmas Message to the
Americans in Viet-Nam, December 23, 1964).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define America: “Free.”
Johnson’s use of “free” is illustrated by the following: “But we have also learned in this
century, and we have learned it at painful and bloody cost, that our own freedom depends
upon the freedom of others, that our own protection requires that we help protect others,
that we draw increased strength from the strength of others” (Remarks on Foreign Affairs
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at the Associated Press Luncheon, April 20, 1964) and “There are those who wonder why
we have a responsibility there. Well, we have it there for the same reason that we have a
responsibility for the defense of Europe. World War II was fought in both Europe and
Asia, and when it ended we found ourselves with continued responsibility for the defense
of freedom” (Address at Johns Hopkins University, April 7, 1965).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define America: “World.”
In defining America, Johnson referred to the “world” as follows: “In Viet-Nam, in
Cyprus, and in every continent, in a hundred different ways America’s efforts are
directed toward world order” (Remarks in New York City Before the American Bar
Association, August 12, 1964) and “And we must let the rest of the world know that we
speak softly, we carry a big stick, but we have the will and the determination, and if they
ever hit us it is not going to stop us – we are just going to keep coming” (Remarks in
Manchester to the Members of the New Hampshire Weekly Newspaper Editors
Association, September 28, 1964).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define America: “Power.”
Johnson defined “power” as it relates to America to include: “We are the most powerful
of all nations – we must strive also to be the most responsible of nations” (Remarks Upon
Signing Joint Resolution on the Maintenance of Peace and Security in Southeast Asia,
August 10, 1964) and “There are those who ask why this responsibility should be ours.
The answer, I think, is simple. There is no one else who can do the job. Our power alone
in the final test can stand between expanding communism and independent Asian
nations” (Remarks to Committee Members on the Need for Additional Appropriations for
Military Purposes in Viet-Nam and the Dominican Republic, May 4, 1965).

107

Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define America: “Nation.”
Johnson used “nation” in the following ways to define America: “Our Nation was created
to help strike away the chains of ignorance and misery and tyranny wherever they keep
man less than God means him to be” (Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the
Union, January 4, 1965) and “We have more strength than any other nation, more
strength than all nations put together, and we are going to keep it” (Remarks in Memorial
Hall, Akron University, October 21, 1964).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define America: “Homeland.”
A sampling of Bush quotes defining America included the following for the most used,
“homeland”: “They have attacked America because we are freedom’s home and
defender” (President’s Remarks at the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance Service,
September 14, 2001) and “During the next few minutes, I want to update you on the
progress we are making in our war against terror and to propose sweeping changes that
will strengthen our homeland against the ongoing threat of terrorist attacks. The first and
best way to secure America’s homeland is to attack the enemy where he hides and plans,
and we’re doing just that” (Address to the Nation on Iraq, June 6, 2002).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define America: “Free.”
Bush’s second-most used term to describe America is “free,” as in these examples:
“America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and
opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining” (Address to the
Nation on Terrorist Attacks, September 11, 2001) and “Americans are a free people, who
know that freedom is the right of every person and the future of every nation. The liberty
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we prize is not America’s gift to the world, it is God’s gift to humanity” (Address Before
a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 28, 2003).
Examples of Key Words in Context Used by Bush to Define America: “Nation.”
Bush’s third-most-used term to describe America was “nation,” as in the following
examples: “I like to remind people that the evil ones have roused a mighty nation, and
they will pay a serious price” (Remarks to the United States Attorneys Conference,
November 29, 2001) and “This Nation is peaceful, but fierce when stirred to anger”
(President’s Remarks to the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance Service,
September 14, 2001).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define America: “Great.”
Bush’s fourth-most used word to describe America was “great,” as sampled here: “The
resolve of our great Nation is being tested. But make no mistake: We will show the world
that we will pass this test” (Remarks at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, September
11, 2001); “A great people has been moved to defend a great nation” (Address to the
Nation on Terrorist Attacks, September 11, 2001); “They didn’t understand that when
you attack America and you murder innocent people, we’re coming after you with full
force and fury of a great nation and our allies” (Remarks to United States Mayors and
County Officials, January 24, 2002); and “History has placed a great challenge before us:
Will America, with our unique position and power, blink in the face of terror, or will we
lead to a freer, more civilized world? There’s only one answer: This great country will
lead the world to safety, security, peace, and freedom” (Address to the Nation on the
Proposed Department of Homeland Security, June 6, 2002).
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Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define America: “Resolve.”
Finally, Bush used the word “resolve” to describe America in the following examples:
“These acts shattered steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve” (Address
to the Nation on Terrorist Attacks, September 11, 2001); “The American people have
responded magnificently, with courage and compassion, strength and resolve” (Address
Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 29, 2002); and
“Americans are a resolute people who have risen to every test of our time” (Address
Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 28, 2003).
Category: Coalition 39

Table 4.3 reports the data for this category.
Table 4.3. Five Most-Used Words By Presidents Johnson and
Bush to Define the Coalition
Johnson
Word
Congress
United Nations
world
friend(s)(ly)(ship)
ally (allies)
TOTAL

Bush
Freq.
24
18
16
14
11
83

Word
United Nations (U.N.)
security
nation(s)
world (world’s)
ally (allies)
TOTAL

Freq.
66
52
35
33
26
212

Z-Score
N/A
-5.00** (U.N.)
-5.79** (world)
N/A
-2.26* (ally)
-7.45**

*sig. at p<.05; **sig. at p<.01
Note: Test is the difference between two binomial proportions.

Summary. Based upon the test of binomial proportions employed to examine the
two presidents’ five most-used terms, the results indicate that Bush was much more likely
than Johnson to use terms in total to define the Coalition and to use the terms “United
Nations,” “world” and “ally” (and their variations) in doing so. Johnson used 83 key
39

Through grounded research, the Coalition evolved to include Congress, world leaders and their citizens,
regions, the United Nations and other world bodies.

110

terms, compared to Bush’s use of 212. In his 16 pre-escalation speeches, the five terms
used most by Johnson to define the Coalition were “Congress,” used 24 times; “United
Nations,” used 18 times; “world,” used 16 times; “friend,” and its variations “friends,”
“friendly” and “friendship,” used 14 times; and “ally,” and its variation “allies,” used 11
times.
Bush, on the other hand, in his 29 speeches, used the following five words most
often to define the Coalition: “United Nations,” and its variation “U.N.,” used 66 times;
“security,” used 52 times; “nation,” and its variation “nation,” used 35 times; “world,”
and its variation “world’s,” used 33 times; and “ally,” and its variation “allies,” used 26
times.
Both presidents used the terms “United Nations,” with Johnson giving it
secondary importance and Bush giving it primary importance. Both also used “world,”
with Johnson giving it slightly more importance than Bush. Finally, both used the word
“ally,” giving it the same level of importance even if not saying it the same amount of
times.
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define the Coalition:
“Congress.” Johnson described the Coalition using the word “Congress” the most, as in
these examples: “So I ask you now in the Congress and in the country to join with me in
expressing and fulfilling that faith in working for a nation, a nation that is free from want
and a world that is free from hate – a world of peace and justice, and freedom and
abundance, for our time and for all time to come” (Annual Message to Congress on the
State of the Union, January 8, 1964) and “For each Member of Congress who supports
this request is voting to continue our effort to try to halt Communist aggression. Each is
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saying that the Congress and the President stand before the world in joint determination
that the independence of South Viet-Nam shall be preserved and that Communist
conquest shall not succeed” (Remarks to Committee Members on the Need for Additional
Appropriations for Military Purposes in Viet-Nam and the Dominican Republic, May 4,
1965).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define the Coalition:
“United Nations.” Johnson’s second most-used key term in referring to the Coalition is
the “United Nations,” as illustrated in these examples from his speeches: “The rulers in
Hanoi are urged on by Peking. This is a regime which has destroyed freedom in Tibet,
which has attacked India, and has been condemned by the United Nations for aggression
in Korea” (Address at Johns Hopkins University, April 7, 1965) and “From this chamber
of representative government, let all the world know and none misunderstand that I
rededicate this Government to the unswerving support of the United Nations, to the
honorable and determined execution of our commitments to our allies, to the maintenance
of military strength second to none …” (Address Before a Joint Session of Congress,
November 27, 1963).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define the Coalition:
“World.” The third most-used term by Johnson to refer to the Coalition was “world,” as
in the following examples: “We would hope that you could thoroughly and carefully
consider it and with a minimum of division and discord say to the rest of the world that
we are going to spend every dollar, we are going to take every action, we are going to
walk the last mile in order to see that peace is restored, that the people of not only the
Dominican Republic but South Viet-Nam have the right of self-determination and that
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they cannot be gobbled up in the 20th century and swallowed just because they happen to
be smaller than some of those whose boundaries adjoin them” (Remarks to Committee
Members on the Need for Additional Appropriations for Military Purposes in Viet-Nam
and the Dominican Republic, May 4, 1965) and “The government of North Viet-Nam is
today flouting the will of the world for peace” (Remarks at Syracuse University on the
Communist Challenge in Southeast Asia, August 5, 1964).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define the Coalition:
“Friend.” The fourth most-used term by Johnson to define the Coalition was “friend,” as
shown in these examples: “Thus, to allies we are the most dependable and enduring of
friends, for our own safety depends upon the strength of that friendship” (Remarks on
Foreign Affairs at the Association Press Luncheon, April 20, 1964) and “Peace requires
that we and all our friends stand firm against the present aggressions of the government
of North Viet-Nam” (Remarks at Syracuse University on the Communist Challenge in
Southeast Asia, August 5, 1964).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define the Coalition:
“Ally.” Finally, Johnson used the term “ally” to define the Coalition, as in these
examples: “We have shown that we can also be a formidable foe to those who reject the
path of peace and those who seek to impose upon us or our allies the yoke of tyranny”
(Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, November 27, 1963) and “Finally, we must
develop with our allies new means of bridging the gap between the East and the West,
facing danger boldly wherever danger exists, but being equally bold in our search for new
agreements which can enlarge the hopes of all, while violating the interests of none”
(Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union, January 8, 1964).
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Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define the Coalition: “United
Nations.” Bush referred most frequently to the “United Nations” in defining the Coalition
in his pre-war speeches, as shown by these examples: “Every civilized nation here today
is resolved to keep the most basic commitment of civilization: We will defend ourselves
and our future against terror and lawless violence. The United Nations was founded in
this cause” (Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly, November 10, 2001) and
“In one place – in one regime – we find all these dangers, in their most lethal and
aggressive forms, exactly the kind of aggressive threat the United Nations was born to
confront. Iraq has answered a decade of U.N. demands with a decade of defiance. All the
world now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Will the
United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant? The United
States helped found the United Nations” (Address to the United Nations General
Assembly, September 12, 2002).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define the Coalition:
“Security.” Bush referred to “security” the second most times in defining the Coalition,
as typified in these examples: “America and our friends and allies join with all those who
want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against
terrorism” (Address to the Nation on Terrorist Attacks, September 11, 2001) and “Above
all, our principles and our security are challenged today by outlaw groups and regimes
that accept no law of morality and have no limit to their violent ambitions” (Address to
the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define the Coalition:
“Nation.” Bush used the word “nation” the third most frequently to define the Coalition,
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as demonstrated in these examples: “We are joined by a great coalition of nations to rid
the world of terror” (Address to the Nation on the Anniversary of the Terrorist Attacks of
September 11, September 11, 2002) and “The United States, along with a growing
coalition of nations, is resolved to take whatever action is necessary to defend ourselves
and disarm the Iraqi regime” (Remarks on the Iraqi Regime’s Noncompliance With
United Nations Resolutions, February 6, 2003).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define the Coalition: “World.”
The fourth-most term used by Bush to define the Coalition was “world,” as shown in
these examples from his speeches: “America encourages and expects governments
everywhere to help remove the terrorist parasites that threaten their own countries and
peace of the world” (Remarks on the Six-Month Anniversary of the September 11th
Attacks, March 11, 2002); “The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic
values, because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder” (Remarks
to the American Enterprise Institute Annual Dinner, February 26, 2003); and “Saddam
Hussein’s refusal to comply with the demands of the civilized world is a threat to peace,
and it’s a threat to stability. It’s a threat to the security of our country. It’s a threat to the
security of peace leaving – peace-loving people everywhere” (Remarks to the National
Governors Association Conference, February 24, 2003).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define the Coalition: “Ally.”
Finally, Bush used the term “ally” frequently to define the Coalition, as demonstrated
here: “No group or nation should mistake Americans’ intentions: Where terrorist groups
exist of global reach, the United States and our friends and allies will seek it out, and we
will destroy it” (Address to the Nation From Atlanta on Homeland Security, November 8,
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2001) and “We will plan carefully; we will act with the full power of the United States
military; we will act with allies at our side, and we will prevail” (Address to the Nation
on Iraq, October 10, 2002).
Category: Enemy
Table 4.4 reports the data for this category.

Table 4.4. Five Most-Used Words By Presidents Johnson and Bush
To Define the Enemy
Johnson
Word
aggression(s)(aggressor)
(aggressors)(aggressive)
Communism (Communist)
(Communists)
attack(ed)(ing)(s)
North Viet-Nam
adversary (adversaries)
TOTAL

Bush
Freq.
58
34
28
12
11
143

Word
terror(ism)(ist)
(ists)(ize)
threat(s)(en)
(ens)(ening)(ened)
murder(ered)(erer)
(erers)(ous)
evil(doers)
kill(ed)(ers)(ing)

Freq. Z-Score
317
N/A
109

N/A

44

N/A

37
34
541

N/A
N/A
-17.47*

**sig. at p<.01
Note: Test is the difference between two binomial proportions.

Summary. Based upon the test of binomial proportions employed to examine the
two presidents’ five most-used terms, the results indicate that Bush was much more likely
than Johnson to use terms to define the Enemy. The two presidents shared no terms in
common in defining this category.
Johnson used 143 key terms to define the Enemy, while Bush used 540. In his 16
pre-war-escalation speeches, the five terms used most by Johnson to define the Enemy
are “aggression,” and its variations “aggressions,” “aggressor,” “aggressors” and
“aggressive,” used 58 times; “Communism,” and its variations “Communist” and
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“communists,” used 34 times; “attack,” and its variations “attacked,” attacking” and
“attacks,” used 28 times; “North Viet-Nam,” used 12 times; and “adversary,” and its
variation “adversaries,” used 11 times. Johnson’s use of softer and more dated words
such as “aggressor” and “adversary” seem to hark back to the language of a gentlemanly
duel.
Bush used much stronger antithetical language than Johnson in his 29 speeches to
refer to the Enemy. Indeed, this was clearly a category in which Bush expressed himself
passionately. The five words he used the most are “terror,” and its variants “terrorism,”
“terrorist,” “terrorists” and “terrorize,” used 317 times, used overwhelmingly more than
any other term in this study; “threat,” and its variants “threats,” “threaten,” “threatens,”
“threatening” and “threatened,” used 108 times; “murder,” and its variations “murdered,”
“murderer,” “murderers” and “murderous,” used 44 times; “evil,” and its biblical variant,
“evildoer,” used 37 times; and “kill,” and its variations “killed,” “killers” and “killing,”
used 34. 40
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define the Enemy:
“Aggression.” Examples of how Johnson defines the Enemy using his most frequently
used term, “aggression,” are as follows: “In Asia, Communism wears a more aggressive
face. We see that in Viet-Nam. Why are we there? We are there, first, because a friendly
nation has asked us for help against the Communist aggression.” (Annual Message to the
Congress on the State of the Union, January 4, 1965); “This is a regime which has
destroyed freedom in Tibet, which has attacked India, and has been condemned by the
United Nations for aggression in Korea” (Address at Johns Hopkins University, April 7,
40

Notably, Bush went even to greater extremes in words that did not make it into his most-used category,
including describing the Enemy as Mafia-like, parasites, torturers (even of children), rapists and wielders of
weapons of mass destruction. He even describes Saddam Hussein as a student of Stalin.
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1965); and “This is not the same kind of aggression which the world has long been used
to. Instead of the sweep of invading armies there is the steady and the deadly attack in the
night by guerrilla bands that come without warning, that kill people while they sleep”
(Remarks to Committee Members on the Need for Additional Military Purposes in VietNam and the Dominican Republic, May 4, 1965).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define the Enemy:
“Communism.” Johnson also defined the Enemy using his second-most preferred term,
“Communism,” as shown in these examples: “Third, we have worked for the revival of
strength among our allies, initially, to oppose Communist encroachment on war
weakened nations; in the long run, because our own future rests on the vitality and the
unity of the Western society to which we belong” (Remarks on Foreign Affairs at the
Associated Press Luncheon, April 20, 1964) and “But the United States cannot and must
not and will not turn aside and allow the freedom of a brave people to be handed over to
Communist tyranny. This alternative is strategically unwise, we think, and it is morally
unthinkable” (Remarks in New York City Before the American Bar Association, August
12, 1964).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define the Enemy:
“Attack.” Johnson’s third-most preferred term to define the Enemy was “attack,” and
these are some examples of what he said: “On August 2 the United States destroyer
Maddox was attacked on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin by hostile vessels of the
Government of North Viet-Nam” (Remarks at Syracuse University on the Communist
Challenge in Southeast Asia, August 5, 1964) and “Since the end of World War II,
America has been found wherever freedom was under attack, or wherever world peace
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was threatened” (Remarks in New York City Before the American Bar Association,
August 12, 1964).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define the Enemy: “North
Viet-Nam.” Johnson next used “North Viet-Nam” the most to describe the Enemy, as
follows: “For 10 years three American Presidents-President Eisenhower, President
Kennedy, and your present President – and the American people have been actively
concerned with threats to the peace and security of the peoples of southeast Asia from the
Communist government of North Viet-Nam” and “South Viet-Nam has been attacked by
North Viet-Nam. It has asked our help. We are giving that help; we are giving it because
of our commitments, because of our principles, and because we believe that our national
interest demands it” (Remarks to Committee Members on the Need for Additional
Appropriations for Military Purposes in Viet-Nam and the Dominican Republic, May 4,
1965).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define the Enemy:
“Adversary.” Finally, Johnson used the term “adversary” to define the Enemy, as in these
examples: “Now, what has come from that? Tonight we have more than twice as many
bombers that can be put over our adversaries’ land than they can put over ours” (Remarks
in Manchester to the Members of the New Hampshire Weekly Newspaper Editors
Association, September 28, 1964) and “We destroy bridges that are made up of steel and
concrete and bleed little blood, so it is harder for our adversaries to convey their
instruments of war from the north to the south” (Remarks to Committee Members on the
Need for Additional Appropriations for Military Purposes in Viet-Nam and the
Dominican Republican, May 5, 1965).
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Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define the Enemy: “Terror.”
Bush’s focus was primarily on “terror” to define the Enemy, which was his largest
category of all: “The face of terror is not the true faith of Islam. That’s not what Islam is
all about. Islam is peace. These terrorists don’t represent peace. They represent evil and
war” (Remarks at the Islamic Center of Washington, September 17, 2001). He also said,
“Al Qaida is to terror what the Mafia is to crime,” and:
We value life; the terrorists ruthlessly destroy it. We value education; the
terrorists do not believe women should be educated or should have health
care or should leave their homes. We value the right to speak our minds;
for the terrorists, free expression can be grounds for execution (Address to
the Nation from Atlanta on Homeland Security, November 8, 2001).
More examples of the key word “terror” include “The dictator of Iraq is a student of
Stalin, using murder as a tool of terror and control, within his own cabinet, within his
own army, and even within his own family” (Address to the Nation on Iraq, October 7,
2002); and finally this:
The passing of Saddam Hussein’s regime will deprive terrorist networks
of a wealthy patron that pays for terrorist training, and offers rewards to
families of suicide bombers. And other regimes will be given a clear
warning that support for terror will not be tolerated (Remarks to the
American Enterprise Institute Annual Dinner, February 26, 2003).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define the Enemy: “Threat.”
“Threat” was Bush’s second-most used term to define the Enemy, as in these examples:
“States like these and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the
peace of the world” (Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the
Union, January 29, 2002); “At the same time, every nation in our coalition must take
seriously the growing threat of terror on a catastrophic scale, terror armed with
biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons” (Remarks on the Six-Month Anniversary of
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the September 11th Attacks, March 11, 2002); “And we will not allow any terrorist or
tyrant to threaten civilization with weapons of mass murder” (Address to the Nation on
the Anniversary of the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, September 11, 2002).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define the Enemy: “Murder.”
Bush also used the term “murder” to define the Enemy, as shown here: “They are the
heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century” (Address Before a Joint Session
of the Congress of the United States in Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September
11th, September 20, 2001); “A murderer is not a martyr; he is just a murderer” (Remarks
to the United Nations General Assembly, November 10, 2001); and “Iraq’s weapons of
mass destruction are controlled by a murderous tyrant who has already used chemical
weapons to kill thousands of people” (Address to the Nation on Iraq, October 7, 2002).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define the Enemy: “Evil.”
Bush also defined the Enemy as “evil,” as illustrated by these examples from his
speeches: “We’ve come to know truths that we will never question: Evil is real, and it
must be opposed” (Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the
Union, January 29, 2002); “Terror cells and outlaw regimes building weapons of mass
destruction are different faces of the same evil. Our security requires that we confront
both. And the United States military is capable of confronting both” (Address to the
Nation on Iraq, October 7, 2002) and this:
The dictator who is assembling the world’s most dangerous weapons has
already used them on whole villages – leaving thousands of his own
citizens dead, blind, or disfigured. Iraqi refugees tell us how forced
confessions are obtained – by torturing children while their parents are
made to watch. International human rights groups have catalogued other
methods used in the torture chambers of Iraq: electric shock, burning with
hot irons, dripping acid on the skin, mutilation with electric drills, cutting
out tongues, and rape. If this is not evil, then evil has no meaning (Address
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Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January
28, 2003).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define the Enemy: “Kill.”
Finally, Bush used the word “kill” to refer to the Enemy, as demonstrated in these
examples: “The terrorists’ directive commands them to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all
Americans, and make no distinctions among military and civilians, including women and
children” (Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress of the United States in
Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, September 20, 2001) and “Iraq’s
weapons of mass destruction are controlled by a murderous tyrant who has already used
chemical weapons to kill thousands of people” (Address to the Nation on Iraq, October 7,
2002).

Category: Job of President

Data for this category are reported in Table 4.5.
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Table 4.5. Five Most-Used Words By Presidents Johnson and Bush
To Define the Job of President
Johnson
Word
Eisenhower
(President)(General)
(Mr.)
ask
order(s)(ed)
Kennedy
leader(ship)
help
hope(s)
administration
duty
pledge(d)
peace
responsibility
(responsibilities)
TOTAL

Bush
Freq.
10

9
8 (tie)
8 (tie)
8 (tie)
7 (tie)
7 (tie)
6 (tie)
6 (tie)
6 (tie)
6 (tie)
6 (tie)
87

Word
secure (security)

Freq.
16

Z-Score
N/A

protect(ion)
defense (defended)
love(d)
strengthen (strong)
ask(ed)
commander-in-chief

15
7 (tie)
7 (tie)
7 (tie)
5
3

-1.21 (ask)
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

TOTAL

60

2.90**

** sig. at p<.01
Note: Test is the difference between two binomial proportions.

Summary. Based upon the test of binomial proportions employed to examine the
two presidents’ five most-used terms, the results indicate that Johnson was much more
likely than Bush to use terms to define the Job of President. The two presidents shared
only one top key word in this category – “ask.” This small verb was coded because it
emerged as important and because it seems to highlight the fact that while presidents do
have certain powers, in the end their main power is the one to persuade (Neustadt 1986).
Johnson had three sets of ties in number of words used. Each tie was treated as
one set for the purposes of tallying up the five words used most. Johnson referred the
most to “Eisenhower,” a former president, calling him “President Eisenhower,” “General
Eisenhower” and “Mr. Eisenhower” 10 times in his 16 speeches. He then turned to such
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words as “ask,” used nine times; followed by a three-way tie of eight uses of “orders,”
and its variants “orders” and “ordered, “Kennedy” (meaning President Kennedy, whom
he succeeded when Kennedy was assassinated) and “leader” and its variation
“leadership”; a second tie in seven uses of “help” and “hope,” including its variant
“hopes”; a third tie in six uses of “administration,” “duty,” “pledge” and its variant
“pledged,” “peace,” and finally “responsibility” and its variant “responsibilities”.
In contrast, Bush had only one tie, and therefore his category features six fewer
words than Johnson. The five words Bush used most to define the Job of President were
“secure,” and its variant, “security,” 16 times; “protect,” and its variation “protection,”
used 15 times; a three-way tie between “defense,” and its variant “defended,” “love” and
its variation “loved” and “strengthen” and its variant “strong,” used seven times; a twoway tie between “ask” and its variant “asked,” as well as “strengthen,” and its variant
“strong,” each used five times; and “commander-in-chief,” used three times.
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define the Job of President:
“President Eisenhower.” Johnson defined the Job of President by referring to “President
Eisenhower” as follows:
But today finds us where President Eisenhower found himself 10 years
ago. The position he took with Viet-Nam then in a letter that he sent to the
then President is one that I could take in complete honesty today, and that
is that we stand ready to help the Vietnamese preserve their independence
and retain their freedom and keep from being enveloped by communism
(Remarks to the Legislative Conference of the Building and Construction
Trades Department, AFL-CIO, March 24, 1964).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define the Job of President:
“Ask.” Johnson also defined the Job of President by the word “ask,” as shown here:
I do not ask complete approval of every phase and every action of your
Government. I do ask for the support of our basic course. What is that?
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That is resistance to aggression. That is moderation in the use of power.
That is a constant search for peace (Remarks to Committee Members on
the Need for Additional Appropriations for Military Purposes in Viet-Nam
and the Dominican Republic, May 4, 1965).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define the Job of President:
“Order.” Johnson employed the word “order” in defining the Job of President, as shown
here:
As President and Commander in Chief, it is my duty to the American
people to report that renewed hostile actions against United States ships on
the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to order the
military forces of the United States to take action in reply (Radio and
Television Report to the American People Following Renewed Aggression
in the Gulf of Tonkin, August 4, 1964).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define the Job of President:
“Kennedy.” Johnson also referred to President “Kennedy” in defining the Job of
President, as illustrated here: “I am going to try to see that the peace that President John
Kennedy fought so valiantly to preserve is kept” (Remarks in Manchester to the Members
of the New Hampshire Weekly Newspaper Editors Association, September 28, 1964).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define the Job of President:
“Leader.” Johnson referred to the term “leader” in defining the Job of President:
I intend as your leader and as your President to work to strengthen the
United Nations, because I think they have prevented a number of wars
already, and I think they can help us on the road to peace in the days ahead
(Remarks in Memorial Hall, Akron University, October 21, 1964).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define the Job of President:
“Help.” Johnson used the term “help” to define the Job of President: “I am here today to
say I need your help; I cannot bear this burden alone. I need the help of all Americans,
and all America” (Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, November 27, 1963).
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Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define the Job of President:
“Hope.” Johnson used the word “hope” to define the Job of President:
Every night before I turn out the lights to sleep I ask myself this question:
Have I done everything that I can do to unite this country? Have I done
everything I can to help unite the world, to try to bring peace and hope to
all the peoples of the world? Have I done enough? (Address at Johns
Hopkins University, April 7, 1965).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define the Job of President:
“Administration.” Johnson also employed the term “administration” to refer to the Job of
President, as is illustrated in this example: “And in the Gulf of Tonkin, the Johnson
administration acted, and will continue to act to halt Communist aggression” (Remarks in
Manchester to the Members of the New Hampshire Weekly Newspaper Editors
Association, September 28, 1964).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define the Job of President:
“Duty.” Johnson used the term “duty” to describe the Job of President, as in this
example: “I know that duty, as other Presidents have known it before me. I know that the
responsibility for exercising that duty is the President’s, and it is his alone, and he is
alone a great deal of the time” (Remarks at Lindbergh Field, October 28, 1964).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define the Job of President:
“Pledge.” Another term Johnson used to describe the Job of President is “pledge,” as
demonstrated here:
In Asia, communism wears a more aggressive face. We see that in VietNam. Why are we there? We are there, first, because a friendly nation has
asked us for help against the Communist aggression. Ten years ago our
President pledged our help. Three Presidents have supported that pledge.
We will not break it now (Annual Message to the Congress on the State of
the Union, January 4, 1965).
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Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define the Job of President:
“Peace.” Johnson also used the term “peace” to define the Job of President, as in the
following:
But I am humble, I am humble in the belief that on the issue of war, when
you take your boy down to the depot to say goodbye, maybe never to see
him again, on the issue of war and peace I share the view of the Presidents
of both parties who have preceded me, and I share the view of what I think
is the overwhelming majority of Americans today (Remarks at Lindbergh
Field, October 28, 1964).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define the Job of President:
“Responsibility.” Finally, Johnson used the term “responsibility” to define the Job of
President, as in this example:
It is a solemn responsibility to have to order even limited military action
by forces whose overall strength is as vast and as awesome as those of the
United States of America, but it is my considered conviction, shared
throughout your Government, that firmness in the right is indispensable
today for peace; that firmness will always be measured (Radio and
Television Report to the American People Following Renewed Aggression
in the Gulf of Tonkin, August 4, 1964).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define the Job of President:
“Secure.” The Bush list of terms used to define the Job of President begins with
“secure,” as illustrated in this example: “Whatever action is required, whenever action is
necessary, I will defend the freedom and security of the American people” (Address
Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 28, 2003).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define the Job of President:
“Protect.” The next most-used term Bush used to define the Job of President was
“protect,” as shown here: “The next priority of my budget is to do everything possible to
protect our citizens and strengthen our Nation against the ongoing threat of another
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attack” (Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,
January 29, 2002).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define the Job of President:
“Defend.” Next, Bush used the term “defend” to define the Job of President: “Whatever
action is required, whenever action is necessary, I will defend the freedom and security of
the American people” (Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the
Union, January 28, 2003).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define the Job of President:
“Love.” Bush also used the term “love” to define Job of the President: “They love
America just as much as I do” (Remarks at the Islamic Center of Washington, September
17, 2001).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define the Job of President:
“Strengthen.” He also used a variation of the term “strengthen” to define the Job of
President: “What’s on my mind is to make sure this country is strong and safe” (Remarks
to the National Governors Association Conference, February 24, 2003).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define the Job of President:
“Ask.” Bush’s next-most-used term to define the Job of President is “ask,” as shown
here: “I have asked Congress to authorize the use of America’s military, if it proves
necessary, to enforce U.N. Security Council demands” (Address to the Nation on Iraq,
October 7, 2002).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define the Job of President:
“Commander-in-Chief.” Finally, Bush used the term “commander-in-chief” to define the
Job of President: “The United States of America has the sovereign authority to use force
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in assuring its own national security. That duty falls to me, as Commander-in-Chief, by
the oath I have sworn, by the oath I will keep” (Address to the Nation on Iraq, March 17,
2003).
Category: Victims 41
Table 4.6 reports the data for this category.

Table 4.6. Five Most-Used Words By Presidents Johnson
And Bush to Define Victims
Johnson
Word
South-Viet-Nam (south)
independence (independent)
Asia(n)(ns)
free(dom)
nation(s)
Viet-nam(ese)
TOTAL

Bush
Freq.
27
19
15
10
9 (tie)
9 (tie)
89

Word
people
Iraqi
innocent
Afghan(s)(istan)(istan’s)
free(d)(dom)
TOTAL

Freq.
33
24
18
11
10
96

Z-Score
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
0

Summary. There was no significant difference between the two presidents’ use of
words in the category of Victims, but they did share use of the word “freedom.” Johnson
most used the words “South-Viet-Nam” or referred to the “south” when referring to VietNam 27 times in 29 speeches; “independence” and its variant “independent,” used 19
times; “Asia,” and its variations “Asian” and “Asians,” used 15 times; “free,” and its
variation “freedom,” used 10 times; and a two-way tie between “nation,” and its variant
“nations,” and “Viet-Nam,” and its variant “Vietnamese,” each used nine times.
In contrast, Bush defined Victims using the five most-used words: “people,” used
33 times; “Iraqi,” used 24 times; “innocent,” used 18 times; “Afghan,” and its variations
41

For Bush, the Victims morphed from the 9/11 casualties to the people who suffered under the Taliban in
Afghanistan to the people who had suffered under Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.
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“Afghans,” “Afghanistan” and “Afghanistan’s; and “free,” and its variations “freed” and
“freedom,” used 10 times. Bush had no ties in this category. He did go into greater detail
than Johnson in this category.
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define Victims: “South
Viet-Nam.” When it came to defining Victims, Johnson used the term “South Viet-Nam”
the most, as demonstrated here:
I think it is well to remember that there are a hundred other little nations
sitting here this moment watching what happens and what the outcome is
in South Viet-Nam and if South Viet-Nam can be gobbled up, the same
thing may happen to them (Remarks to Committee Members on the Need
for Additional Appropriations for Military Purposes in Viet-Nam and the
Dominican Republic, May 4, 1965).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define Victims:
“Independence.” Johnson’s next-most-used term to define Victims was “independence,”
as illustrated here: “We will not permit the independent nations of the East to be
swallowed up by Communist conquest” (Remarks in Memorial Hall, Akron University,
October 21, 1964).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define Victims: “Asia.”
Johnson’s third-most-used term to define Victims is “Asia,” as shown in this example:
There are those who ask why this responsibility should be ours. The
answer, I think, is simple. There is no one else who can do the job. Our
power alone in the final test can stand between expanding communism
and independent Asian nations. Thus when India was attacked it looked to
us for help and we gave it immediately. We believe that Asia should be
directed by Asians, but that means that each Asian people must have the
right to find its own way, not that one group or one nation should overrun
all the others (Remarks to Committee Members on the Need for
Additional Appropriations for Military Purposes in Viet-Nam and the
Dominican Republic, May 4, 1965).
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Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define Victims: “Free.”
Johnson also defined Victims as “free,” as shown here:
There are some that say we ought to go south and get out and come home,
but we don’t like to break our treaties and we don’t like to walk off and
leave people who are searching for freedom, and suffering to obtain it, and
walk out on them (Remarks in Oklahoma at the Dedication of the Eufala
Dam, September 25, 1964).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define Victims: “Nation.”
Johnson defined Victims as being a “nation,” as in “The first reality is that North VietNam has attacked the independent nation of South Viet-Nam. Its object is total conquest”
(Address at Johns Hopkins University, April 7, 1965).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define Victims: “VietNam.” Finally, Johnson defined Victims as “Viet-Nam,” as in this example:
Time and time and time again, men, women, and children – Americans
and Vietnamese alike – were bombed in their villages and their homes
while our forces made no reply (Remarks to Committee Members on the
Need for Additional Appropriations for Military Purposes in Viet-Nam
and the Dominican Republic, May 4, 1965).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define Victims: “People.”
Bush chose first to define Victims as “people,” as in this example:
The United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people; they’ve suffered
too long in silent captivity. Liberty for the Iraqi people is a great moral
cause, and a great strategic goal. The people of Iraq deserve it; the security
of all nations requires it (Address to the United Nations General
Assembly, September 12, 2002).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define Victims: “Innocent.”
Bush also defined Victims as “innocent,” as in this example: “But those who celebrate
the murder of innocent men, women, and children have no religion, have no conscience,
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and have no mercy” (Address to the Nation From Atlanta on Homeland Security,
November 8, 2001).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define Victims: “Afghan.”
Bush defined Victims as “Afghan,” as shown in this example: “Afghanistan’s people
have been brutalized” (Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress of the United
States in Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, September 20, 2001).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define Victims: “Free.”
Finally, Bush defined Victims as “free,” as shown here:
The first to benefit from a free Iraq would be the Iraqi people, themselves.
Today they live in scarcity and fear, under a dictator who has brought
them nothing but war, and misery, and torture. Their lives and their
freedom matter little to Saddam Hussein – but Iraqi lives and freedom
matter greatly to us (Remarks to the American Enterprise Institute Annual
Dinner, February 26, 2003).
Category: War 42
Data for this category are reported in Table 4.7.

42

For Bush, the War evolved from an attack on the United States in 9/11, to an attack on the free world as a
whole, as he explained on September 12, 2001, in Remarks to the National Security Team: “This enemy
attacked not just our people but all freedom-loving people everywhere in the world.”

132

Table 4.7. Five Most-Used Words By Presidents Johnson
And Bush to Define War
Johnson
Word
peace(ful)(fully)
Viet-Nam(Viet-Nam)
(Viet-Nam’s)
world(’s)

Bush
Freq.
82
38

Word
security (secure)(securing)
free(dom)(doms)(dom’s)(r)

Freq.
67
57

34

53

N/A

52

-.3.00**
(free)

42

N/A

271

-2.62**

free(dom)(dom’s)
(ly)a
fight(ing)(fought)

27

terror(ism)(ist)(ists)
(bioterrorism)
peace(ful)(fully)(-loving)

22

just(ice)

TOTAL

203

Z-Score
.97 (peace)
N/A

** Sig. at p<.01
Note: Test is the difference between two binomial proportions.

Summary. Based upon the test of binomial proportions employed to examine the
two presidents’ five most-used terms, the results indicate that Bush was much more likely
than Johnson to use terms in total to define War and to use the shared term “free” and its
variants. The two presidents also shared the top key-word concepts of “peace” and
“freedom” in this category, and both used many words to define War. Both defined War
in terms of peace, with Johnson doing this much more so.
Johnson used the following words most in his 19 pre-escalation speeches to define
War: “peace,” and its variations “peaceful” and “peacefully,” used 82 times; “Viet-Nam,”
and its variations “Viet-Nam” and “Viet-Nam’s,” used 38 times; “world, and its variation
“world’s,” used 34 times; “free,” and its variations “freedom,” “freedom’s” and “freely,”
used 27 times; and “fight,” and its variations,” “fighting” and “fought,” used 22 times.
In defining War, Bush chose to focus the most on the words “secure,” and its
variants “secure” and “securing,” used 67 times; “free,” and its variants “freedom,”
“freedoms” and “freer,” used 57 times; “terror,” and its variants, “terrorism,” “terrorist,”
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“terrorists” and “bioterrorism,” used 53 times; “peace,” and its variants, “peaceful,”
“peacefully” and “peace-loving,” used 52 times; and “just,” and its variant, “justice,”
used 42 times.
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define War: “Peace.”
When it came to defining the War, Johnson’s most-used term was “peace,” as in this
example from his speeches: “Our goal is peace in southeast Asia. That will come only
when aggressors leave their neighbors in peace” (Annual Message to the Congress on the
State of the Union, January 4, 1965).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define War: “Viet-Nam.”
The next-most-used term by Johnson to define War was “Viet-Nam,” as illustrated here:
Every day some one jumps up and shouts and says, ‘Tell us what is
happening in Viet-Nam and why are we in Viet-Nam, and how did you get
us into Viet-Nam?’ Well, I didn’t get you into Viet-Nam. You have been
in Viet-Nam 10 years. President Eisenhower wrote President Diem a letter
in 1954 when the French pulled out of Viet-Nam, and said, ‘We want to
help you to help your people keep from going Communist, and we will
furnish you advice, we will furnish you assistance, and we will furnish you
equipment, if you will furnish the men, and if you want to fight for your
freedom we will try to help you’(Remarks in Manchester to the Members
of the New Hampshire Weekly Newspaper Editors Association,
September 28, 1964).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define War: “World.”
Johnson also defined the War in the context of the “world,” as shown in this example:
“We fight because we must fight if we are to live in a world where every country can
shape its own destiny. And only in such a world will our own freedom be finally secure”
(Address at Johns Hopkins University, April 7, 1965).
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Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define War: “Free.”
Additionally, Johnson used the term “free” to define the need for War, as Johnson
illustrates in this line from one of his speeches:
So let no one doubt that we are in this battle as long as South Viet-Nam
wants our support and needs our assistance to protect its freedom. I have
already ordered measures to step up the fighting capacity of the South
Vietnamese forces, to help improve the welfare and the morale of their
civilian population, to keep our forces at whatever level continued
independence and freedom require (Remarks on Foreign Affairs at the
Associated Press Luncheon, April 20, 1964).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Johnson to Define War: “Fight.”
Finally, Johnson defined War in terms of the word “fight,” as illustrated here: “We fight
because we must fight if we are to live in a world where every country can shape its own
destiny” (Address at Johns Hopkins University, April 7, 1965).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define War: “Security.” Bush
chose to define War by first emphasizing “security,” as in this example:
Saddam Hussein’s refusal to comply with the demands of the civilized
world is a threat to peace, and it’s a threat to stability. It’s a threat to the
security of our country. It’s a threat to the security of peace leaving –
peace-loving people everywhere (Remarks to the National Governors
Association Conference, February 24, 2003).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define War: “Free.” Next,
Bush used “free” to define War, as shown here: “History has called America and our
allies to action, and it is both our responsibility and our privilege to fight freedom’s fight”
(Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 29,
2002).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define War: “Terror.” Bush
also used the word “terror” to define War, as illustrated here:
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Today, the gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger facing
America and the world, is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons. These regimes could use such weapons
for blackmail, terror, and mass murder (Address Before a Joint Session of
the Congress on the State of the Union, January 28, 2003).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define War: “Peace.” Like
Johnson, Bush defined the War in terms of “peace,” as in this example:
Last fall the international community spoke, with united voice. It said: this
is your last chance, Mr. Saddam Hussein, to do what you said you would
do, which is, in the name of peace, disarm; destroy your weapons of mass
destruction (Remarks at the National Religious Broadcasters Convention,
February 10, 2003).
Example of Key Word in Context Used by Bush to Define War: “Just.” Finally,
Bush defined the War in terms of “just,” as in this example:
America will take the side of brave men and women who advocate these
values around the world, including the Islamic world, because we have a
greater objective than eliminating threats and containing resentment. We
seek a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror (Address Before a
Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 29, 2002).
Category: Job of Citizens
Data for this category are reported in Table 4.8.
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Table 4.8. Five Most-Used Words By Presidents Johnson 43
And Bush to Define the Job of Citizens
Johnson
Word
alert
counsel
heart
look back
thank
unite
TOTAL

Bush
Freq.
2 (tie)
2 (tie)
2 (tie)
2 (tie)
2 (tie)
2 (tie)
12

Word
good(s)(goodness)
serve(service)
alert(ing)
patient (patience)
responsibility (responsibilities)

Freq.
6 (tie)
6 (tie)
5
4 (tie)
4 (tie)
28

Z-Score
-1.09 (alert)
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
-2.36**

**sig. at p<.01
Note: Test is the difference between two binomial proportions.

Summary. Based upon the test of binomial proportions employed to examine the
two presidents’ five most-used terms, the results indicate that Bush was much more likely
than Johnson to use terms in total to define the Job of Citizens. Johnson used six terms
twice: 44 “alert,” “counsel,” “heart,” “look back,” “thank” and “unite.” In contrast, Bush
defined the Job of Citizens as “good” and its variations “goods” and “goodness” in a tie
for six uses with “serve” and its variation “service”; “alert” and its variant “alerting,”
used five times; and “patient” and its variant “patience,” tied for four mentions with
“responsibility” and its variation “responsibilities.”

43

In order to allow Bush five most-used key words, it is necessary to give Johnson six most-used key
words in this category because all Johnson’s words are tied in being used twice, and it would simply be a
random choice and unrepresentative of the results to eliminate one of the terms, or the last term.
44
Job of Citizens is a category that did not work particularly well for Johnson. In effect, every descriptor
categorized under this heading is listed for him because there were so many single uses of words that
qualified them as a tie. In addition, the other words used more than once were only used twice, which led to
a tie among them as well. Thus it appears that Johnson used many more words most often to talk about the
Job of Citizens, when if each tie is counted as one, as is done here, there are five terms used most by each
president. Nevertheless, the variety of words used by Johnson, even if used only a few times, is revealing.
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Johnson used the fewest words in all categories to define the Job of Citizens (12,
compared to Bush’s 28). And this was the category that Bush used the fewest definitional
words (28), although he was the inspiration for the category.
The two presidents shared the use of the word “alert” in their top key words, a
word which connotes an element of fear and perhaps a false sense of security. After all,
what really can Americans do about Communism in Asia or potential terrorists at home?
Examples of Key Words in Context Used by Johnson to Define the Job of Citizens:
“Alert,” “Counsel,” “Hand,” “Heart,” “Help” “Look Back,” “Thank,” “Unite.”
Showing how Johnson defined the Job of Citizens requires grouping some words as they
appeared infrequently in sometimes just one or two quotes. Johnson used the term “alert,”
as in “We must be alert to shifting realities, to emerging opportunities, and always alert to
any fresh dangers” (Remarks on Foreign Affairs at the Associated Press Luncheon, April
20, 1964); “counsel,” as in the following:
I am prepared to submit to the Congress very shortly recommendations.
Before I do that, however, I want to review with you some of my thoughts
and get your judgment and your counsel and, I trust, your cooperation
(Remarks to Committee Members on the Need for Additional
Appropriations for Military Purposes in Viet-Nam and the Dominican
Republic, May 4, 1965).
He used “hand,” “heart” and “help,” as in the following:
And I want to ask you in advance, because I may just have some kind of
illusion and some kind of dream about what is going to happen in
November, I want to ask you in advance to give me your hand and give
me your help, and give me your counsel and give me your heart, and give
me your prayers, because the 37th President of this country is going to
need them more than the 36th (Remarks in Manchester to the Members of
the New Hampshire Weekly Newspaper Editors Association, September
28, 1964).
He also uses “look back,” as in the following:
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So let’s look back and see what our grandpa and our grandma and those
that came here in ‘49 and those who came and started to establish a
government in ‘76, let’s look back and see how far they have come from
their covered wagons to our Air Force One, our 707’s, to our supersonic
planes that are now on the drawing boards, that will go over 2,000 miles
an hour (Remarks at Lindbergh Field, October 28, 1964).
He uses “thank,” as in this example:
And on this Thanksgiving eve, as we gather together to ask the Lord’s
blessing, and give Him our thanks, let us unite in those familiar and
cherished words: America, America, God shed His grace on thee, And
crown thy good, With brotherhood, From sea to shining sea (Address
Before a Joint Session of Congress, November 27, 1963).
And he uses “unite,” as in this example:
Sunday night I talked about the problems of the world on television. More
than 63 million Americans listened to that discussion. The great majority
of them are, I think, united behind the responsible foreign policies of this
country that have kept peace for us (Remarks in Memorial Hall, Akron
University, October 21, 1964).
Examples of Key Words in Context Used by Bush to Define the Job of Citizens:
“Good,” “Serve,” “Alert,” “Patient,” “Responsibility.” Bush’s use of words to define
the Job of Citizens was quite different. He used “good” the most, as in “Those of us in
leadership position (sic) must understand that there are a lot of Americans who are asking
what they can do to help. I like to put it in as plain terms as I can: If you want to fight
evil, do some good” (Remarks to United States Mayors and County Officials, January 24,
2002); “serve,” as in “And I call on all Americans to serve by bettering our communities
and, thereby, defy and defeat the terrorists” (Address to the Nation From Atlanta on
Homeland Security, November 8, 2001); “alert,” as in “And as government works to
better secure our homeland, America will continue to depend on the eyes and ears of alert
citizens” (Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,
January 29, 2002); and “patient,” as in this example:
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But in order to make sure that our homeland is secure for a long time, we
as a nation must be patient enough and resolved enough to hunt down the
killers and the terrorists wherever they try to hide and bring them to
justice. And that’s exactly what this country is going to do. I say ‘patient
enough’ because sometimes there is a certain sense of anxiety that creeps
into the national dialog. Some folks are trying to rush the scorecard, I
guess, is a way to put it (Remarks to United States Mayors and County
Officials, January 24, 2002).
He also uses “responsibility,” as in “After September the 11th, our Government assumed
new responsibilities to strengthen security at home and track down our enemies abroad.
And the American people are accepting new responsibilities, as well” (Address to the
Nation From Atlanta on Homeland Security, “November 8, 2001).

Conclusion
The research questions for this work focused on (1) how the two presidents used
rhetoric to try to talk us into war, (2) how their addresses were similar and different in
terms of the words and emphases they used, and (3) how they framed their causal stories
in terms of who (or what) was to blame for the circumstances or events precipitating the
war/conflict.
Regarding this secular portion of this project (the portion not involving inherently
religious language), the expectation was that Johnson would use less antithetical language
than Bush to define the need for war escalation/war initiation. Antithetical language was
defined as language that is highly charged and provides highly contrasting descriptions of
the qualities of the United States (America), its coalition, its enemy, the war, the plight of
victims and job of citizens.
This expectation was both confirmed and disconfirmed. As to the confirmation,
Johnson did indeed use less strident antithetical language than Bush, although both used
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antithetical language. 45 In the category America, for instance, both presidents’ key words
defined America as exceptional, 46 and the key words in context made this even more
apparent. But even on its face Johnson’s definition of America’s strength and power was
not quite as strong as Bush’s definition of America’s “greatness.” Consider one of
Johnson’s quotes on America’s “strength,” for instance: “We have more strength than
any other nation, more strength than all nations put together, and we are going to keep it”
(Remarks in Memorial Hall, Akron University, October 21, 1964). And even when
Johnson defined America as powerful, he countered it with responsibility: “We are the
most powerful of all nations – we must strive also to be the most responsible of nations”
(Remarks Upon Signing Joint Resolution on the Maintenance of Peace and Security in
Southeast Asia, August 10, 1964).
Compare this with Bush’s definition of why America was targeted for attack:
“We’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world” (Address to the
Nation on Terrorist Attacks, September 11, 2001). And, he says, “the liberty we prize is
not America’s gift to the world; it is God’s gift to humanity” 47 (Address Before a Joint
Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 28, 2003).
The antithetical language was most apparent in how these presidents differed in
their definitions of the Enemy. Not only is “terrorist” Bush’s most-used word of all (used
317 times), but the word itself embodies the concept of extreme fear. Along with

45

This is not to say that there were not many more dissimilarities and similarities in these presidents’
definitional word choices. However, for the purposes of manageability, this project only discusses the top
key words used by each president, up to as many as five, or more if there were ties.
46
This becomes even more apparent when one examines the extensive panoply of words employed by both
presidents to define America.
47
While it would seem any quote that mentions inherently religious terms should belong in the secular
findings, this quote is included here because it is a prime example of the exceptionalist terms that Bush
used to define America and so was included here.
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terrorist, Bush defined the Enemy using the terms “threat,” “murderers,” “evildoers” and
“killers.”
Johnson’s words describing the Enemy were much less emotional and more
benign. Johnson’s language was somewhat dated, at times even harking back to the
terminology of a gentlemanly duel, as when he defined the Enemy as “aggressors” and
“adversaries,” which are not highly emotionally charged words. Even Johnson’s
“attacked” is a step down from Bush’s use of “murder.”
When it comes to defining War, Bush’s key terms were again more antithetical
than Johnson’s. “Terrorism” and “bioterrorism,” as well as “security” and “justice,”
figure strongly in Bush’s definitions of the need for War, while Johnson employs more
traditional definitions such as “freedom,” “fight,” the location of the fight (“Viet-nam”),
“peace” and the support of the “world.” Thus, even in Johnson’s seminal speech on why
America was in Vietnam, he sounded toned down compared to Bush: “We fight because
we must fight if we are to live in a world where every country can shape its own destiny”
(Address at Johns Hopkins University, April 7, 1965). In contrast, we have Bush saying
to Congress:
Today, the gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger facing
America and the world, is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons. These regimes could use such weapons
for blackmail, terror, and mass murder (Address Before a Joint Session of
the Congress on the State of the Union, January 28, 2003).
As to the disconfirming data, it was surprising that there were as many similarities
as there were, given the time differences between the two presidents, their differences in
party affiliation, their backgrounds and their different wars. Yet there appear to be certain
standard concepts presidents feel compelled to use, particularly patriotic language and
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language pertaining to basic, American democratic foundational values, such as
“freedom.” Coe (2007), who has studied 12 modern presidents, notes that presidents
consistently, and without exception, talk about freedom and liberty in three ways,
although there is variation by political context and party. Coe says presidents have
“described America as the nation uniquely positioned – even destined – to lead the ‘cause
of freedom’ … Presidents have then used freedom as a primary criterion for determining
who should be treated as a friend and who as a foe … Finally, presidents have relied on
freedom as a rationale for the implementation of their political policies. Wars have often
been justified based on freedom … The consistency of presidents’ messages over the past
eight decades is striking, if not altogether surprising.”
In defining America, Johnson and Bush emphasized “freedom” in their five mostused terms. They also repeatedly referred to the United States as a “nation.” The latter
may seem purely definitional, but to understand its significance and why it arose out of
grounded research, one has to counterpose that definition with these presidents’
descriptions of the Enemy, defined variously as a camp, a state, a regime, and other
similar terms. The American Psychological Association’s WordNet defines a “nation” as
“a large body of people, associated with a particular territory, that is sufficiently
conscious of its unity to seek or to possess a government peculiarly its own.” Words such
as “camp,” “state” and “regime” do not connote that same level of political organization,
civilization, values or indeed respect that are due a “nation.” Thus, to define America as a
“nation,” while defining the Enemy’s country as a “camp,” a “state” or a “regime” is to
de-civilize the Enemy and perhaps make it morally easier to wage war against it.
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Both presidents also included the concepts “world” and “ally” to define what they
considered to be their Coalition. Certainly to say the world supports you in your cause is
to validate your cause. And to define the Coalition as an “ally” connotes a level of buy-in
by other countries to your cause.
In the category of Job of President, the only category in which Johnson used more
inherently religious words than Bush, the only word used by both presidents in their top
five key-words was “ask.” This little word is significant because it suggests that while the
president has the powers of commander-in-chief, executive and statesman, his real power
lies in his power to persuade, using his bully pulpit (Edwards 2003). Words are his tool to
sell his policy, and so he must “ask” for support, but ask persuasively. This diminutive
term embodies a key presumption behind this study, that words employed by the
president are powerful and are used as key policy tools.
The concept of “freedom” again crops up in the top key words these presidents
use to define the people they labeled as victims. According to both of their definitions,
victims desire freedom. And indeed, freeing the victims is one of the main reasons
presidents give for going to war (or escalating one). Victims must be freed from what is
described as appalling violations to their freedom imposed upon them by the enemy.
Freedom is not seen as a basic human right denied victims by the enemy, but a value
necessary to world security and moral order. Therefore, presidents justify war by saying
they and their coalition must free victims.
Freedom is also given as a defining reason for war. Freedom is a noble concept, a
seemingly selfless concept and one upon which the United States was founded. Just as it
seems important and right to make victims free, it is also important and right, according
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to these presidents, to fight a war for the cause of freedom, a cause valued by civilized
people the world over. It is difficult to question the cause of freedom. And it is difficult to
define freedom. But apparently it resonates widely across populations, even though these
presidents, in using it to justify war, were talking about freedom, American-style.
Paradoxically, the two presidents also defined war in terms of “peace.” The
reason for war is to restore peace, and one must use violence to achieve peace, according
to their definitions. A desire for peace also implies a reluctance to wage war, and thus
both presidents depict the United States as a sleeping giant that is only stirred to righteous
violence when aroused, but which would rather have peace than war. If a nation is seen as
reluctant to go to war, it does not seem self-aggrandizing or self-interested. Therefore, its
cause of war appears to be more just. The presidents shared no similar key words when it
came to the Job of Citizens.
In terms of Stone’s causal story or narrative, we can boil down the argument of
both presidents to the idea (more antithetically stated by Bush) that America, its coalition
and the victims are good, while the enemy is bad (in Bush’s case, the epitome of evil).
The enemy provokes America, the bastion of freedom and power, and the free world, by
challenging basic principles and values. The enemy has oppressed the victims, and they
are in desperate need of help that only America and its allies can give. The war is
unwanted, but necessary, just and completely supported by the coalition of nations.
America is called by history and God to lead it. Presidents, who are good and humble and
righteous, need the help and support of their citizens. The job of citizens, according to
Johnson, is to be alert, caring, united and supportive of the war. Bush also wants people
to be alert, but he goes beyond this to call for acts of kindness, patience and
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responsibility. He, too, urges complete support, but unlike Johnson, is less the supplicant
in doing so. The implied job of citizens is to support, unquestioningly, their president’s
decision to go to war.
The upcoming Chapter 5 summarizes the key “inherently religious words” words
used by each president in the main definitional categories. It begins with a brief history of
each president’s religious background and ends with some conclusions about their
different use of inherently religious speech.
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CHAPTER 5 – EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE

Introduction
When it comes to references to religion, presidential rhetoric has changed
substantially since President John F. Kennedy. In a 1960 speech, JFK urged voters not to
consider a candidate’s faith when they entered the voting booth. While President Jimmy
Carter was the first president to claim to be a “born again” Christian and is responsible
for reintroducing “matters of faith and belief into the arena of public discourse,”
President George W. Bush was the first presidential candidate to declare that Jesus was
his favorite philosopher (on the eve of the 2000 Iowa precinct caucuses) (Balmer 2008, 12).
Since 1980, with the exception of President Bill Clinton, “candidates who have
made forthright professions of evangelical faith and who have enjoyed the support of the
Religious Right have occupied the Oval Office,” although Clinton was able to “speak the
evangelical language of sin and redemption” (Balmer 2008, 3). Balmer says there has, in
effect, been a “religionization of our politics” (2008, 4).
In this section, the pre-war-escalation speeches of Johnson and the pre-war
speeches of Bush are analyzed for their “inherently religious” terms. “Inherently
religious” words are defined here as words that in and of themselves connote a
relationship to religion. Thus, a word such as “prayer” is seen as inherently religious
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because there is a direct connection to religion. Other words used in religion, however,
may or may not qualify, depending on the context. “Blessing” and “faith,” for example,
can have religious and non-religious meanings, so they are counted as inherently
religious words only when they directly relate to religion. Thus, each word is examined in
context to make sure it qualifies as an inherently religious word.
It should be noted again that Johnson and Bush differed dramatically in their
religious orientation. Johnson’s religious lineage was “a mixture of various influences,
from Baptist to Christadelphian, … a marginal, non-trinitarian group with roots in
nineteenth-century Britain and America” (Balmer 2008, 50). “At age 15, Johnson joined
the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), a Protestant group with roots in the
Restorationist movement of the early nineteenth century, an attempt to restore
Christianity to its primitive, first-century purity” (Balmer 2008, 50). Balmer speculates
this was “a reaction on young Lyndon’s part to the fire-and-brimstone preachers he
encountered in Baptist circles and in local camp meetings” and that he “gravitated instead
to the more liberal and tolerant Disciples group, with their emphasis on good works”
(Balmer 2008, 50). Balmer says Johnson’s “baptism was also, almost certainly, a
manifestation of adolescent rebellion,” his mother being a “prim Baptist” (Balmer 2008,
50-51). Balmer concludes, “Johnson himself, however, evinced little piety, and what little
he showed during his long career of public life could properly be called perfunctory, even
performative” (2008, 51). What he did seem to glean from his ascent from poverty and
from his parents were “the rudiments of a kind of ‘golden rule’ of Christianity,” Balmer
says (2008, 52). Goodwin quotes Johnson as saying, “At the center of my mother’s
philosophy was the belief that the strong must care for the weak” (1976, 55).
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Bush, on the other hand, like Jimmy Carter, pledged to “cleanse the temple of the
Oval Office” (after Bill Clinton) and “offered himself as a model of probity, someone
who had forsaken a dissolute life of alcohol abuse in favor of the path of moral rectitude”
(Balmer 2008, 143-4). He had been raised in an Episcopal household, attended a
Presbyterian church, but was by all accounts a “party guy” (Balmer 2008, 144). While his
1977 marriage to Laura Welch, a graduate of Southern Methodist University, tamed him
in some respects and drew him to her church, he continued to have an alcohol problem. It
wasn’t until 1984, when Bush had lunch with an evangelist named Arthur Blessitt, who
had been carrying a large wooden cross with him since 1969, that Bush prayed and was
“born again.” However, he continued to drink. Subsequently, the family summoned noted
evangelist Billy Graham, and in 1985, after a private walk with Graham, Bush says he
renewed his faith, started to read the Bible regularly and began taking part in a group
Community Bible Study, designed by a conservative organization. Thereafter, he vowed
to give up alcohol and spoke openly about his faith and later about how God and the
power of prayer had enabled him to become president. In 1999, he summoned a group of
prominent pastors to his governor’s mansion to “lay hands” on him, assuring them he felt
“called” to run for president. It was during a debate on December 13, 1999, that his
declared that Christ was his favorite philosopher “because he changed my life” (Balmer
2008, 144-5; Mansfield 2003, 53, 56, 63-66, 67-73; Smith 2006, 367-368, 372, 373).
Given this brief background, it is no wonder that Johnson and Bush used different
inherently religious language (both due to their background, the different time periods in
which they were president and the nature of their wars) and used that language to
different extents, as the following summary and categorical data reveal.
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The Qualitative and Quantitative Findings
Summary
Johnson and Bush used inherently religious terms and biblical allusions to define
the need for war, with Johnson doing so to a lesser extent than Bush. Such language
allowed these presidents to tap into the manifest destiny theme that characterizes the
United States as a country called by God to right wrongs and to enhance their arguments
by connecting to American civil religion. The words most used in this category include
the up to five most-used key terms, if there were that many, and fewer if there were not.
In some cases, the full list of words used was exhausted, as indicated.
In total, Johnson used 41 key inherently religious terms in 16 pre-war-escalation
speeches, compared to 176 terms by Bush in 29 pre-war speeches. Johnson and Bush
used inherently religious words the most to define the Job of President (30 Johnson to
115 Bush), although Bush used more such words (but also had slightly more column
inches of speech compared to Johnson) (see Table 5.1).

Table 5.1. Total Use of Inherently Religious Words in All Categories
By Presidents Johnson and Bush
Categories
America
Coalition
Enemy
Job of President
Victims
War
Job of Citizens
TOTAL

Johnson
6
0
0
30
1
2
2
41

Bush
21
10
19
115
2
9
0
176
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As with the previous data discussed in Chapter 4, this chapter examines how the
two presidents employed this rhetoric in the various categories. The results indicate Bush
was much more likely than Johnson to use inherently religious terms in total to define the
categories.
Category: America
Data for this category are reported in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2. Three Most-Used Inherently Religious Words
By Presidents Johnson and Bush to Define America
Johnson
Word†
faith
God
blessings

TOTAL

Bush
Freq.
3
2
1

Word†
bless(ed)(ings)
God(’s)
created (creator)
prayer(s)
faiths
religion
worship

Freq.
7 (tie)
7 (tie)
2 (tie)
2 (tie)
1 (tie)
1 (tie)
1 (tie)
21

6

Z-Score
-0.95 (faith)
-1.62 (God)
-1.15 (bless)
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
-2.76**

†Full list exhausted.
**sig. at p<.01
Note: Test is the difference between two binomial proportions.
Summary
Based upon the test of binomial proportions employed to examine the two
presidents’ most-used terms, the results indicate that Bush was much more likely than
Johnson to use inherently religious terms in total to define America. The three most-used
inherently religious terms by Johnson to define America were “faith” (three times);
“God” (twice)” and “blessings” (once). There was a two-way tie in the three most-used
inherently religious terms by Bush to define America; they were “blessed” and its
variations “blessed” and “blessings” and “God,” and its variation “God’s,” each used
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seven times. Next, in a two-way tie for two uses each, were “created,” and its variation
“creator,” and “prayer,” and its variation “prayers,” used twice. And, in a three-way tie
for one use each was “faiths,” “religion” and “worship.”
Johnson and Bush shared the use of the words (and their variations) “faith,” God”
and “blessings,” all used by Johnson. Bush went beyond those three uses to include the
words (and their variations) “created,” “prayer,” “religion” and “worship.”
Examples of Inherently Religious Key Words in Context Used by Johnson to
Define America: “Faith,” “God,” “Blessings.” Johnson used three inherently religious
words to define America: “faith,” as in “So it was in the beginning. So it shall always be,
while God is willing, and we are strong enough to keep the faith” (Annual Message to the
Congress on the State of the Union, January 4, 1965); “God,” as in this example:
Let’s just see if we can’t find something good about America, and let’s see
if we can’t take a little pride in that flag, and let’s see if we can’t have a
little feeling well up in us and see if we can’t get down on our knees
sometime during the night and thank God that I am an American (Remarks
at Lindbergh Field, October 28, 1964).
And he used “blessings,” as in “We, with all of our power and all of our resources, and
all of our blessings, are doing something to reach down and extend a helping hand to our
neighbor, and to love thy neighbor as thyself” (Remarks at Lindbergh Field, October 28,
1964).
Examples of Inherently Religious Key Words in Context Used by Bush to Define
America: “Bless,” “God,” “Created,” “Prayer,” “Faiths,” “Religion,” “Worship.”
Bush used the same inherently religious words as Johnson, as well as others, to define
America. First, he used “bless,” as in “As our nation moves troops and builds alliances to
make our world safer, we must also remember our calling as a blessed country is to make
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this world better” (Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the
Union, January 28, 2003); “God,” as in “The liberty we prize is not America’s gift to the
world, it is God’s gift to humanity” (Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on
the State of the Union, January 28, 2003); “created,” as in “Our deepest national
conviction is that every life is precious, because every life is the gift of a Creator who
intended us to live in liberty and equality. More than anything else, this separates us from
the enemy we fight” (Address to the Nation on the Anniversary of the Terrorist Attacks
of September 11, September 11, 2002); “prayer” and “worship,” as in “We have seen it as
Americans have reassessed priorities, parents spending more time with their children and
many people spending more time in prayer and in houses of worship” (Address to the
Nation From Atlanta on Homeland Security, November 8, 2001); and “faiths” and
“religion,” as in “We respect people of all faiths and welcome the free practice of
religion; our enemy wants to dictate how to think and how to worship, even to their
fellow Muslims” (Address to the Nation From Atlanta on Homeland Security, November
8, 2001).
Category: Coalition
Data for this category are reported in Table 5.3.
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Table 5.3. Three Most-Used Inherently Religious Words
By Presidents Johnson and Bush to Define the Coalition
Johnson
Word
NONE

Bush
Freq.

TOTAL

Word†
Muslim(s)
Islamic
faith
worship
bless

0

Freq.
5
2
1
1
1
10

†Full list exhausted.

Summary
Bush was much more likely than Johnson to use terms in total to define the
Coalition. Indeed, Johnson used no inherently religious words to describe his Coalition,
while Bush used 10. Bush used the word “Muslim” and its variation “Muslims,” five
times; “Islamic,” used twice; and had a three-way tie in the single use of “faith,”
“worship” and “bless.”
Examples of Inherently Religious Key Words in Context Used by Bush to Define
the Coalition: “Muslim,” “Islamic,” “Faith.” Examples of Bush’s use of inherently
religious words to define the Coalition as “Muslim” include:
Like the good folks standing with me, the American people were appalled
and outraged at last Tuesday’s attacks. And so were Muslims all across the
world. Both Americans, our Muslim friends and citizens, taxpaying
citizens, and Muslims in nations were just appalled and could not believe
what we saw on our TV screens (Remarks at the Islamic Center of
Washington, September 17, 2001).
He also defines the Coalition as “Islamic,” as in “I also thank the Arab and Islamic
countries that have condemned terrorist murder” (Remarks to the United Nations General
Assembly, November 10, 2001) and in terms of “faith,” as in this example:
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I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. We
respect your faith. It’s practiced freely by many millions of Americans and
by millions more in countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings
are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah
blaspheme the name of Allah (Address Before a Joint Session of the
Congress of the United States in Response to the Terrorist Attacks of
September 11, September 20, 2001).
Category: Enemy
Data for this category are reported in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4. Most-Used Inherently Religious Words
By Presidents Johnson and Bush to Define the Enemy
Johnson
Word
NONE

Bush
Freq.

TOTAL

Word†
faith
religion(s)(religious)
Allah
God(’s)
blaspheme
Christians
holy
Islam
Jews

0

Freq.
6
4
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
19

Z-score

-4.21

†Full list exhausted.

Summary
Bush was much more likely than Johnson to use inherently religious terms in total
to define the Enemy. Indeed, in this category, Bush was the only one to use inherently
religious words in a defining way, using 19 words to Johnson’s zero. Bush used “faith,”
six times; “religion,” and its variations “religions” and “religious,” four times; “God,”
and its variation “God’s,” and “Allah,” twice; and finally the following words once:
“blaspheme,” “Christians,” “holy,” “Islam” and “Jews.”
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Examples of Inherently Religious Key Words Used in Context By Bush to Define
the Enemy: “Faith,” “Religion,” “God,” “Allah,” “Blaspheme,” Christians,” “Jews,”
“Islam.” An example of Bush’s use of “faith” is “The terrorists are traitors to their own
faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself” (Address Before a Joint Session of the
Congress of the United States in Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11,
September 20, 2001). Bush used “religion” in the following example to define the
Enemy: “The Government that used to hate women and not educate its children and
disrupt humanitarian supplies and destroy religious symbols of other religions is now in
rout” (Remarks to the United States Attorney Conference, November 29, 2001).
Bush used the terms “Allah” and “blaspheme” to define the Enemy, as in this
example:
I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. We
respect your faith. It’s practiced freely by many millions of Americans and
by millions more in countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings
are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah
blaspheme the name of Allah (Address Before a Joint Session of the
Congress of the United States in Response to the Terrorist Attacks of
September 11, September 20, 2001).
Bush also referred to “Christians” and “Jews” in defining the Enemy, as in this
example: “They want to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa”
(Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress of the United States in Response to the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, September 20, 2001). Another inherently religious
word Bush used to define the Enemy is “holy,” as in this example: “The terrorists call
their cause holy, yet they fund it with drug dealing” (Remarks to the United Nations
General Assembly, November 10, 2001).
Bush used the word “Islam,” as follows:
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I believe there is a reason that history has matched this nation with this
time. America strives to be tolerant and just. We respect the faith of Islam,
even as we fight those whose actions defile that faith (Address to the
Nation on the Anniversary of the Terrorist Attacks of September 11,
September 11, 2002).

Category: Job of President
Data for this category is reported in Table 5.5.

Table 5.5. Most-Used Inherently Religious Words By Presidents
Johnson and Bush to Define the Job of President
Johnson
Word†
God(’s)
blessing(s)
pray(er)(ers)
prophet
Lord(’s)
Him (His)
Isaiah
Bible (biblical)
church
heaven
cursing
spiritual
tabernacle
grace
TOTAL

Bush
Freq.
7
3 (tie)
3 (tie)
3 (tie)
2 (tie)
2 (tie)
2 (tie)
2 (tie)
1 (tie)
1 (tie)
1 (tie)
1 (tie)
1 (tie)
1 (tie)
30

Word
God(’s)(-given)
pray(s)(er)(ers)(ed)
faith(ful)(s)
bless(ings)(ed)
He(His)

Freq.
33
41
17
16
8

115

Z-Score
-3.89** (God)
-2.75** (bless)
-5.40** (prayer)
N/A
N/A
-1.73 (Him)
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
-1.90*

†Full list exhausted.
*sig. at p<.05; **sig. at p<.01
Note: Test is the difference between two binomial proportions.

Summary
Based upon the test of binomial proportions used to examine the two presidents’
most-used words, the results indicate Bush was more likely than Johnson to use
inherently religious terms in total to define the Job of President and especially to use the
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shared words “God,” “bless” and “prayer,” and their variants. Although it did not meet
the Z-score test for significance, Bush also used the term “He” and its variant more than
Johnson.
Johnson used 85 fewer inherently religious words than Bush to define the Job of
President. However, both presidents did use four of the same words: “God,” “bless,”
“pray,” and “Him” or “He.”
Johnson used “God” and its variant “God’s” seven times; experienced a three-way
tie in his use of “blessing,” and its variant “blessings,” used three times each; had a fourway tie in his use of “Lord,” and its variant “Lord’s,” “Him” and its variant “His,”
“Isaiah” and “Bible” and its variant “biblical, each used twice; and finally had a six-way
tie in the use of “church,” “heaven,” “cursing,” “spiritual,” “tabernacle” and “grace,”
each used once.
To define the Job of President, Bush used “God” and its variants “God’s” and
“God-given” 33 times; “pray” and its variants “prays,” “prayer,” “prayers” and “prayed,”
used 41 times; “faith” and its variants “faithful” and “faiths,” used 17 times; “blessing”
and its variants “blessings” and “blessed,” used 16 times; and “He,” and its variant “His,”
used eight times. Johnson distinguished himself in this category by using more different
words (14 to Bush’s five), but Bush used more words total (115 to Johnson’s 30).
Examples of Inherently Religious Key Words Used by Johnson in Context to
Define the Job of President: “God,” “Blessing,” “Prayer,” “Prophet,” “Lord,” “Him,”
“Grace,” “Isaiah,” “Bible,” “Church,” “Heaven,” “Cursing,” “Spiritual,”
“Tabernacle.” He used “God,” as in, “I asked for God’s help and for yours” (Remarks in
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Oklahoma at the Dedication of the Eufala Dam, September 25, 1964); “blessing,”
“heaven” and “cursing,” as in this example:
We may well be living in the time foretold many years ago when it was
said: ‘I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set
before you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that
both thou and thy seed may live’ (Address at Johns Hopkins University,
April 7, 1965).
He used “prayer,” as in
Call the roll of Americans who have shaped the world policy of the United
States in your lifetime: Truman and Eisenhower and Kennedy, Acheson
and John Foster Dulles, Arthur Vandenberg and Walter George, Warren
Austin and Henry Cabot Lodge. These were men of every party, and I am
proud to say of every section. Everyone agreed on the great shaping
principles of America’s foreign policy. Together they offered the biblical
prayer, ‘Peace be to this house.’ For them the house of peace was the
entire world (Remarks in Manchester to the Members of the New
Hampshire Weekly Newspaper Editors Association, September 28, 1964).
He also used “prophet,” as in “Let me, in the words of the prophet Isaiah, “Come now, let
us reason together,” let me take a moment to discuss these with you” (Remarks in
Manchester to the Members of the New Hampshire Weekly Newspaper Editors
Association, September 28, 1964). He used “Lord,” as in this example:
But I am solemnly pledged with whatever ability the good Lord gave me,
whatever energy and talents I possess, to do my dead level best to keep
our world at peace – and with all that is in me I am determined to keep
that vow to you (Remarks at Lindbergh Field, October 28, 1964).
And he used “Him” and “grace,” as in this example:
And on this Thanksgiving eve, as we gather together to ask the Lord’s
blessing, and give Him our thanks, let us unite in those familiar and
cherished words: America, America, God shed His grace on thee, And
crown thy good, With brotherhood, From sea to shining sea (Address
Before a Joint Session of Congress, November 27, 1963).
Johnson also used inherently religious terms to define the Job of President
by employing such words as “Isaiah,” the prophet, as in “That is the course, I
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think, that we should follow, the course of the prophet Isaiah, ‘Come now, let us
reason together’” (Remarks in Memorial Hall, Akron University, October 21,
1964); “Bible,” as in “We must say in southeast Asia – as we did in Europe – in
the words of the Bible: ‘Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further’” (Address at
Johns Hopkins University, April 7, 1965); “church,” as in “Last Sunday, Palm
Sunday, as I sat in church, I thought about all the problems that faced this world –
ancient feuds and recent quarrels that have disturbed widely separated parts of the
earth” (Remarks to the Legislative Conference of the Building and Construction
Trades Department, AFL-CIO, March 24, 1964). And he used “spiritual” and
“tabernacle,” as in the following:
So the point I want to leave with you good people, Republicans and
Democrats, and Independents, and folks who do your own thinking, the
thing I want to leave with you before I go to that tabernacle in Salt Lake
City and meet that wonderful man, President McKay, who has given me
great spiritual strength and given great leadership, I want to leave this with
you: We work for peace not as Democrats, not as Republicans, but as
Americans (Remarks at Lindbergh Field, October 28, 1964).
Examples of Inherently Religious Key Words Used by Bush to Define the Job of
President: “God,” “Pray,” “Faith,” “Bless,” “He.” In defining the Job of President,
Bush used the terms “God,” as in this example:
We Americans have faith in ourselves, but not in ourselves alone. We do
not know – we do not claim to know all the ways of Providence, yet we
can trust in them, placing our confidence in the loving God behind all of
life, and all of history. May He guide us now. And may God continue to
bless the United States of America (Address Before a Joint Session of the
Congress on the State of the Union, January 28, 2003).
He used “pray,” as in:
I turn to them without hesitation and say, it is the greatest gift you can give
anybody, is to pray on their behalf. I especially feel that because I believe
in prayer. I pray. I pray for strength, I pray for guidance, I pray for
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forgiveness. And I pray to offer my thanks for a kind and generous
Almighty God (Remarks at the National Prayer Breakfast, February 6,
2003).
He used “faith,” as in “At the same time, faith shows us the reality of good and the reality
of evil” (Remarks at the National Prayer Breakfast, February 7, 2002); “bless,” as in “In
this time of testing for our nation, my family and I have been blessed by the prayers of
countless of Americans. We have felt their sustaining power, and we’re incredibly
grateful” (Remarks at the National Prayer Breakfast, February 7, 2002); and “He,” as in
“We’re confident, too, that history has an author who fills time and eternity with His
purpose” (Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly, November 10, 2001).
Category: Victims
Data for this category are summarized in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6. Most-Used Inherently Religious Words By Presidents Johnson
And President Bush to Define Victims
Johnson
Word†
God

Bush
Freq.
1

TOTAL

Word†
religion
souls

1

Freq.
1 (tie)
1 (tie)
2

†Full list exhausted.

Summary
Bush was more likely than Johnson to use inherently religious terms in total to
define Victims. Bush used twice as many words as Johnson, although the numbers were
small. The two presidents had no similarities in this category. Johnson used “God” once;
Bush used “religion” once and “souls” once.
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Examples of Inherently Religious Key Words in Context Used by Johnson to
Define Victims: “God.” Johnson’s use of “God” is demonstrated in this quote: “Our
Nation was created to help strike away the chains of ignorance and misery and tyranny
wherever they keep man less than God means him to be” (Annual Message to the
Congress on the State of the Union, January 4, 1965).
Examples of Inherently Religious Key Words in Context Used by Bush to Define
Victims: “Religion,” “Souls.” Bush’s use of “religion” is illustrated as follows:
Afghanistan’s people have been brutalized. Many are starving, and many
have fled. Women are not allowed to attend school. You can be jailed for
owning a television. Religion can be practiced only as their leaders dictate
(Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress of the United States in
Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, September 20, 2001).
Bush also used the term “souls,” as in this quote: “There is a line in our time, and
in every time, between the defenders of human liberty and those who seek to master the
minds and souls of others” (Address to the Nation on the Anniversary of the Terrorist
Attacks of September 11, September 11, 2002).
Category: War
Data for this category are summarized in Table 5.7.
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Table 5.7. Most-Used Inherently Religious Words By
Presidents Johnson and Bush to Define War
Johnson

Bush

Word†
Freq.
Christmas Eve
1 (tie)
prophet
1 (tie)

Word†
Christians
Jews
Islamic
God
jihad
religion

TOTAL

2

Freq.
2 (tie)
2 (tie)
2 (tie)
1 (tie)
1 (tie)
1 (tie)
9

Z-Score
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
-1.97**

†Full list exhausted.
**sig. at p<.05
Note: Test is the difference between two binomial proportions.

Summary
Based upon the test of binomial proportions used to examine the two presidents’
most-used terms, the results indicate that Bush was more likely than Johnson to use
inherently religious terms in total to define War. This category elicited two terms from
Johnson, compared to six terms from Bush, with no common words. Johnson used
“Christmas Eve” and “prophet” once each. Bush used “Christians,” “Jews” and “Islamic”
twice each; and “God,” “jihad” and “religion” once each.
Example of Inherently Religious Key Words Used by Johnson to Define War:
“Christmas Eve.” Johnson’s use of “Christmas Eve” is illustrated in this quote: “There
was the Christmas Eve bombing of the Brinks Hotel in Saigon” (Remarks to Committee
Members on the Need for Additional Appropriations for Military Purposes in Viet-Nam
and the Dominican Republic, May 4, 1965). Johnson again uses the Old Testament term
“prophet” and quotes Scripture. His use of “prophet” is shown here:
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The people of the world, I think, prefer reasoned agreement to ready
attack. That is why we must follow the prophet Isaiah many, many times
before we send the Marines and say, ‘Come now, let us reason together,’
and this is our objective: the quest for peace and not the quarrels of war
(Remarks to the Legislative Conference of the Building and Construction
Trades Department, AFL-CIO, March 24, 1964).

Examples of Inherently Religious Key Words in Context Used by Bush to Define
War: “Christians,” “Jews,” “Islamic,” “Jihad,” “God,” “Religion.” Bush’s use of
“Christians” is shown in the following quote: “We are the target of enemies who boast
they want to kill – kill all Americans, kill all Jews, and kill all Christians” (Address to the
Nation From Atlanta on Homeland Security, November 8, 2001). Bush used “Jews” as
follows: “The terrorists’ directive commands them to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all
Americans, and make no distinctions among military and civilians, including women and
children” (Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress of the United States in
Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, September 20, 2001). He used
“Islamic” and “jihad” as follows: “This group and its leader, a person named Usama bin
Laden, are linked to many other organizations in different countries, including the
Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan” (Address Before a
Joint Session of the Congress of the United States in Response to the Terrorist Attacks of
September 11, September 20, 2001). He used “God” as follows: “Freedom and fear,
justice and cruelty have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between
them” (Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress of the United States in Response
to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, September 20, 2001). However, he then
distinguished war from religion (“Our war is not against a religion,” Remarks
Announcing the Most Wanted Terrorists List, October 10, 2001), to which one wants to
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respond, “Which is it?” Finally, he used “religion” as follows: “Our war is not against a
religion” (Remarks Announcing the Most Wanted Terrorists List, October 10, 2001).
Category: Job of Citizens
Data for this category are summarized in Table 5.8.
Table 5.8. Most-Used Inherently Religious Words By Presidents Johnson
And Bush to Define the Job of Citizens
Johnson
Word†
God
prayers
TOTAL

Bush
Freq.
1
1
2

Word†
NONE

Freq.

0

†Full list exhausted.

Summary
In the category of Job of Citizens, Johnson used “God” and “prayers” each once;
Bush used no inherently religious words in this category.
Examples of Inherently Religious Key Words in Context Used by Johnson to
Define the Job of Citizens: “God,” “Prayers.” Johnson used “God” as follows:
Let’s just see if we can’t find something good about America, and let’s see
if we can’t take a little pride in that flag, and let’s see if we can’t have a
little feeling well up in us and see if we can’t get down on our knees
sometime during the night and thank God that I am an American (Remarks
at Lindbergh Field, October 28, 1964).
He also tried to inspire faith in country and to ask for help:
Let’s just see if we can’t find something good about America, and let’s see
if we can’t take a little pride in that flag, and let’s see if we can’t have a
little feeling well up in us and see if we can’t get down on our knees
sometime during the night and thank God that I am an American (Remarks
at Lindbergh Field, October 28, 1964).
And he asked for “prayers,” as follows:
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And I want to ask you in advance, because I may just have some kind of
illusion and some kind of dream about what is going to happen in
November, I want to ask you in advance to give me your hand and give
me your help, and give me your counsel and give me your heart, and give
me your prayers, because the 37th President of this country is going to
need them more than the 36th (Remarks in Manchester to the Members of
the New Hampshire Weekly Newspaper Editors Association, September
28, 1964).

Conclusion
This chapter has focused on how Presidents Johnson and Bush used inherently
religious language to define the various categories that led them to escalate and launch
their respective wars. The expectation was that Johnson would use less inherently
religious language than Bush. One reason for this expectation was that Johnson’s
background involved a brush with civil religion that instilled in him some basic human
values, which could be traced to Christian roots, but which were not necessarily framed
that way, while Bush claimed to have had a distinctly religious experience that he drew
upon to build his base of political supporters. In addition, Bush’s language was striking in
its religious references to this researcher and to prominent others, including the media,
even before this analysis was begun. It could be expected that Bush’s fundamentalist,
neo-conservative background would prompt him to make more frequent use of religious
language than Johnson and to see war as a messianic mission, rather than as a secular
policy choice based upon shared human values.
Johnson used about four times fewer inherently religious words than Bush.
However, the presidents shared many key words, which is not that surprising considering
that the generic language of Western religions relies upon a handful of common words.
For instance, in defining America, both presidents used the words “faith,” “God” and
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“bless,” which actually exhausted Johnson’s dictionary of terms for that category. These
words are part of the common lexicon of Western religions. Bush went beyond these
generic terms by talking about, for instance, being “created,” “prayers” and “worship,”
reflecting a deeper and more personal relationship with religion. But, it must be noted, he
also was dealing with an enemy that was religiously motivated.
In defining the Coalition, Johnson used no inherently religious words. But Bush
made a point to address the religion that provided the context for the first version of the
enemy in his war – the Islamic Taliban. Thus, he used terms not usually employed by
presidents in defining their allies or their enemies, such as “Muslim” and “Islamic,” plus
some of the more standard religious terms.
Johnson again used no inherently religious terms to define the Enemy, which was
largely defined as Communist by him (even though Communism is a-religious). Bush
broadened his religious references from “Islam” and “Allah” to include “Jews” and
“Christians,” as he made the case that the Enemy was also out to attack Jews and
Christians. Bush also used terms not typically employed by presidents, but used by
priests, such as “blaspheme,” an Old Testament word not much in use these days, and
“holy.”
Surprisingly, in the category of Job of President, Johnson used more inherently
religious terms than did Bush, although Bush used the key words he chose words more
often. Johnson surprised again by using some words that were either Old Testament terms
or not much in use by presidents, such as “prophet,” “Lord,” “Isaiah” (referring to the
biblical prophet), “Bible,” “heaven,” “cursing,” “tabernacle” and “grace.” Indeed,
Johnson spoke of visiting the head of the Mormon Church. Bush used fairly standard
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religious terms, although not a lot of presidents would refer to God in such as personal
way as to call God “He” or “His.” Bush’s use of “God” also included “God-given,”
which is a reference to the American theme of Manifest Destiny and perhaps reflective of
Bush’s proclaimed evangelical beliefs.
In defining Victims, Johnson only used the word “God” once, while Bush
included a word usually reserved more for priests than presidents – “souls.” “Souls” is a
word often associated with salvation, a concept presidents typically do not emphasize.
In defining War, Johnson’s terms were skewed by his Christmas Eve address, and
therefore his reference to that religious (albeit generic) event. But again, he used an Old
Testament word not usually employed by presidents – “prophet.” In this category, Bush
brought in a new concept for Americans –“jihad” – an Islamic term for holy war. This
was also a category in which Bush brought in other faiths by his reference to
“Christians,” “Jews” and “Islamic.” Bush used far more terms than Johnson in this
category.
Finally, in defining the Job of Citizens, Bush surprisingly used no inherently
religious terms, while Johnson used fairly standard ones such as “God” and “prayers.”
The causal narrative here for Johnson seems to have been less about the Vietnam
War having a religious side and more about Johnson wrestling with his own role as a
president involved in a war that he did not wholly support. Moreover, he was thrust into
the role of presidency and appeared to be struggling to define it for himself. For Bush, the
causal narrative was from the beginning religious. The 9/11 terrorists were Islamic, and
they were fighting a jihad against the United States and Western culture. The War was
very much a war not just for ideals, such as freedom, but also a struggle to preserve the
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integrity of Israel in the Middle East. This was especially evident as Bush broadened the
Enemy to become Iran, Iraq and North Korea (Bush’s “axis of evil”), and then, finally,
Saddam Hussein and Iraq. Given U.S. support for Israel, setting up this supposed threat to
Israel added a religious reason for the war that was consistent with American foreign
policy, and so made it more difficult to criticize.
It appears that when American presidents sprinkle their definitional reasons for
war with religious language they can generate more support – if they do not go too far,
meaning if they stick with basic, Western, civil religious concepts. They can tap into
Manifest Destiny themes taught to Americans that their country is one nation, under God,
indivisible, with liberty and justice for all. However, as mentioned, this is not easily
exportable. Bush used the Manifest Destiny theme much more than Johnson, whose war
did not necessarily contain a distinct religious element (even though Communist theory is
based upon a negation of God) 48 and who had a much less profound religious experience
than Bush.
Chapter 6 presents a summary and discussion of the highlights of the data in
Chapter 4 (the secular findings) and Chapter 5 (the inherently religious findings). The
latter discussion includes a more detailed discussion of the use of Manifest Destiny by the
two presidents. Chapter 6 also discusses how this project advances the literature,
examines some limitations of this study and suggests numerous areas for further research,
particularly in the area of problem definition by probability statement, in which
predictions of the future are made.

48

Aiello (2005) says, “American claims that Communist philosophy was fundamentally atheistic had
obvious merit. Communist thinkers from Marx to Lenin to Trotsky to Stalin advocated an abandonment of
a religion they felt to be superstitious and unproductive. Thus mid-century Americans referred to ‘godless
communism.’”
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CHAPTER SIX – SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
This chapter presents a brief summary of highlights of the findings from Chapters
4 (findings on secular language) and 5 (findings on religious language), discusses how
they can be interpreted in terms of Stone’s (1989) concept of the causal story and
explores the meaning of these findings for citizens and for public policy analysis. This
chapter then discusses what the findings add to the literature on problem definition,
presidential studies and political communication. It then proceeds to outline the
limitations of this study. Finally, this chapter suggests numerous areas for further
research, including the fertile area of problem definition by probability statement.

Discussion of Empirical Findings on Secular Language From Chapter 4
With respect to the number of speeches each president gave pre-escalation of war
or pre-war, Johnson had 83 fewer inches of speech copy than Bush (1,084 total inches
versus 1,167 total inches, respectively) in 16 speeches (versus 29 for Bush). Yet despite
this relatively small difference in inches of speech, Johnson used almost half as many key
terms as Bush, far fewer than one might have expected. This could point to a variety of
interpretations, among them these four: (1) Bush had a more focused message, while
Johnson’s was more abstract (2) Bush had more of a commitment to his war, given that
he started it (unlike Johnson, who inherited his war and found it conflicted with his
desired domestic focus), (3) Johnson might have used more key words if he had given
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more major speeches on Vietnam, 49 and (4) Johnson was more difficult to code than
Bush because he spoke more indirectly and philosophically about his war (and the
flipside of war – peace), unlike Bush, who spoke quite directly.
The two presidents shared a number of most-used key words in various
categories, as has been pointed out. These key words emerged from among scores of
definitional words coded for each president.50 The following are some highlights of the
findings in notable categories:
Regarding their definition of America, while both presidents shared a sense of the
supposed singularity of United States, Bush’s language seemed more confident than
Johnson’s, even to the point that Bush seemed arrogant. Surely a prime example of this is
Bush’s statement, “The liberty we prize is not America’s gift to the world, it is God’s gift
to humanity” (Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,
January 28, 2003). It is difficult to imagine peoples of other countries not taking offense
at such a claim. Johnson, meanwhile, seemed more willing to balance statements about
U.S. “singularity” with humility, as in this example: “We are the most powerful of all
nations – we must strive also to be the most responsible of nations” (Remarks Upon
Signing Joint Resolution on the Maintenance of Peace and Security in Southeast Asia,
August 10, 1964).

49

As Hinckley (1990) points out, Johnson gave only one foreign policy speech on Vietnam from 1965
through 1967 that fit her criteria for a major speech. Further, Hinckley says “Johnson is so busy responding
to crises in the two years that he does [italics mine] make speeches that he takes no time to address the
nation on all the legislation he is moving through Congress” (21-2).
50
To narrow the focus of this study, it was necessary to hone in on the up to five most-used key words used
by each president to define America, the Coalition, the Enemy, the Job of President, the Victims, the War
and the Job of Citizens, categories which arose out of grounded research. I say “up to five” because in some
of the categories that produced fewer key words in general the presidents did not have as many as five top
key words.
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When it came to defining America, Johnson’s use of “world” also stood out when
used in the context of “world order.” It would be interesting to explore what Johnson
meant by “world order” (perhaps holding back the forces of Communism?), but
obviously the Vietnam War represented to him a way to preserve it.
Also notable for Bush in defining America was his introduction of a new concept
– homeland – which was echoed in his establishment of the new U.S. Department of
Homeland Security. Perhaps he was borrowing from Great Britain’s Homeland Secretary,
but there are also echoes, likely unintended, of the Nazi concept of “motherland.”
It was also interesting that Bush defined the United States metaphorically as a
sleeping giant that was peaceful unless wronged and fearsome when roused, as in his
statements “I like to remind people that the evil ones have roused a mighty nation, and
they will pay a serious price” (Remarks to the United States Attorneys Conference,
November 29, 2001) and “This Nation is peaceful, but fierce when stirred to anger”
(President’s Remarks to the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance Service,
September 14, 2001). Johnson echoed this to a lesser extent in this time-worn metaphor:
“And we must let the rest of the world know that we speak softly, we carry a big stick,
but we have the will and the determination, and if they ever hit us it is not going to stop
us – we are just going to keep coming” (Remarks in Manchester to the Members of the
New Hampshire Weekly Newspaper Editors Association, September 28, 1964).
Bush also relied upon the metaphor of war as a test, as in this statement: “The
resolve of our great Nation is being tested. But make no mistake: We will show the world
that we will pass this test” (Remarks at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, September
11, 2001). Finally, Bush frequently relied upon the metaphor of history calling the United
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States to action, part of the Manifest Destiny theme, as in this example: History has
placed a great challenge before us: Will America, with our unique position and power,
blink in the face of terror, or will we lead to a freer, more civilized world? There’s only
one answer: This great country will lead the world to safety, security, peace and freedom
(Address to the Nation on the Proposed Department of Homeland Security, June 6, 2002).
These metaphors are what Schlesinger and Lau (2000) have called condensational
symbols, which enable presidents to communicate more effectively by simplifying
concepts. Their use allows presidents to overcome policy complexities, to appeal to
emotions, to take advantage of public ignorance, to build broad coalitions of support and
to guide their own policy choices.
Regarding the category, Coalition, these presidents seemed to share the idea that
what was good for the United States was good for all. They also shared an effort to get
the support of their allies, especially the United Nations, and of Congress. For example,
consider this statement by Johnson: “Peace requires that we and all our friends stand firm
against the present aggressions of the government of North Viet-Nam” (Remarks at
Syracuse University on the Communist Challenge in Southeast Asia, August 5, 1964).
Certainly, claiming a large group of supporters makes one’s cause stronger than if
one fights alone, as is shown by this statement from Bush: “We are joined by a great
coalition of nations to rid the world of terror” (Address to the Nation on the Anniversary
of the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, September 11, 2002). And world alliances, such
as the United Nations, can be useful, despite the fact that the United States has been
delinquent in its contributions to the U.N. and at times even hostile to it (especially under
Bush).
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Regarding the category of Enemy, it is notable that Bush used the most key words
in this area, which speaks to the focus he had on this aspect of his war. As mentioned,
Bush’s enemy evolved. It began as the al Qaeda terrorists who committed the 9/11 acts,
expanded to include those who mailed anthrax to various offices, grew to include the
Taliban in Afghanistan, expanded further to include what Bush called the “axis of evil”
(Iran, Iraq and North Korea) and finally devolved to Saddam Hussein and Iraq. For
Johnson, the concept of enemy remained fairly consistent as Communism and its backers,
whether that be China (especially Peking), Hanoi or the guerrilla forces within Vietnam.
Notably, both presidents fought “isms,” Johnson with Communism and Bush with
terrorism. But the provocation for war differed profoundly for each. Not only did Johnson
inherit a war in progress, but the Gulf of Tonkin incident has been debunked by many
scholars as not even occurring. In contrast, 9/11 was visible, unprecedented, astonishing,
massive and profound in its horror.
Johnson’s war was always against a faraway nation state, while Bush’s war was at
first against anonymous terrorists who struck the United States at home and then against a
nation state (Iraq) that purportedly was connected to the 9/11 terrorists. Perhaps the
differences discussed here, along with these presidents’ unique world views and
personalities, helps explain the profound dissimilarities in the category of Enemy and in
other categories. If Johnson’s words were directed at a nation state, rather than at a
diffuse group of terrorists, he had to keep certain international accords in mind (such as
the Geneva Convention) and so may have felt bound by certain protocols. He also had a
more focused target. These factors may have prompted tamer language, although they did
not prompt clearly focused language. For Bush, no such protocols existed, although they
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became relevant later when the debate shifted to the use of torture. But at least at first,
Bush’s enemy was difficult to define and locate. It lacked focus. While this may have
influenced Bush to use more antithetical language, the evolution of his enemy into a
nation state did not necessarily prompt Bush to tame his language. If anything, it
prompted even more harsh words.
Finally, the fact that each president used different terms 51 to define the Enemy is
not so remarkable if one considers the different times, events and personalities.
Nevertheless, certain standard concepts seem be used throughout generations in defining
the enemy in a war, which has not been reflected here in the most-used terms.
The category, Job of President, was the only one in which Johnson used more key
words than Bush. One might speculate that this was because Johnson was wrestling with
his role as commander-in-chief and that he felt the need to talk about it. Johnson was also
notable in this category for making the most references to other presidents, which may
again evidence some insecurity and need for guidance. In contrast, Bush’s emphasis was
on being in charge, on being commander-in-chief and, curiously, on trying to seem
avuncular by emphasizing love and care for others, perhaps as part of his effort to paint
himself as a compassionate conservative. What stood out for Johnson was his appeal for
the help of others, including citizens and other presidents, and his worries about the war
(especially at night), his awareness of the sacrifice involved and his feelings of
responsibility for the war. There was none of this with Bush. He never questioned the
sacrifice nor seemed to worry about the war. He merely seemed determined in his
mission. In all this, perhaps we are seeing the difference between a president who
51

The two presidents did share some key words in the scores of other words used to define the Enemy that
did not make it into the top key words, but this study could not accommodate all words used by each
president.
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inherited an unpopular war in a far-flung nation (and whose reasons for escalation were
questioned) and one who started a war precipitated by an outrageous attack on this nation
(and rode a wave of initial solidarity). And perhaps we are seeing the difference between
a president who reasoned through things more (Johnson) and one who saw things more in
black and white terms and was less of an intellect (Bush).
In showing his concern for Victims (and potential victims), Johnson stood out for
his worry about the Domino Theory, 52 which predicted that if one nation fell to
Communism, others would follow, as in this example:
I think it is well to remember that there are a hundred other little nations
sitting here this moment watching what happens and what the outcome is
in South Viet-Nam and if South Viet-Nam can be gobbled up, the same
thing may happen to them (Remarks to Committee Members on the Need
for Additional Appropriations for Military Purposes in Viet-Nam and the
Dominican Republic, May 4, 1965).
Johnson also emphasized the supposed singular nature and calling upon the
United States to help people beset by supposed injustice:
There are those who ask why this responsibility should be ours. The
answer, I think, is simple. There is no one else who can do the job. Our
power alone in the final test can stand between expanding Communism
and independent Asian nations. Thus when India was attacked it looked to
us for help and we gave it immediately. We believe that Asia should be
directed by Asians, but that means that each Asian people must have the
right to find its own way, not that one group or one nation should overrun
all the others (Remarks to Committee Members on the Need for
Additional Appropriations for Military Purposes in Viet-Nam and the
Dominican Republic, May 4, 1965).
And we again see Johnson resorting to more antiquated, duel language in his observation
that when the Vietnamese men, women and children were attacked, the United States
52

In his “President’s News Conference of April 7, 1954,” President Eisenhower calls this the “falling
domino principle.” He says, “You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what
will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning
of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences” (Public Papers of the Presidents, Dwight
D. Eisenhower, 1954, pp. 381-90).
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made no “reply” in order to show its restraint (Remarks to Committee Members on the
Need for Additional Appropriations for Military Purposes in Viet-Nam and the
Dominican Republic, May 4, 1965). “Reply” is a very tame word in the context of war.
In contrast, Bush’s language highlighted the innocent nature of victims, who, like
the enemy, evolved from 9/11 victims, to victims of the anthrax mailings, to victims of
the Taliban in Afghanistan, to victims of the so-called “axis of evil” (Iran, Iraq and North
Korea) and finally to victims of Saddam Hussein. Bush’s victims were brutalized,
miserable, tortured, raped, had their tongues cut out, were drenched with hot oil, etc. His
language was far more strident and emotional than Johnson’s in this category.
In the category of War, what stood out was the difficulty involved in connecting
Johnson’s many words about peace (sometimes in the context of foreign policy) to war. It
was finally necessary to view peace as the flipside of war and code peace under War,
especially when one of Bush’s top key words in defining War emerged as “peace.”
It was apparent Johnson was defensive about his war, as is seen by this statement:
“Every day someone jumps up and shouts and says, ‘Tell us what is happening in VietNam and why are we in Viet-Nam, and how did you get us into Viet-Nam?’ Well, I
didn’t get you into Viet-Nam. You have been in Viet-Nam 10 years” (Remarks in
Manchester to the Members of the New Hampshire Weekly Newspaper Editors
Association, September 28, 1964). Johnson also defined the war as a duty to the world
and spent a lot of time defending it, especially in his seminal speech at Johns Hopkins.
Bush, on the other hand, engaged in little hand-wringing about his war. He
reminded citizens the United States was “called” by history to fight it. And he was much
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more strident in his language than Johnson, referring to blackmail, terror and mass
murder.
The category, Job of Citizens, arose out of Bush’s claim that people were asking
him what they could do to help fight terrorism. But Bush’s advice seemed ludicrous in
some cases. In effect, there was really little citizens could do. Thus, Bush gave them thin
(and odd) responsibilities, such as fighting evil by doing good, serving others and being
patient. Asking for patience co-opts citizens into trusting a leader for results, based upon
facts they cannot verify. Bush also admonished citizens to shop to keep the economy
going, to mentor children and to be kind to neighbors.
Johnson, on the other hand, seemed to mainly want citizens to unite and give him
counsel, as he defensively defined why the United States was in Vietnam. Yet what
counsel are citizens really able to give a president regarding battles and bloodshed in
countries so far away? And of course both presidents advocated that citizens be alert, a
statement that had far more meaning coming from Bush at a time when it was feared the
nation faced more terroristic attacks. Nevertheless, what were citizens to look for? We
turn now to the findings in Chapter 5 on the inherently religious words used by the two
presidents.

Discussion of Empirical Findings on Religious Language From Chapter 5
Bush was more predisposed to use inherently religious language than Johnson,
perhaps because of his claimed intense religious experience, the inherently religious
nature of his war (begun as a religious jihad by terrorists against the United States) and
by his attempt to speak to his political base. Johnson was raised with a more civil religion
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mindset to follow the Golden Rule and to help the weak. Johnson’s war, while against
“godless” Communists (my words, not his), was not framed as such by him. Moreover,
he preceded Bush by about 40 years and at a time when the nation was just beginning to
talk about how it felt about the president and religion.
Thus, it is no surprise that Bush used more than four times as many inherently
religious words as Johnson in roughly the same number of column inches of speech.
Nevertheless, it was surprising that Johnson quoted Scripture, or alluded to it, on several
occasions. Bush did this many times as well and often in a less formal way that wove
Scripture into modern language to the degree that one might not recognize it if one did
not know Scripture. Perhaps this was a way for Bush to speak in code to his political
base.
In the category, America, what stood out was how Bush used inherently religious
terms to separate the definition of America from that of the Enemy, as in this example:
“Our deepest national conviction is that every life is precious because every life is the gift
of a Creator who intended us to live in liberty and equality. More than anything else, this
separates us from the enemy we fight” (Address to the Nation on the Anniversary of the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, September 11, 2002). This technique also appears
designed to appeal to Bush’s political base because it subtly connected his and their antiabortion stance to the cause of the war by emphasizing that every life was valuable,
created and precious. Bush also had the additional task of making it clear to Muslims in
the United States and abroad that he was not demonizing all of Islam, which could have
fanned the flames of jihad.
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In defining the Coalition, it is notable that Johnson used no inherently religious
words. What also stood out in this category was that Bush felt the need to use the terms
“Muslim” and “Islamic,” words with which Americans have little familiarity. 53 Bush also
had to distinguish between “good” Muslims (anti-terrorists) and “bad” Muslims
(terrorists).
In defining the Enemy, Bush was in high dudgeon in his use of antithetical
language. He also introduced Americans to religious words they may not have been that
familiar with, such as “Allah,” and Old Testament words such as “blaspheme.” In
addition, Bush’s effort to broaden the definition of war as a strategy by Iraq and the
terrorists to stamp out all Jews and Christians, even in Asia and Africa, was notable. He
again made an effort to separate terrorists from Islam by calling them a radical fringe of
Islam. He also spoke for God, much as a priest would, in defining the Enemy, even
daring to define what prayers God answers and does not answer. He said of the Enemy,
“They dare to ask God’s blessing as they set out to kill innocent men, women, and
children. But the God of Isaac and Ishmael would never answer such a prayer” (Remarks
to the United Nations General Assembly, November 10, 2001).
In defining the Job of President, Johnson stood out for his surprising variety of
terms, including an odd choice of Old Testament words (“cursing,” “prophet,” “Isaiah,”
“tabernacle”) and some more directly spiritual terms one might expect from Bush
(“Bible,” “grace,” “heaven,” “spiritual”). In contrast, Bush stuck to fairly standard fare,
although like Johnson referring to “He” and “His,” both of which connote a more
personal relationship to God. Johnson quoted Scripture often and included an odd

53

Many churches, including some in the researcher’s area, started Bible studies to learn about Islam after
9/11.
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reference to visiting the head of the Mormon Church in Salt Lake City, Utah. Bush also
quoted Scripture. Scripture was coded under the Job of President when it seemed to
evidence the presidents were in a priest-like capacity.
Analysis of the Job of President category suggests that Johnson was looking for
help, perhaps to justify a war he did not fully endorse. Bush seemed to present himself as
seeking some guidance from God, especially through prayer, and emphasized strong
Manifest Destiny themes proclaiming God as the force behind all of life and history, and
both authoring and ordaining them. He also took the opportunity to again define the war
as a battle between good and evil, and as a time of testing. Manifest Destiny will be
discussed in more detail below.
In defining Victims, Johnson stood out for his emphasis on Manifest Destiny, and
Bush stood out for his use of religion to show how victims were brutalized and how, in
his words, the enemy was trying to “master the minds and souls of others.” “Others” was
interpreted as referring to victims of all types, whether terrorist recruits or just plain
citizens. The idea of the enemy trying to master the souls of others stood out as a highly
unusual concept, as Bush explained “There is a line in our time, and in every time,
between the defenders of human liberty and those who seek to master the minds and
souls of others” (Address to the Nation on the Anniversary of the Terrorist Attacks of
September 11, September 11, 2002).
The category of War presented one of the rare times in which Johnson put
Vietnam into religious context, albeit in the quest for peace. Bush again used the
opportunity to characterize the battle between good and evil, to emphasize the Enemy
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sought to kill all Jews and Christians, and to speak for God, much as a priest would. In
the Job of Citizens category, Bush surprised by using no inherently religious terms.
A discussion of inherently religious terms used by these presidents would be
incomplete without a more in-depth examination of Manifest Destiny, as this is a concept
that drives a good deal of these presidents’ worldviews in regards to war and is a concept
that is novel to those who have not grown up in the United States.
Manifest Destiny
Manifest Destiny is an American theory that the United States is uniquely created
by God to right wrongs and lead the world to justice and freedom. It was used by both
presidents in this study to justify their respective wars, but more so by Bush, who used it
liberally and enthusiastically. In relying upon this theory, one must assume these
presidents hoped to be more persuasive by tapping into basic American indoctrination
that is emotive, patriotic and religious. It also seems likely that these presidents used this
concept to preclude citizen dissent.
Johnson used Manifest Destiny to explain why the United States was in Vietnam:
“You are in Viet-Nam, far from the places and people you love because the forces that
have given our Nation strength and wealth have also placed upon it the burden of
defending freedom – even in remote and distant villages” (Christmas Message to the
Americans in Viet-Nam, December 23, 1964). He further defined the role of the United
States less than a month later with these words: “Our Nation was created to help strike
away the chains of ignorance and misery and tyranny wherever they keep man less than
God means him to be” (Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union,
January 4, 1965).

182

Part of the theme of Manifest Destiny is that the United States is the only one that
can intervene and hold back the forces of evil in the world. In an appropriations speech
given on April 4, 1965 54 , Johnson illustrated this in talking about the Vietnam War:
There are those who ask why this responsibility should be ours. The
answer, I think, is simple. There is no one else who can do the job. Our
power alone in the final test can stand between expanding communism
and independent Asian nations.
Manifest Destiny also supposedly places a unique responsibility upon the United
States, as Johnson explains:
There are those who wonder why we have a responsibility there. Well, we
have it there for the same reason that we have a responsibility for the
defense of Europe. World War II was fought in both Europe and Asia, and
when it ended we found ourselves with continued responsibility for the
defense of freedom (Address at Johns Hopkins University, April 7, 1965).
Bush also highlighted the supposed singular nature of the United States and its
responsibility to rout out evil:
This is our calling. This is the calling of the United States of America, the
most free nation in the world, a nation built on fundamental values, that
rejects hate, rejects violence, rejects murderers, rejects evil. And we will
not tire. We will not relent. It is not only important for the homeland
security of America that we succeed; it is equally as important for
generations of Americans who have yet be born. Now is the time to draw
the line in the sand against the evil ones. And this Government is
committed to doing just that (Remarks Announcing the Most Wanted
Terrorists List, October 10, 2001).

Bush also used the metaphor of history calling the United States to battle as part
of this theme: “History has called America and our allies to action, and it is both our
responsibility and our privilege to fight freedom’s fight” (Address Before a Joint Session
of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 29, 2002). He also said, “I believe
there is a reason that history has matched this nation with this time. America strives to be
54

Speech not included in the data for the study because of its limited audience.
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tolerant and just. We respect the faith of Islam, even as we fight those whose actions
defile that faith” (Address to the Nation on the Anniversary of the Terrorist Attacks of
September 11, September 11, 2002). And, as mentioned previously, Bush in his Address
Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union on January 28, 2003,
actually advanced the theory that God gives freedom to humanity through the United
States, in effect defining the country as a kind of intervening Christ figure.
While all this may seem surprising (and scary) to citizens of other countries and
certainly not very transportable outside the United States, it is apparent that these
presidents considered Manifest Destiny as a commonly accepted truth by Americans,
designed to inspire pride, purpose and, apparently, a commitment to war that the United
States alone deemed necessary, based upon its unique religious calling.

Advancing the Literature
This dissertation makes contributions to the literature on problem definition,
presidential leadership and political communications. One way it does this is by
combining these areas of study to show how they can supplement and enhance one
another. For too long public policy has ignored the importance of the communication of
policy, focusing instead on the policy process itself or on certain areas of policy. This
study makes the case that the communication of public policy may be just as important as
the policy itself (and in some cases may be indistinguishable from it), especially when it
is done by the president, and especially when it involves foreign affairs (war in
particular). Yet, as has been discussed, rhetoric often not only promotes policy to the
public, but it contributes to policy development, its agenda position, its legitimacy and its
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evaluation. This is especially true when problems are rhetorically defined by the
president, who has the powerful bully pulpit at his disposal and enormous credibility on
foreign policy issues. Words indeed are the currency of the presidency. This is especially
true when presidents choose their words for their emotional impact for, as Lakoff (2008)
holds, emotional words, especially when repeated often, can actually change the circuitry
in our brains. In addition, when presidents rhetorically define the need for war using
emotional, patriotic and antithetical rhetoric that is repeated often, they can accrue more
political power, even to the extent of quelling dissent. Thus, they can use rhetorical
problem definition to such degrees that it becomes propaganda, as has been done by
dictators such as Hitler and Mussolini.
Communication of public policy, especially by the president, has become an art
form, with presidents and party operatives focus-testing and fine-tuning words and
concepts. Such communication is key to what has been termed in this study “selling”
policy, not only to the American public, but also to the world at-large. Not all policy is
discussed publicly or in a high-profile setting. Numerous rule changes take place
regularly that do not generate much public rhetoric. Congress fine-tunes laws that often
do not get much public discussion. But when presidents decide to escalate our
involvement in a war, or start one pre-emptively, policy “selling” must take place that
emanates largely from the bully pulpit because blood, treasure, and larger
security/relational concerns are at stake. To ask a country to go to war is the most
important policy demand a president can make, and so he must define why the problem is
so grave as to warrant war. It is to be hoped that communications scholars also will
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integrate their studies with aspects of the discipline of public policy to show us even
better ways to study how policy is communicated.
This work also expands the study of problem definition by looking at it in a
unique way. War is not just a policy – it is a problem, meaning a situation or condition
that exists, to which presidents add definition. And how that policy/problem is defined
very much affects what happens, from agenda setting, to formulation, to evaluation.
Further, presidents are definers-in-chief when it comes to foreign policy. And how they
define a problem, the patriotic language they employ, the Manifest Destiny themes they
tap into, the emotive, religious and metaphorical language they use repetitively can help
them define their leadership, can encourage dialogue or quell dissent, can contract or
expand their powers.
In summary, prior to this study, we knew that problem definition was a key part
of the policy process, that it involved framing the issue and that it was especially
powerful when it employed causal stories. We knew that presidents were key players in
problem definition by virtue of their position. We knew that presidents especially were
looked to for leadership in foreign policy and crisis. And we knew that presidents
commanded the bully pulpit, a unique tool that gave them great influence and reach.
We now also know that when presidents try to define the need for war by using
highly antithetical, patriotic, religious and emotional language, repeated frequently, they
can enhance their power (perhaps disproportionately vis à vis other branches of
government, and Congress in particular), quell dissent and even change our brain
circuitry (Lakoff 2008). We know that we can be talked into escalating unpopular wars
and into waging pre-emptive, and perhaps misguided, wars. And we know that this can
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be done, to some degree, by the combination of problem definition communicated
through an increasingly powerful (and perhaps dangerous) rhetorical presidency that
creates a sustaining narrative. We know that presidents are problem-definers-in-chief and
priests-in-chief when it comes to foreign crisis, and in particular, war. And we know that
we as citizens are more manipulatable by these presidential machinations than perhaps
we knew.

Suggestions for Future Research
This work provides numerous avenues for future research, primary among them
the definition of problems by predicting the future, an extension of Stone’s (1989) classic
work on causal stories. Some investigation was done into this variant of problem
definition, but there is much room for theoretical development.
Defining Problems By Predicting the Future
Stone’s (1989) work on the role and power of causal stories in problem definition
neglects statements about the future. It focuses instead primarily on assigning blame after
an event has happened. Defining problems by predicting the future involves the creation
of causal stories by probability statement. A person predicts what is likely to happen if
the issue is not defined and addressed as that person sees fit. Problem definition by
probability statement relies heavily upon model verbs that predict an event or action, such
as “could,” “if,” “is,” “may,” “might” and “would.” In this work, any words coded under
the concept of “threat” could well be seen as predictive, as threat implies something that
has not happened but which could under certain conditions (as defined by the president,
in this case). Indeed, “threat” always implies danger.
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Thus is it no surprise that both Presidents Johnson and Bush engaged in problem
definition by probability statement to different degrees to define the need for war in the
various categories. Like defining the need for war, presidents have particular power when
it comes to problem definition by probability statement. If they say that the reasons for
war are defined as such and such, and if they further say that if we do not accept their
definition that some greater danger is likely to occur, we are inclined to believe them
because we trust that they have access to more information than we do and that they have
our best interests in mind, especially when it comes to national security. Moreover,
presidents have additional power, especially when it comes to security issues, to scare
citizens into believing them. And this is largely the power of problem definition by
probability statement, although one must allow that president’s predictions are not always
so cynical and may have basis in fact.
In this dissertation, problem definition by probability statement was observed, but
it was not analyzed in the same detailed way as concepts in the various categories. There
is a reason for this. Problem definition by probability statement is best delineated in
context. So for this work, examples were simply provided, and a rough estimate was
made of the concept’s use, based upon a sampling. For example, in examining the quotes
accompanying the most-used words in this work, it is estimated that Johnson used
problem definition by probability statement much less than Bush, in an estimated ratio of
approximately 1:11, based upon counting the number of speeches in which it was used in
the various categories (and not the number of uses per column inch of speech). This count
shows approximately how many speeches containing the top key words had at least one
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predictive statement. This allows for the fact that, as with the other categories in this
work, there could be some duplicate quotes across categories. 55
Johnson used problem definition by probability statement mostly in regards to the
categories Enemy, War and Victims. Bush used predictive speech mostly in reference to
the categories Coalition, Enemy and Victims. The following are examples of predictive
speech used by these presidents to define the need for war or its escalation.
Examples of Johnson’s Predictions Regarding the Enemy. For example, in
defining the “Enemy,” Johnson predicted, “Aggression and upheaval, in any part of the
world, carry the seeds of destruction to our own freedom and perhaps to civilization
itself” (Remarks in New York City Before the American Bar Association, August 12,
1964). He also said, “To fail to respond to these realities would reflect on our honor as a
nation, would undermine worldwide confidence in our courage, would convince every
nation in South Asia that it must now bow to Communist terms to survive” (Remarks on
Foreign Affairs at the Associated Press Luncheon, April 20, 1964).
Example of Johnson’s Predictions Regarding War. In defining War, Johnson
predicted:

Second, our own security is tied to the peace of Asia. Twice in one
generation we have had to fight against aggression in the Far East. To
ignore aggression now would only increase the danger of a much larger
war (Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January
4, 1965).
Examples of Johnson’s Predictions Regarding Victims. In defining Victims,
Johnson predicted, “To leave Viet-Nam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these
people in the value of an American commitment and in the value of America’s word. The
55

This was estimated to be about 10 percent in the data examined in this work.
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result would be increased unrest and instability, and even wider war” (Address at Johns
Hopkins University, April 7, 1965). He later predicted, “I think it is well to remember
that there are a hundred other little nations sitting here this moment watching what
happens and what the outcome is in South Viet-Nam and if South Viet-Nam can be
gobbled up, the same thing may happen to them,” and also said, “Now make no mistake
about it, the aim in Viet-Nam is not simply the conquest of the south, tragic as that would
be. It is to show that American commitment is worthless and they would like very much
to do that, and once they succeed in doing that, the gates are down and the road is open to
expansion and to endless conquest. Moreover, we are directly committed to the defense
of South Viet-Nam beyond any question” (Remarks to Committee Members on the Need
for Additional Appropriations for Military Purposes in Viet-Nam and the Dominican
Republic, May 4, 1965).
Examples of Bush’s Predictions Regarding the Coalition. In contrast, in defining
the Coalition and informing them about the threat from the Enemy, Bush predicted, for
example, “They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States”
(Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 29,
2002); “We could wait and hope that Saddam does not give weapons to terrorists, or
develop a nuclear weapon to blackmail the world” (Address to the Nation on Iraq,
October 7, 2002); “They could also give or sell those weapons to terrorist allies, who
would use them without the least hesitation” (Address Before a Joint Session of the
Congress on the State of the Union, January 28, 2003); and “Another resolution is now
before the Security Council. If the council responds to Iraq’s defiance with more excuses
and delays, if all its authority proves to be empty, the United Nations will be severely
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weakened as a source of stability and order. If the members rise to this moment, then the
Council will fulfill its founding purpose” (Remarks to the American Enterprise Institute
Annual Dinner, February 26, 2003).
Examples of Bush’s Predictions Regarding the Enemy. In defining the Enemy,
Bush’s predictions evolved from predictively defining the terrorists who staged the
attacks of 9/11, to predicting Iraq’s actions. He began in 2001 by saying, “As we meet,
the terrorists are planning more murder – perhaps in my country, or perhaps in yours …
And all the world faces the most horrifying prospect of all: These same terrorists are
searching for weapons of mass destruction, the tools to turn their hatred into holocaust”
(Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly, November 10, 2001).
His language evolved until in 2002 he was predicting, “Secretly, without
fingerprints, Saddam Hussein could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists, or
help them develop their own. Saddam Hussein is a threat. He’s a threat to the United
States of America. He’s a threat to some of our closest friends and allies. We don’t accept
this threat” (Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,
January 29, 2002).
Eventually, in 2003, Bush’s problem definition by probability statement regarding
Iraq, its link to terrorists in general and its threat to the world became more defined and
strident, as shown in this quote: “The danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, one
day, nuclear weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their
stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our
country, or any other” (Address to the Nation on Iraq, March 17, 2003). The United
States and its coalition would attack Iraq that same month.
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Example of Bush’s Predictions Regarding Victims. Aside from what was coded as
top key words, the most blatant example of problem definition by probability statement
came from Bush’s “Address to the Nation on Iraq,” delivered October 7, 2002, in
Cincinnati, Ohio. Operation Iraqi Freedom would commence about six months later on
March 19, 2003 (American time). In this speech, Bush combined predictions of threat,
peril, risk and nuclear annihilation if his definition of the need for war was not accepted.
He called upon duty. He created urgency. He projected great certainty. The prediction is a
prime example of how the power of the president can be used to instill fear:
Knowing these realities, America must not ignore the threat gathering
against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final
proof – the smoking gun – that could come in the form of a mushroom
cloud. As President Kennedy said in October of 1962, ‘Neither the United
States of America, nor the world community of nations can tolerate
deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large
or small. We no longer live in a world,’ he said, ‘where only the actual
firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nations security to
constitute maximum peril.’ Understanding the threats of our time,
knowing the designs and deceptions of the Iraqi regime, we have every
reason to assume the worst, and we have an urgent duty to prevent the
worst from occurring. Some have argued we should wait – and that’s an
option. In my view, it’s the riskiest of all options, because the longer we
wait, the stronger and bolder Saddam Hussein will become. We could wait
and hope that Saddam does not give weapons to terrorists, or develop a
nuclear weapon to blackmail the world. Failure to act would embolden
other tyrants, allow terrorists access to new weapons and new resources,
and make blackmail a permanent feature of world events. And through its
inaction, the United States would resign itself to a future of fear.

As in most categories in this research, there are many, many more examples that
could be given for each president, and especially for Bush. Bush may have used problem
definition by probability statement more often and more intensely than Johnson because
he was defining the need for a pre-emptive war, a very controversial act (and some would
argue, illegal act, according to international law), while Johnson was arguing for the
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escalation of a more traditional war that he inherited, and, from all accounts, was not as
enthusiastic about as Bush was about his war because Johnson saw continuation of the
Vietnam War as undermining his Great Society domestic programs.
Problem definition by probability statement, or the predictive story, is a powerful
tool in the hands of a president, who is assumed to have the broadest view of threats. It is
even more powerful when it comes to security issues, such as war, in which the president
has more access to intelligence than any other official and is, by law, designated as
commander in chief.
Some additional features of problem definition by probability statement,
especially when presidents use it to describe security or foreign affairs matters, are that it
involves (1) empirical statements for which the average person does not have enough
confirmatory data (and elites only have that data if the president provides it to them); (2)
predictions we cannot verify will happen until after the fact (and the timeline for
verification may be uncertain or movable); or, (3) in some cases, normative propositions
masquerading (falsely) as empirical statements/predictions. If such statements turn out to
be measurably untrue by some deadline, and presidents prove to be false prophets, so to
speak, it is interesting to ponder the recourse citizens have and the accountability
presidents have, if any.
Thus, when presidents are inclined toward war, their predictions about what will
happen if we do not accept their definitions are likely to be dire. And we, who presume
the president has superior knowledge of foreign policy and security issues, are more
likely to accept that definition of policy and go along. As Lakoff (2008) says, someone is
using that fear to advantage.
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Recently, some scholars have touched on problem definition by probability
statement, although they have not done so in regards to presidential rhetoric pertaining to
war. These scholars have argued that political rhetoric consists of arguments about what
will happen if a particular policy is passed or not passed (Lau, Smith and Fiske 1991;
Riker 1990, 1996; Jerit 2002). Jerit (2002) says “elites have an incentive to focus on the
future because this is where citizens are most uncertain – and uncertainty implies
persuadability” (19). As no one knows for sure the outcome of a specific policy,
predictive rhetoric provides “certainty” (Riker 1990). Lau et al. (1991) maintain that “the
most frequently attempted manipulation … consists of a set of arguments about the
consequences of a policy proposal (645).
Riker (1996) draws upon decision theory to argue that elites focus on the future
because citizen outcome preferences are influenced by the presentation of, in many cases,
dire alternatives (Allais 1979; Einhorn and Hogarth 1986; Ellsberg 1961; Kahneman,
Tversky and Slovic 1982; Markowitz 1952; Quattrone and Tversky 1988). Jerit (2002)
gives an example: “It is well known that people subjectively overestimate the likelihood
of low-probability events, especially events with undesirable outcomes. Thus, elites who
seek to quash support for a legislative proposal need only argue that a proposal is ‘risky’
or make drastic predictions about the negative consequences of a bill. It does not matter if
the probability of these events is so low as to be virtually indistinguishable from zero;
risks that are statistically microscopic can nevertheless prompt a very substantial visceral
reaction (italics mine) (20). Thus, the deep emotional reaction elites can solicit through
carefully chosen rhetoric can be so powerful as to quash dissent.
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This psychology of rhetoric is not new in American culture. In studying the U.S.
Constitution, Riker (1996) found elites tried to take advantage of what Jerit (2002) calls
“this inherent aversion to unpleasant outcomes” (20). For instance, “Federalists argued
that the nation was disintegrating under the Articles of Confederation, and that unless the
Constitution was ratified, there would be civil and foreign war, economic decline, and
confiscation of property. In response, Anti-Federalists predicted that the proposed
consolidation would destroy traditional liberties, shield elected officials from popular
control and result in oligarchy. It is clear, in other words, that both sides sought to take
advantage of citizens’ risk aversion to making drastic predictions about events that were
highly unlikely” (Jerit 2002, 20-21). Interestingly, Anti-Federalists tended to rely more
on negative appeals.
Somewhat similarly, Ben-Porath (2007) found that “in building the case for
imminent war, presidents turn to narrative descriptions of specific atrocities, namely rape,
torture and victimization of children, [while by] the same token presidents wishing to
avoid American involvement in war use abstract terms and statistical information
concerning human rights crises, but refrain from detailing personalized stories of abuse”
(181).
This study invites researchers to go beyond Jerit, Riker, Stone and others to merge
the study of presidential rhetoric with that of problem definition and predictions of what
is likely to happen, or not happen, if we do or do not accept a president’s arguments for
the policy of war.
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Other Areas of Potential Research
Other areas of potential future research involve the ways in which presidents may
use rhetorical problem definition and/or rhetorical problem definition by probability
statement to enhance the powers of the president (potentially at the expense of the other
branches of government, thus upsetting the balance of power) and increase their personal
authority. One way presidents can do this is by saying they are encountering something
unprecedented, which only they know how to handle. Both Johnson and Bush did this. If
something is new and different, if there is a new era, if there are new responsibilities,
leaders may seek greater power to help us navigate this territory and define it for us.
Johnson highlights this in his Remarks to Committee Members on the Need for
Additional Military Purposes in Viet-Nam and the Dominican Republic, May 4, 1965:
“This is not the same kind of aggression which the world has long been used to. Instead
of the sweep of invading armies there is the steady and the deadly attack in the night by
guerrilla bands that come without warning, that kill people while they sleep.” Bush does
the same in his Address to the Nation From Atlanta on Homeland Security on November
8, 2001: “We have entered a new era, and this new era requires new responsibilities, both
for the Government and for our people. The Government has a responsibility to protect
our citizens, and that starts with homeland security.”
In addition, research is certainly warranted (and was done during this study,
although not included in the final work) on how the assassination of President Kennedy
for Johnson and 9/11 for Bush were parallel in many ways, as they were both events that
propelled these presidents into their wars.
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Certainly more study needs to be done of the rhetorical devices used by presidents
to define the need for war, including symbols, metaphors and frames. Strong metaphors
for Bush, for instance, were that “freedom” and “fear” were at war and that the battle was
between “good” and “evil” and “justice” versus “cruelty.” Various authors and
commentators are starting to write about the consequences of promoting a polarized
world view that is black versus white, when in fact the world is many shades of black and
white. Another strong metaphor for Bush involved “weapons of mass destruction,” first
used by him in his November 10, 2001, Remarks to the United Nations General
Assembly: “And all the world faces the most horrifying prospect of all: These same
terrorists are searching for weapons of mass destruction, the tools to turn their hatred into
holocaust. They can be expected to use chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons the
moment they are capable of doing so. No hint of conscience would prevent it.”
More research could be conducted as to how presidential rhetorical problem
definition discourages or even quells dissent, especially as regards security issues. One
way this study elucidated the attempt by the two presidents to quell dissent was in
showing the way they defined the county and the coalition as united, sometimes in the
process of presenting a request for increased authority, funding or support. Declaring
unity, or calling for it, can have the effect of co-opting coalition members and quelling
dissent. For instance, in a speech on September 25, 2001, to Federal Bureau of
Investigation employees, 56 Bush said:
There are some other things we can do in the country, and our Congress
needs to work with us. And I believe – I had breakfast this morning with
Republican and Democrat leaders, and I will tell you, the spirit on Capitol
Hill is good for America. It’s a united spirit, and I want to thank the
leaders from both parties and both Houses for their willingness to listen to
56

Speech not included in the data for the study because of its limited audience.
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anybody who has got a good idea about how to fight terrorist activity in
the country ... And so I hope Congress will listen to the wisdom of the
proposals that the Attorney General brought up, to give the tools necessary
to our agents in the field to find those who may think they want to disrupt
America again ... And we’re asking for the authority to share information
between intelligence operations and law enforcement, so we can direct the
best of both in the critical effort. That, too, is a reasonable request to make
of Congress. I want you to know that every one of the proposals we’ve
made on Capitol Hill, carried by the Attorney General, has been carefully
reviewed. They are measured requests; they are responsible requests; they
are constitutional requests. Ours is a land that values the constitutional
rights of every citizen, and we will honor those rights, of course ... But
we’re at war, a war we’re going to win. And in order to win the war, we
must make sure that the law enforcement men and women have got the
tools necessary, within the Constitution, to defeat the enemy.
And in a speech on September 26, 2001, to Central Intelligence Agency
employees, Bush said, “The cooperation with Capitol Hill is unique and, I hope,
lasting … There’s deep concern amongst Republicans and Democrats on Capitol
Hill to do what’s right for America – to come together to provide the necessary
support for an effective war.” 57
Bush also defined the American people as united. On October 10, 2001, in
Remarks Announcing the Most Wanted Terrorists List, he said, “We’re united. People of
all faiths, all religions, all areas of our country are united in the common effort to stamp
out evil where we find it. It is the right thing to do.” And On October 11, 2001, he told
Department of Defense employees, 58 “But now, as then, we can be certain of the outcome
because we have a number of decisive assets. We have a unified country.” Certainly, it is
harder to go against a president when he talks as if everyone is united in protecting the
country.

57
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Speech not included in the data for the study because of its limited audience.
Speech not included in the data for the study because of its limited audience.
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The effect of this type of speech and other efforts to quell dissent were that those
who spoke out were often singled out as unpatriotic, especially in the early stages of the
Iraq War. This was typified by the incident involving the female vocal group, the Dixie
Chicks, whose audience was largely country music fans in the heartland, generally more
conservative and part of the Bush base. On the eve of the war, lead singer Natalie Maines
told a crowd in London that she was “ashamed” that Bush was from her home state of
Texas. The Dixie Chicks subsequently had to cancel fourteen engagements in the U.S.
heartland as country music fans protested their “unpatriotic” behavior by refusing to buy
tickets or their CDs. In addition, hundreds of radio stations across middle America
refused to play their songs. And country music stations publicly boycotted the Dixie
Chicks and organized publicity stunts that included crushing their CDs with a tractor.
Meanwhile, sympathizers began buying their albums and coined the term “dixie-chicked”
to refer to those whose publicly stated views, especially against the war, prompted a
backlash. By 2006, the tenor had changed. The Dixie Chicks released a CD with the song
“Not Ready to Make Nice” that chronicled their travails over the incident, which included
the death threats they received. Maines said she was “still mad as hell” at the backlash
over stating her opinions. Other performers, namely Neil Young and the Rolling Stones,
also began taking an anti-Bush tone, but their fan base had always been more compatible
with their political beliefs. Interestingly, countries such as Australia, Canada and Great
Britain had welcomed the group throughout the controversy, indicating that aspects of the
coalition were never as strong as Bush stated (Gumbel 2006). Another way presidents can
quell dissent is by using extreme language to evoke the maximum fear, as Bush did
frequently when he warned predictively that “These same terrorists are searching for
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weapons of mass destruction, the tools to turn their hatred into holocaust” (Remarks to
the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, November 10, 2001).
Another area warranting more research involves expanding problem definition to
other areas of policy (and campaigning, for that matter), and not just by presidents, but
also by other government actors. And it could also be expanded to examine how
presidents set agendas and evaluate policy. The development of narratives could be
further investigated by carefully chronicling the evolution of definitions, which has been
done to some extent here. And more research can and certainly will be done to examine
how communication of policy affects us physiologically, as Lakoff has begun to
elucidate. There can be no doubt that language, especially in the hands of a president who
advocates war, is powerful.
Still other areas of research may be directed to the religious side of presidential
speech, including the use by presidents of direct quotes or direct references to Scripture.
Has the use of religious rhetoric by presidents changed or increased over time? If so, does
this mean presidents are becoming more religious, or that presidents are finding the use
of religious rhetoric more useful, or a myriad other possibilities?
And finally, further investigation could be made into the effect of the media on
rhetorical problem definition by presidents, including whether the media are “an
intervening variable between public opinion and foreign policy, or primarily a conveyor
belt for messages from the elite to the public” (see Baum and Potter 2008, 40); whether
the rise of alternative television viewing choices brought about by cable television has
reduced the audience and the influence of presidential rhetoric over the public agenda
(see Young and Perkins 2005); and whether the variable impact of televised presidential
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addresses on media attention has affected the president’s power to set an agenda (see
Peake and Eshbaugh-Soha 2008).

Limitations of the Research
One of the main limitations of this research is that it does not propose cause and
effect. Just because these presidents tried to talk us into war by employing the many
devices discussed does not mean they were successful in getting complete buy-in by their
respective audiences. Showing presidential speech affects public opinion is difficult to
do, as pointed out earlier. But what we do know is that presidents and their staffs take
extreme care in choosing the words they use to communicate policy, and therefore we
must assume these presidents thought these ways of trying to talk us into war would be
most effective. And by their choices, it appears they sought to quell the most dissent and
co-opt the greatest numbers of their various audiences to their cause. Thus, the
researcher’s job is to make sure that she categorizes and codes the appropriate data in the
best way possible to show the apparent design behind the words.
Another limitation involves the fact that this study focuses only on the top key
words under each category, although there were scores of other words used by each
president in almost every category. Nevertheless, every study of necessity has to limit the
amount of data it analyzes.

Summary and Discussion
The research questions for this work focused on (1) how the two presidents used
rhetoric to try to talk us into war, (2) how their addresses were similar and different in

201

terms of the words and emphases they used, and (3) how they framed their causal stories
in terms of who (or what) was to blame for the circumstances or events precipitating the
war/conflict. The latter question stems from Stone’s (1988, 1989) assertion that at the
heart of successful problem definition is the causal story, which identifies the harm done,
describes its cause, assigns moral blame and claims government is responsible for the
remedy. In crafting an effective causal story, Stone says problem definers must translate
difficult conditions into problems that are amenable to human action, and do it in a way
that wins over the most people and gives them the most leverage over their opponents.
In looking at how presidents define the need for war, it is clear that Johnson and
Bush followed Stone’s formula, although to different degrees, with Bush using more
antithetical, religious, patriotic and emotive language than Johnson in most cases, as well
as using more key words in general to define the problem. It is also clear that these
presidents chose their words carefully, and one can only conclude they did so in a way
designed to be the most persuasive and quell dissent, with Bush going far further than
Johnson in both areas once again.
In bringing this work to an end, it is worth noting that Patton (2002) tells us there
is no formula for transformation of qualitative analysis data into findings or conclusions,
as each study is unique. Numerous guidelines abound, he says, but they are not rules, and
their application requires judgment and creativity. Scholarly qualitative research, he adds,
emphasizes the published literature, which contributes to the initial design. It is therefore
revisited in analysis.
As regards grounded theory, Patton (2002) says it begins with basic description,
moves to conceptual organizing of the data into discrete categories and finally culminates
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in theory generation. The latter involves developing, or intuiting, ideas and concepts, and
then formulating them into a “logical, systematic and explanatory scheme” (490).
Grounded theory relies upon imageric concepts that are easy to apply. “They are applied
… with a feeling of ‘knowing’ … They ring true with great credibility … They feel
theoretically complete” (Patton 2002, 491). Strauss and Corbin (1998) add that:
In doing our analyses, we conceptualize and classify events, act and
outcomes. The categories that emerge, along with their relationships, are
the foundations for our developing theory … Doing line-by-line coding
through which categories, their properties and relationships emerge
automatically takes us beyond description and puts us into a conceptual
mode of analysis (66).

Qualitative analysis is “grounded in thick description,” “balanced by analysis and
interpretation” (Patton 2002, 503). Patton (2002) adds, “The analyst should help readers
understand different degrees of significance of various findings, if these exist” (504).
Analysts may also use metaphors and analogies to convey meaning. Finally, Wolcott
(1990) warns about being too certain about conclusions in qualitative research:
Give serious thought to dropping the idea that your final chapter must lead
to a conclusion or that the account must build toward a dramatic climax …
In reporting qualitative work, I avoid the term conclusion. I do not want to
work toward a grand flourish that might tempt me beyond the boundaries
of the material I have been presenting or detract from the power (and
exceed the limitations) of an individual case (55).

By revealing the pattern behind the words of these two presidents through thick
description, a good deal of meaning has emerged, including similarities and differences in
how these presidents tried to talk us into war. Despite their separation in service by
decades, these presidents used some of the same concepts and key words, perhaps
because commonalities of thought are passed down through each generation, regardless
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of the conflict. Perhaps presidents also build upon language that they believe has been
effective for past presidents and perfect that inherited rhetoric through focus-group
testing and other methods. In any case, both presidents’ rhetoric produced similar
categories, and in some cases the presidents used the same key words. Each used
language that was antithetical, patriotic, emotive, metaphorical, co-opting and religious.
Each president, as Bostdorff (1994) says, named the issue so that their proposed policy
seemed to be the best solution. Each president defined the problem as a crisis to give it
urgency and to enable him to more easily call upon citizen sacrifice and unity (Bostdorff
1994). It is just that Bush did more of this and in more pronounced fashion than did
Johnson.
Thus, expectations that Johnson would speak in less extreme terms than Bush
were confirmed. Indeed, the tests of binomial proportions reveal that Bush was far more
likely than Johnson to use terms to define all categories of secular language, except the
Job of President, and all categories of inherently religious language, except the Job of
Citizens. Bush was more likely to emphasize what Bostdorff calls a menacing crisis that
threatens American lives and principles, at the same time deflecting troubling questions
about ethicality (1994).
These presidents also made repeated references to unity, especially with
Congress, but also with their coalitions and with the American people. Kernell (1997)
theorizes that presidents increasingly go public in a belief they can better influence the
public through their speech, but Eshbaugh-Soha (2006) says that presidents do not so
much rally public support through their speech as they seek to influence the votes of
members of Congress and signal policy preferences to highly placed bureaucrats. This
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study points to the likelihood that presidents must also think they are persuasive with
coalition leaders and with the American people when it comes to war policy, or they
would not speak to them repeatedly and use word repetition.
Despite their commonalities, each president made choices to talk more or less
about the war, to emphasize certain aspects more or less. Johnson spoke less about his
war, and did so in more general terms, or in a broader context, than Bush. Bush made so
many speeches preparing us for war that culling his speeches was a feat in itself. Johnson
also was less repetitive than Bush, who often used the same language over and over.
Each was propelled into their respective wars by events beyond their control – for
Johnson, the assassination of President Kennedy, which thrust him into the presidency,
for Bush the unprecedented horror of 9/11. Yet they fought different wars in different
times. Johnson inherited a war he did not create and that conflicted with his Great Society
programs. Bush created his war, and launched it pre-emptively.
In sheer tone alone, Johnson appears the reluctant warrior, more concerned with
prevention, peace and deterrence than war. He seems less secure with his war and with
his role in it. He is more philosophical, more like the gentleman engaged in a duel. In
contrast, Bush is the eager warrior, bent upon war, secure in his role as commander-inchief and brimming with conviction. He speaks in simple, direct, informal language.
Bush’s policy rhetoric falls more in line with Lowi’s description of social
regulatory policy, as characterized by “radical” politics. Lowi notes that “for the radical,
conduct is to be regulated because it is good or bad in itself.” The goal of radical policy is
the complete elimination of conduct. Radicalists see social regulatory policy in terms of
“sin” (Tatalovich and Daynes 2005, xiv). Perhaps this is because, as Tatalovich and
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Daynes say about domestic policy, Republicans tend more than Democrats to exploit
social regulatory issues to mobilize their base (1988). Thus, it seems more likely that
rhetoric promoting social regulatory policy, especially in the hands of Republicans, may
be more black and white, patriotic and religious (Edelman 1980). Yet elites must go
beyond ideological arguments if they want to appeal to more than their supporters
(Converse 1964), which may be why both presidents’ rhetoric devolved to the simplest
message to cancel out what Ferejohn calls “random components” (1990, 14). Ferejohn
(1990) also notes that “information is retained in rough proportion to the existing stock of
information on the topic,” which suggests one reason presidents might repeat their
messages – so that receivers are more likely to retain and accept them.
Lakoff (2008) suggests another reason for repetition. He says presidential speech
has particular power in times of trauma. Such speech is so powerful that, when repeated
often, it can forever change the brain’s synapses and create neural binding, a process that
can only be ameliorated by inhibiting those connections by alternative language. Thus,
says Lakoff (2008), we cannot “freely choose not to think certain thoughts when certain
words are used and when [our] brain is tuned to active those thoughts.” And so rhetoric
as used by these presidents, and especially by Bush (who used more of it), potentially
undermines the very freedom they say they are fighting for (19).
Both presidents spoke in antithetical language to define the need for war and to
define the players, but Johnson was much less strident than Bush, whose words were
stark in their contrast. For Bush, there were no grays, just a world of black and white, of
good versus evil. This antithetical difference extended to their predictive definitions, with
Bush producing language more laden with fear, to the point where his enemy was
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supposedly desirous to kill off all Jews, Christians and Americans and to unleash a
nuclear mushroom cloud. We are reminded by Edwards and Wayne (2003) that during a
crisis presidents evoke strong emotions in their rhetoric, use simple language and present
a case of good versus evil. For Bush, it seemed easier to personify America and
dehumanize the enemy, as Wander (1984) discusses, even resorting to the images of
savagery that Ivie (1980) has observed in presidential war rhetoric. And Bostdorff’s
(1994) study rings true in its conclusion that antithetical appeals characterizing the enemy
as both evil and threatening rule out appeasement, increase the chances the innocent will
suffer and allow blame for the bloodshed to be placed upon others. Antithetical language
narrows policy options. And, as Holsti and Fagen (1967) point out, painting the enemy as
evil allows a nation to be self-righteous and to justify any means used to win, thus
enhancing the tendency to use religious arguments and language. Antithetical language
also tends to portray a people as a monolithic bloc, as Bostdorff notes (1994), thus
reducing individualism (and again, freedom).
Indeed, when Tatalovich and Daynes say that “public policy is often a reaction to
the perceived scope of the problem and/or the salience of the issue” (in Haider-Markel
and O’Brien 1997, 553), we can add that such scope and salience can be enhanced by the
use of antithetical language, symbols and causal stories.
For Johnson, however, it was more difficult to find a convincing rationale for
escalating the war he inherited, as the traditional moral arguments used by previous
presidents seemed inappropriate and ineffective (Turner 1985; Vaughn 1985). This is
largely because, as Turner says, the national press “gravitated from an initial position of
essential disinterest concerning Vietnam to one that was in large measure actively hostile
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to presidential policy (5). Moreover, Johnson “tried to walk a line between those on the
Right who wanted more forceful military action and those on the Left who wanted the
United States to withdraw” (Vaughn 1985, 617).
Johnson’s language, while patriotic, was not full of the bravado and confidence
seen with Bush. He was less emotive, less metaphorical, less co-opting and less religious
in tone than Bush, while at times surprising us with his scriptural knowledge. Bush was
highly emotive in his choices of words, drawing liberally on metaphor. He had a wider
definition of those whom he co-opted into his cause (his coalition) and was more personal
in his religious language. Both drew upon Manifest Destiny themes and quoted or alluded
to Scripture, but Bush used religious language more liberally, more personally and less
formally. Unlike Johnson, Bush had had a personal religious experience, and it showed.
Bush’s religious language was Armageddon-like, weaving in fundamentalist, neoconservative philosophy in a way that spoke to his base, to the general American public
and to the world at the same time. In this, he was quite masterful.
Both spoke in language that could pre-empt dissent, but Bush had the advantage
of the unprecedented 9/11 attacks and the American desire for revenge, unlike Johnson.
And thus Bush’s pre-war language brooked no dissent, even though some dissent arose
after the enemy changed from the terrorists to Saddam Hussein and Iraq. In contrast,
Johnson continued to explain why we were in Vietnam and pointed out he did not get us
there. Nevertheless, as Bostdorff (1994) points out, once a president defines a problem as
a crisis, opposition to his definition is difficult, leaving the opposition to attack the
president’s definition before they attack the policy, yet reluctant to criticize the
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commander-in-chief for fear of being disunified or unpatriotic in the face of danger to the
country.
We have seen in this study how presidents used war rhetoric to talk about their
duties and responsibilities, especially as commander-in-chief, in the same way that
Bostdorff says presidents do in foreign crises when they refer to their office, their title
and their responsibilities to legitimize their policy definitions. Indeed, it was out of this
emphasis that the grounded theory category Job of Presidents grew. But, as Bostdorff
notes, such references also function as authoritative appeals to forestall questions and
criticism, as presidents argue that they alone have the necessary expertise and power to
make the right decisions and urge citizens to defer to them. Such uses of “we,” “nation”
and “America” help citizens identify with the president and encourage group conformity,
she says. They discourage dissent, especially when presidents invoke national myths.
And indeed, especially in the early stages of a crisis, opposition to the president and his
office can be viewed as traitorous. This is much more so when that crisis is a war
(Bostdorff 1994). Baum and Potter (2008) add that “typically, public attention to foreign
policy … is very low, resulting in an equilibrium favorable to leaders[,]” … especially …
in the early stages of a military conflict” (43). The authors call this a “well-documented,”
“short-term” “rally round the flag” effect that “favors leaders” (Baum and Potter 2008,
43).
Perhaps linked to this crisis aspect, we see differences in confidence experienced
by these two presidents, who are studied in somewhat different stages of their respective
wars. Johnson, engaged in pre-escalation and not pre-war, worries over his war and his
“boys,” shows signs of wrestling with his presidency and speaks more about other
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presidents. A pre-war Bush, on the other hand, seems entirely comfortable in his role as
commander-in-chief and never questions the reasons for a pre-emptive assault. He speaks
rarely about other presidents.
The use of more inherently religious terms by Bush is in keeping with Bostdorff’s
(1994) study of presidential crisis rhetoric showing that presidents can deflect dissent by
infusing military intervention with moral and even sacred purpose, reinforcing American
myths of mission and Manifest Destiny. Wars can too easily become the defense of moral
ideals. This is also in keeping with social regulatory policy, which Lowi observes is
“more ideological, more moral, more directly derived from fundamental values, more
intense, less utilitarian, more polarized and less prone to compromise (in Tatalovich and
Daynes 2005, xiii). Tatalovich and Daynes (1998) say social policy also exercises legal
authority to modify or replace moral values and norms with new standards. With Bush,
the treatment of social regulatory policy not only took the form of more moralistic
rhetoric, but also the controversial use of pre-emptive war against a perceived threat. And
in this we are reminded that, as Risse (1999) points out, political rhetoric tends to
emphasize the “moral rightness of the norms underlying arguments” as part of its validity
claims (5). Wei (2000) reminds us political rhetoric is “both an expression of emotion
and an appeal to others to become emotionally involved,” with emphasis on patriotism as
a way to encourage uncritical acceptance of a problem definition (96). It is also a means
to engage in unreflective policy making (Ivie 2007). The latter worked particularly well
for Bush, who Ivie (2007) says “spoke to a Christian America in the language of a
Christian man crusading for a righteous cause by declaring an unrestricted war on evil
(223). Bush’s post 9/11 world was “governed by theistic essence, “filled with heroes and
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villains, divided by good and evil, and given purpose by God’s will, which was to be
fulfilled by people of faith and character opposed to evil” (Ivie 2007, 223-4). For Bush,
this provided “providential certainty,” which “supplanted critical thought” (Ivie 2007,
223-4). And thus people questioned Bush’s war less, at least at the beginning. As
presidents’ rhetorical styles reflect their leadership personality, according to Hart (1984),
we are reminded that those who prize reason appeal to logic and rationality (more in line
with Johnson), while those who value morality appeal to faith and scriptural ideas (more
in line with Bush).
Johnson’s “soft religiosity,” as Balmer (2008, 49-50) calls it, was no match for the
linguistic talents of Bush in this regard. And this may have been why he was perceived to
have less moral leadership in his war because “bloody military interventions apparently
become more palatable to citizens, even heroic, when presidents can successfully imbue
them with moral purpose” (Bostdorff 1994, 210) and even apocalyptic imagery, and
when they so tightly control the policy environment by releasing only minimal amounts
of empirical information, even disallowing television coverage of the returning caskets of
soldiers, as Bush did. When presidents attribute morality to a nation by claiming it is
chosen by God, and assume the cloak of priest-in-chief, they have wide latitude to define
problems and address them as they see fit, under the guise of bringing the blessings of
such inheritance to the world. They are, as Blanchard (1978) puts it, free from all
restraint.
Such a worldview is difficult to contradict, and may be offensive to others. Thus,
Shogan (2002) is right to argue that “moral and religious rhetoric should not be viewed
simply as a reflection of presidential character or as a fulfillment of American ‘civil
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religion,’ but as a strategic tool to enhance independent power and authority” (iii). So we
can assume that presidents who engage heavily in this moral and religious rhetoric are
actually seeking more power and do not want their authority on policies questioned. This
especially seems the case with Bush and his war policies.
What is more, this “rhetoric of virtue,” as Sicherman (2007) calls it, allows
presidents to vaguely appeal to people across faiths, especially because the American
civil religion of exceptionalism and universalism does not export well outside the United
States. It may initially be useful for coalition building, but it can also be divisive,
demonize the opposition and define who is considered a “real American” (Lawton 2003).
Internally, it appeals to the myth of Manifest Destiny, a sanctioning of action by God and
history that unites and justifies any “rightly guided action,” (Rhys and Alexander 1994,
4), as defined here by the president, who functions as a type of priest, especially in trying
times (Lawton 2003). Indeed, Slotkin (1973) reminds us that Americans historically have
seen violence as a means of regeneration.
Schneider and Ingram’s (1990) reminder that public policy almost always
attempts to get people to do what they would not otherwise have done holds particularly
true for war. That is why, according to these authors, people are more likely to take
action to support policy goals if they are promoted by government officials as important
and high priority, consistent with their values, beliefs and preferences, and supported by
positive symbols and images that emphasize the positive parts of the policy and minimize
the negative parts.
In making the case for war, these two presidents’ causal stories bear a basic
similarity. And here we hark back to Stone (1989), the preeminent scholar of causality in
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problem definition. Stone calls the causal story the essence of successful problem
definition in that it outlines the harm done, stipulates who or what is to blame and labels
who has responsibility for the remedy in a way designed to win over the most people.
This is part of what Hoekstra (1999) calls a president’s “sustaining narrative.”
In this study, each president painted a picture of America as an inherently good
nation, an example to others, called by God to right wrongs and point the way to peace
and prosperity. They spoke of a nation with good intentions, peaceful by nature, not
aggressive unless provoked, and reluctant to engage in hostility. They portrayed the
United States as all-powerful and as a leader of world democracies.
In contrast, they framed the enemy as bad, less civilized and less organized. Its
attacks were unprovoked and unjust. Moreover, the enemy treats its own people unjustly.
And it is desirous of power. Its victims are pathetic and want help.
It is the role of America as the world leader of freedom to quench the enemy and
free the victims. War, or continuation of war, is the only answer. America goes to war
with the full support of a broad coalition, at home and abroad, according to these
presidents. As president and commander-in-chief, they ask us to trust them because they
alone have the knowledge and vision to know what is needed. Our job as citizens is to
support the war and not question our leaders.
While both presidents played out a version of this, Bush’s version was more
audacious than Johnson’s, to the point of bordering on caricature. To Bush, America was
purely good, while the enemy was purely evil and even inhuman. His victims were
profoundly tortured, especially the women and children, and were highly desirous of
freedom, American-style. His coalition was multi-faceted, large and wholly on board.
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War was not only the only answer, but it was a holy calling. As president, he alone had
all the answers. The job of citizens was to unquestioningly support America, the war and
him as their unflinching president and extremely confident commander-in-chief.
As Gardner (1995) tells us, good leaders tell dynamic unfolding stories “about
themselves and their groups, about where they were coming from and where they were
headed, about what was to be feared, struggled against and dreamed about.” These
leaders are the “principal characters or heroes” in their own stories (14). And we see this
in the case of presidents talking us into war, but in Bush more so.
As Bostdorff (1994) tells us, presidents in foreign crisis mode construct a story
wherein the United States is described as passive, desirous of peace and the welfare of
others, retaliatory only as a last resort when attacked, to preserve both itself and other
nations of goodwill. This narrative has the United States fully capable and determined to
defend itself, with the crises presented as a test of national will, and with emphasis on the
American character rather than the consequences of war. The United States is the victim,
and the enemy is responsible for the crisis. The enemy is defined as diabolical. This
narrative seeks to rally unity and support, while also deflecting responsibility for the U.S.
contribution to the crisis. Finally, presidents ask to be evaluated in terms of progress that
they alone define. Their inflated rhetoric expands their power in foreign affairs at the
expense of Congress.
And certainly in times of crisis, including war, “followers thirst for leadership,
they are highly suggestible by the ideas forcefully expressed and vividly embodied by a
leader; they have strong emotional attachments to leaders” (Goethals 2005, 557). As
Edwards and Wayne (2003) remind us, leaders also may “frequently invoke the names of
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revered leaders of the past who made difficult decisions on the basis of high principles”
(135). And as leaders begin to feel their will and that of the nation are “isomorphic,” as
Hart (1984) puts it, they believe themselves to be America incarnate, allowing them to
accrue even more power. Successful crisis promotion increases a president’s personal
credibility, supply of public goodwill and symbolic reserve, which he can then bank on
for future use (Bostdorff 1994). Thus, leadership is about persuasion to accept a
president’s definition of the problem and of himself.
In all this, it is worth remembering that one of the three activities of problem
definition is framing the condition as a problem amenable to intervention (Weimer 1993),
that not only is the function of problem definition in political discourse to explain,
describe and recommend, but it is above all to persuade (Rochefort and Cobb 1994). One
way presidents do this is to create condensational symbols that can transcend meaning for
large numbers of people (typical of Bush), rather than referential symbols that rely more
on facts (more typical of Johnson) (Rochefort and Cobb, 1994). These value concerns tap
into images familiar to target populations, given that they are based upon stereotypes
portrayed through symbolic language, metaphors and stories (Schneider and Ingram
1993).
In speaking of problem definition, Rochefort and Cobb (1994) also help us
distinguish between Bush’s style of being more expressive, which they call a defense of
moral values, and Johnson’s style of being more instrumental, or focusing on rational
problem solving. Edwards and Wayne (2003) remind us that, using the power of the bully
pulpit, especially in times of foreign crises, presidents have the power not only to reflect
widely held views, but to intensify them and exploit them. They can, as Page and Shapiro
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(1999) put it, promote misleading, distorted or false information. They can manipulate
symbols to lead and mislead public opinion (Edwards and Wayne 2003). They can create
moral frames, and then fit policy to them (Lakoff 2008). Such frames interact with our
memory to prime certain considerations, raise the priority and weight we give to ideas
already in our consciousness, making them less subject to distortion by journalists and
opponents than do direct persuasion (Edwards and Wayne 2003). These frames draw
upon stereotypes that determine policy agendas and create “us” versus “them” categories
(Schneider and Ingram 1993).
Kay (2003) reminds us that policymakers filter out what they consider
inconvenient language in defining problems. They may intensify their narrative
descriptions by speaking of atrocities if they want to promote war (more typical of Bush),
or they may use more abstract and statistical information if they want to avoid war, or, I
would add, are conflicted about war (more typical of Johnson). Presidents also can create
stereotypical images of perceived enemies that tap into pervasive American narratives
(Doherty 1999, Robin 2001, Whitfield 1996), including what Lakoff (2008) calls the
“deep Rescue narrative” we see so often when presidents define the need for war. In this
rescue narrative, Lakoff (2008) says presidents become skillful manipulators of
metaphor. He cites in particular Bush’s “war on terror” metaphor, calling it carefully
chosen for maximum impact at a time when the nation was vulnerable following a
trauma. Unlike literal wars against nations or insurgents, metaphorical wars can be
endless because there is no military end to an emotional state. As Lakoff (2008) puts it,
the war on terror “was used by the Bush administration as a ploy to get virtually
unlimited war powers – and further domestic influence – for the president … because the
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mention of ‘terror’ activates a fear response, and fear activates a conservative worldview,
in which there is a powerful leader, willing to use his strength, who offers protection and
security” [and rescue] (126). Lakoff (2008) continues,
The war metaphor defined war as the only way to defend the nation. From
within it, being against war as a response was to be unpatriotic, to be
against defending the nation … The war metaphor put progressives on the
defensive. Once it took hold, any refusal to grant the president full
authority to conduct the war would open progressives in Congress to the
charge of being unpatriotic, unwilling to defend America, defeatist –
traitorous. And once the military went to battle, the war metaphor created
a new reality that reinforced itself. The war metaphor allowed the
president to assume war powers, which made him politically immune from
serious criticism and gave him extraordinary domestic power to carry the
agenda to the radical right: Power to shift money and resources away from
social needs to the military and related industries. Power to override
environmental safeguards on the grounds of military need. Power to set up
a domestic surveillance system to spy on our citizens and to intimidate
political enemies. Power over political discussion, since war trumps all
other topics. In short, power to reshape America to the vision of the
radical right – with no end date (126).
Finally, Lakoff (2008) says, Bush used the war on terror metaphor to justify the
invasion of Iraq. But, he notes, it was the chief right-wing language technician, Frank
Luntz, who led the charge to refer to the Iraq War as the main front in the “war on terror”
(126-7). And it was the power of that metaphor, and the concomitant extension to the
word “terrorist,” that, through repetition following trauma, evoked a permanent change in
the synapses of people’s brains so that it became used reflexively, not reflectively. In
other words, such presidential words caused physical change in Americans that reduced
their ability to reason. 59
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“The basis of Lakoff’s theory is simple: The mind is the brain. Any connection that forms between your
thoughts also forms between your neurons. As you internalize a metaphor, a circuit in your brain
‘physically constitutes the metaphor.’ This parallel development continues as mental complexity increases.
‘Narratives are brain structures,’ he proposes” (Saletan 2008). Lakoff’s work is a theoretical merging of the
principles of cognitive linguistics and neuroscience more in line with communications theory, rather than a
scientific testing.
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The framers of the Constitution feared direct or pure democracy, typified by,
among other factors, popular rhetoric on a mass scale. This they thought would
undermine the rational and enlightened self-interests of citizens (Cronin 1982). While this
may no longer be a concern, perhaps it should be, especially when citizens and others
repeatedly are subjected to highly emotive, religious, metaphorical, antithetical
presidential war rhetoric.
The power of such language in the hands of a president, as part of crisis
promotion, gives cause for worry about what Bostdorff (1994) calls an imperial
presidency: “Presidents have used foreign crises to accrue more power and, in turn, have
relied on public and congressional acceptance of power usurpation to promote more
crises” (2). Like Bush, these presidents “involve the nation in military intervention in
other countries almost at will” (Bostdorff 1994, 2). They use “their discourse about
foreign crises to … [allow] them to expand their powers and to enhance their political
standing” (Bostdorff 1994, 207). This “relationship between power and discourse appears
to be symbiotic,” Bostdorff (1994, 234) concludes.
What happens to democracy when presidents employ such powerful language to
talk us into war? Where is there room for dissent? What happens to reasoned debate?
What does it mean for world relations?
This is the power of presidential language – to not only talk us into war but also to
quash dissent, greatly enhance executive power, reduce reasoned thought, quell
individualism and suppress the very freedom presidents claim they want to preserve.
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